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Zusammenfassung
Privatheit und Verifizierbarkeit entsprechen fundamentalen Prinzipien demokrati-
scher Wahlen und geho¨ren deshalb zu den Sicherheitsanforderungen, die jedes elek-
tronische Wahlsystem erfu¨llen muss. Dennoch existieren sehr unterschiedliche Ideen
und Auffassungen von Privatheit und Verifizierbarkeit innerhalb der Wissenschafts-
gemeinde. Obwohl die gewu¨nschten Eigenschaften eines Wahlprotokolls außerdem
getrennt vom jeweiligen Angreifermodell betrachtet werden sollten, beinhalten die
Sicherheitsanforderungen der Quittungsfreiheit und Unzwingbarkeit, die in engem
Bezug zur Privatheit stehen, implizite Annahmen hinsichtlich bestimmter Angreifer-
ma¨chtigkeiten, was die Analyse von Wahlprotokollen zusa¨tzlich erschwert.
Der erste Teil dieser Arbeit stellt eine Taxonomie fu¨r Privatheit und Verifizier-
barkeit bei elektronischen Wahlen vor. Wir stellen mo¨gliche Stufen dieser beiden
Anforderungen zusammen und untersuchen die Zusammenha¨nge zwischen Privatheit
und Verifizierbarkeit. Dazu fu¨hren wir ein Begriffsmodell ein, welches beide Eigen-
schaften erfasst. Wir erstellen außerdem eine Liste mo¨glicher Angreiferma¨chtigkei-
ten, die als Basis fu¨r ein individuelles Angreifermodell dienen ko¨nnen.
Die Taxonomie tra¨gt zu einem tieferen Versta¨ndnis von Privatheit und Verifizier-
barkeit und dem Zusammenhang zwischen diesen beiden Eigenschaften bei. Wir
zeigen, dass die Taxonomie zur Sicherheitsanalyse von Wahlprotokollen verwen-
det werden kann, indem die erreichte Stufe an Privatheit und Verifizierbarkeit in
Abha¨ngigkeit von den zugrunde gelegten Angreiferma¨chtigkeiten bestimmt wird.
Die Taxonomie erlaubt es außerdem, ada¨quate Stufen dieser beiden Sicherheitsan-
forderungen fu¨r verschiedene Wahlszenarien auszuwa¨hlen und ein angemessenes An-
greifermodell festzulegen.
Der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit betrachtet langfristige Aspekte der Verifizierbarkeit
bei Internetwahlen. Aufgrund einer mo¨glichen Wahlanfechtung muss die Recht-
ma¨ßigkeit jeder gesetzlich bindenden Wahl auch nach Jahren beweisbar sein. Dazu
mu¨ssen bestimmte Wahldokumente, wie zum Beispiel die Stimmzettel, aufbewahrt
werden. Die Wahlunterlagen werden u¨blicherweise fu¨r die Dauer der Amtszeit des
gewa¨hlten Organs archiviert. Bei laufenden Wahlpru¨fungsverfahren kann die not-
wendige Aufbewahrungsdauer jedoch ausgedehnt werden. Aufbewahrungspflichten
gelten nicht nur fu¨r gewo¨hnliche papierbasierte Wahlen, sondern auch fu¨r Inter-
netwahlen. Im Gegensatz zu Papierwahlen existieren fu¨r Internetwahlen jedoch
keinerlei Bestimmungen oder Richtlinien hinsichtlich der Aufbewahrung elektroni-
scher Wahldokumente. Insbesondere ist offen, welche Daten hierbei u¨berhaupt zu
archivieren sind.
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Im zweiten Teil dieser Arbeit werden die Wahldokumente identifiziert, welche
bei einer Internetwahl aufbewahrt werden mu¨ssen, um den korrekten Ablauf der
Wahl nachweisen zu ko¨nnen. Ausgehend von gesetzlichen Bestimmungen fu¨r Bun-
destagswahlen leiten wir Anforderungen hinsichtlich der Aufbewahrung von Inter-
netwahldaten ab und machen konkrete Vorschla¨ge fu¨r die Umsetzung dieser An-
forderungen.
Die Einfu¨hrung von Internetwahlen auf parlamentarischer Ebene setzt voraus, dass
ihre technische Umsetzung gesetzliche Anforderungen erfu¨llt, zu denen auch eine
beweiskra¨ftige Aufbewahrung von Wahldaten geho¨rt. Unsere Arbeit tra¨gt daher
dazu bei, Internetwahlen als zusa¨tzliche Option bei Bundestagswahlen zu etablieren,
und kann gesetzgebende Organe darin unterstu¨tzen, eine entsprechende gesetzliche
Basis zu schaffen. Weiterhin ist diese Arbeit bei der Entwicklung gesetzeskonformer
Wahlsysteme von Wert, da die Notwendigkeit der Aufbewahrung bereits beim Ent-
wurf von Wahlprotokollen beru¨cksichtigt werden sollte.
xii
Abstract
Privacy and verifiability refer to fundamental principles of democratic elections and
therefore belong to the set of established security requirements which each electronic
voting scheme is expected to meet. However, very different ideas and opinions about
privacy and verifiability exist in the scientific community, which shows that both
properties are not well understood yet. Moreover, although the desired properties
(captured by the security requirements) should be separated from the assumed adver-
sary model (expressed by adversary capabilities), specific adversary capabilities are
inherently assumed for the privacy-related security requirements of receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance, which complicates the analysis of voting schemes.
The first part of this thesis presents a taxonomy for privacy and verifiability in
electronic voting. We compile the conceivable levels of privacy and verifiability and
investigate the relation between both properties. To this end, we introduce a concep-
tual model capturing both privacy and verifiability. We also provide a comprehensive
adversary model for electronic voting by considering different adversary capabilities.
The conceptual model, the levels of privacy and verifiability, and the adversary capa-
bilities together form our taxonomy for privacy and verifiability in electronic voting.
The presented taxonomy provides a deeper understanding of privacy and verifia-
bility and their correlation in electronic voting. We show how the taxonomy can be
used to analyze the security of voting schemes by identifying the level of privacy and
verifiability provided depending on the adversary capabilities assumed. Moreover,
the taxonomy allows to select appropriate levels of the requirements for different
types of elections, and to determine reasonable adversary models for individual elec-
tion scenarios.
The second part of this thesis considers long-term aspects of verifiability in remote
electronic voting. The lawfulness of any legally binding election must be provable
for several years due to possible scrutiny proceedings. Therefore, specific documents
such as the ballots must be retained. The election records are usually retained for
the legislative period of the elected body; however, this period may be extended if
scrutiny procedures are pending. Retention obligations apply not only to conven-
tional paper-based elections, but also to remote electronic voting. But contrary to
the case of paper-based elections, general regulations or guidelines on retention of re-
mote electronic election data have not been issued so far. In particular, the question
which records should be retained is yet unanswered.
The second part of this thesis sets out to identify the election records that have to
be retained in order to prove the proper conduct of a remote electronic election. We
derive retention requirements for online elections from legal regulations which apply
xiii
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to Federal Elections for the German Bundestag, and we make recommendations on
how to meet these requirements.
Establishing Internet voting in parliamentary elections presupposes that its tech-
nical implementation meets certain legal requirements, and conclusive retention of
election data is one of them. Thus, our work contributes to establishing online vot-
ing as an additional voting channel in parliamentary elections in Germany. It may
support legislative organs when issuing a legal framework on remote electronic vot-
ing. Moreover, our work is valuable for developing legally compliant voting systems
as the need for record keeping should be considered already when designing and
implementing a remote electronic voting scheme.
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1. Introduction
A fundamental principle of democratic elections is voter privacy, also known as se-
crecy of the vote. It requires that only the voter knows his voting decision and
nobody else is able to gain information about it. Moreover, voter privacy is a pre-
condition for expressing one’s preference freely and without coercion. Therefore,
privacy is not only an option which the voter is being offered—it must be enforced.
In the controlled environment of a polling station, this is established by requiring the
voters to fill in their ballot paper at tables equipped with privacy shields. For remote
electronic voting in uncontrolled environments, the privacy-related requirements of
receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are usually imposed on the voting scheme.
This shall prevent the voter from selling his vote, and protect him from being forced
to abstain from voting or to vote in a specific way.
Transparency is another fundamental principle of democratic elections. Due to
the public nature of democratic elections, all of their essential steps are subject to
the possibility of public scrutiny. In conventional paper-based elections taking place
at polling stations, transparency is established by allowing the interested public to
be present during polling and tallying. As this kind of physical observation is not
achievable for electronic elections, transparency is established by means of verifiabil-
ity, which comes in two forms: while individual verifiability allows each voter to be
assured that his vote was properly taken into account, universal verifiability gives
anyone the possibility to verify the correct processing and tallying of the votes.
Although privacy and verifiability play a major role in electronic voting, we will
see that both properties are not well understood yet. Therefore, this thesis sets out
to explore privacy and verifiability in electronic voting.
Chapter overview
We motivate our work in Section 1.1. In Section 1.2 we formulate our research
questions and outline the methodology used to answer them. Our contribution is
presented in Section 1.3. An outline of this thesis and instructions for reading are
given in Section 1.4. As this thesis consists of two independent parts, each of the
Sections 1.1 to 1.4 is divided in two parts accordingly.
1
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Part I: A Taxonomy for Privacy and Verifiability in Electronic Voting
A plethora of remote electronic voting protocols has been proposed in the past (for
a survey see [LGT+03, SP06]), and a number of promising electronic voting schemes
for use in polling stations has also been developed, for example [BMQR07, CCC+08,
CRS05, Nef04]. There is one thing they all have in common: each voting scheme is
expected to meet the security requirements which have been established for electronic
voting (definitions can be found for example in [BM03, Cet07, Hir01, Rie98, Smi05]).
However, very different ideas and opinions about these requirements exist in the e-
voting community, and the definitions are often vague and imprecise [Pie08]. This
applies in particular to privacy and verifiability as these are the most complex secu-
rity requirements. We cite two examples:
1. Universal verifiability is usually seen as the chance for any observer to check
that the tally has been correctly computed from the votes that were cast.
Some authors postulate that universal verifiability comprises checking that the
tallied votes were cast by legitimate voters only [CMFP+06, JdV06, Smi05],
while others do not require this [DKR09, Hir01, MN06].
2. Privacy in electronic voting is usually understood as the unlinkability of voter
and vote. But what exactly does this mean? That it must not be possible to
establish a link between the voter’s name and his plaintext vote—or even his
encrypted vote? And what if an attacker can reveal the link, but cannot prove
it to third parties?
This shows that privacy and verifiability comprise many different levels at which
they can be met. Consequently, voting schemes that claim to meet these security
requirements may in fact meet different levels of privacy and verifiability. As long
as these levels are not considered, the security of different voting protocols cannot
be assessed and compared in a meaningful way.
While the security requirements capture the properties which the voting scheme
should exhibit, the adversary model considers attackers seeking to compromise these
properties [BBG07]. In light of security engineering, the desired properties should
be separated from the assumed adversary capabilities. However, assumptions re-
garding adversary capabilities are inherent for example in the security requirements
of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. Thus, the security requirements and the
adversary models are not clearly separated at present, which complicates the analysis
of voting schemes.
The goal of Part I is to establish a taxonomy for privacy and verifiability in elec-
tronic voting. Besides the fact that these requirements and their correlations are not
well understood, the motivation for such a taxonomy is twofold: on the one hand,
it may not be necessary for each election, or even possible in general, to achieve
the maximum level for both requirements at the same time. On the other hand, in
view of practicability, it may not be appropriate for every type of election to assume
2
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an all-powerful adversary who is able to control the communication channels, inject
illegal votes, and corrupt voters as well as election authorities, i.e. a more fine-tuned
adversary model for specific use cases would be appropriate.
Part II: Long-Term Verifiability: Legal Issues and Technical Implications
The lawfulness of any legally binding election must be verifiable within a specific
period of time after the election has been carried out. To this end, specific documents
such as the ballots or the voters’ register must be retained. These records allow for
later review in case the election is challenged. Usually, the election documents are
retained for the legislative period of the elected body. In Germany, this period ranges
from two years for associations [Ges04] to six years for elections for the governing
boards of social security institutions (see § 58 (2) of the German Social Security
Code IV). However, this period may be extended if scrutiny procedures are pending.
Thus, it is realistic to assume that election data must be retained for up to ten years.
Retention obligations apply not only to conventional paper-based elections, but
also to electronic voting. But contrary to the case of paper-based elections, gen-
eral legal regulations on keeping electronic election records have not been issued so
far. Although plenty of research has been conducted into long-term preservation in
general, long-term verifiability in electronic voting has not been studied thoroughly
before, and there are no according specifications or guidelines. In particular, the
question which records should be retained is yet unanswered. A naive approach
would be to simply retain any data occurring during the election. This falls short
for several reasons:
1. The data generated by the voting protocol may be insufficient or inappropriate
to meet applicable legal requirements.
2. The principle of data minimization must be considered: personal data must
only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.
3. Voter privacy may be compromised if specific records are combined which,
though, may not be a threat to privacy individually.
A one-to-one mapping from documenting a paper-based election at the polling sta-
tion to keeping records of an electronic election is not possible due to their differing
implementations. Thus, other ways of determining the according records in an elec-
tronic election must be found. Once these records have been identified, established
methods for secure long-term retention can be applied.
The goal of Part II is to derive specifications regarding secure retention of electronic
election data from existing electoral laws on paper-based elections. This comprises
– identifying the election records which should be retained, and
– making recommendations how to achieve secure and conclusive retention of the
records.
3
1. Introduction
In this part of the thesis we do not consider electronic voting machines since these
are used in polling stations and, thus, are more close to classical paper-based voting.
We rather focus on remote electronic voting as the underlying problem is more
challenging and, therefore, more interesting in this case.
1.2. Research questions and methodology
Part I: A Taxonomy for Privacy and Verifiability in Electronic Voting
The first part of this thesis aims at answering the following research question:
Which levels of privacy and verifiability are conceivable in electronic vot-
ing, and how are both properties related?
To answer this question, we approach the issue from two sides:
– we review existing literature (for example [BM03, Cet07, DKR09, Hir01, JCJ05,
JdV06, KT09, Rie98, Smi05]) with regard to definitions of privacy and verifi-
ability, and
– we consider existing works that have evaluated or compared voting protocols
[Cet07, LGT+03, SP06]; in particular, we focus on different ratings of the same
protocol, since this indicates differing perceptions of privacy or verifiability,
respectively.
Both approaches are addressed in Chapter 3.
Part II: Long-Term Verifiability: Legal Issues and Technical Implications
The second part of this thesis aims at answering the following research question:
Which records of a remote electronic election should be retained, and
which protective measures should be applied?
The approach used to answer this question is referred to as KORA (“Konkretisierung
rechtlicher Anforderungen”, Implementation of Legal Requirements, see [HPR92]).
KORA is an approved method to bridge the gap between law and technology by
translating abstract legal norms into concrete technical measures, and can be used
whenever a certain technology has to be (re)designed such that it complies with
law. In a four-stage process, legal requirements are substantiated into technical
implementation proposals:
1. Legal requirements. Starting from constitutional law and its specifications in
simple statute law, legal requirements are identified.
2. Legal criteria. Next, legal criteria for the evaluation and the design of information
technology systems are derived from the legal requirements.
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3. Implementation requirements. Technical implementation requirements are de-
termined, referring to the legal criteria established at stage 2.
4. Implementation proposals. Finally, technical implementation proposals are made,
taking into account the implementation requirements which have been identi-
fied at stage 3.
KORA is explained more thoroughly in Chapter 7.
1.3. Contribution
Part I: A Taxonomy for Privacy and Verifiability in Electronic Voting
The first part of this thesis provides a taxonomy on privacy and verifiability in
electronic voting. This taxonomy comprises three components:
1. a conceptual model considering both privacy and verifiability,
2. a compilation of the different levels which are conceivable for privacy and ver-
ifiability, and
3. a comprehensive set of different adversary capabilities.
The first component provides a deeper understanding of privacy and verifiability and
their correlation in electronic voting. The second component demonstrates the scope
of privacy and verifiability in voting, and allows to select appropriate levels of the re-
quirements for different types of elections. The third component allows to determine
reasonable adversary models for individual election scenarios. For example, parlia-
mentary elections could require voter privacy to hold forever [Wil02], while it is not
necessary for elections in associations to require privacy in such strictness. Similarly,
for parliamentary elections a more powerful adversary should be assumed than for
elections in associations. The taxonomy can also be used for analyzing the security
of voting schemes, i.e. the level of privacy and verifiability provided depending on
the adversary capabilities assumed.
Part II: Long-Term Verifiability: Legal Issues and Technical Implications
The second part of this thesis points out the importance of appropriate record keeping
for secure electronic voting. The main contributions are the following:
– we identify the election records that should be retained in order to document
the proper conduct of the online election, and
– we give concrete recommendations on how to implement secure and conclusive
retention of electronic election data.
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1. Introduction
Secure and conclusive retention of election data is a precondition for introducing
remote electronic voting as an additional voting channel in Federal Elections for
the German Bundestag. Thus, our work contributes to establishing legally binding
online elections on a parliamentary level in Germany. It may support legislative
organs when issuing a legal framework on remote electronic voting. Moreover, it
is valuable for developing legally compliant voting systems as the need for record
keeping has to be considered already when designing and implementing a remote
electronic voting protocol.
1.4. Outline and instructions for reading
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce the security require-
ments for electronic voting and provide an overview of the cryptographic primitives
used to support privacy and verifiability in electronic voting schemes. The remainder
of this thesis is divided in two parts:
Part I: A Taxonomy for Privacy and Verifiability in Electronic Voting
In Chapter 3 we review existing literature on definitions of privacy and verifiability
and consider related work. In Chapter 4 we compile the conceivable levels of privacy
and verifiability in voting and investigate the relation between both properties. To
this end, we introduce a conceptual model capturing both privacy and verifiability.
Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive adversary model for electronic voting by con-
sidering different adversary capabilities. In Chapter 6 we analyze the security of
state-of-the-art voting schemes in light of the taxonomy established in Chapters 4
and 5.
Part II: Long-Term Verifiability: Legal Issues and Technical Implications
Chapter 7 provides an introduction to long-term retention of election data and
presents related work. In Chapter 8, retention requirements for online elections
are derived from legal retention obligations for paper-based elections. Chapter 9
proposes how to implement secure and conclusive retention of electronic election
data by deriving implementation requirements from legal requirements. The results
of Chapter 8 and 9 are applied to a state-of-the-art voting protocol in Chapter 10.
Chapter 11 concludes the thesis at hand by providing a summary of both Parts I
and II and considering future work.
In this thesis, the expressions “remote electronic voting” and “online voting” are
used synonymously, referring to voting in uncontrolled environments using the In-
ternet. References listed in the bibliography are referred to by alphanumeric labels
containing the authors’ initials and the year of publication (for example [KOV07]),
while publications of the author of this thesis (see page vii) are referred to by num-
bers (for example [1]). Legal texts are frequently referred to especially in the second
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part of this thesis. As usual in such cases, laws and regulations are not listed in
the bibliography, but rather referred to by their official German abbreviations (see
page 129). We refer to the respective version as amended, which can be found in the
Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt1). We provide references to English trans-
lations of the respective texts if available. Note, however, that the English version
may be outdated, and that only the version published in the Federal Law Gazette is
official.
1Available at http://www.bgbl.de/.
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This chapter lays the foundations for the following considerations by introducing the
security requirements for electronic voting and explaining the cryptographic prim-
itives which are usually employed to meet these requirements. Implementation re-
quirements such as scalability or usability are not considered here (see for example
[LGT+03, SP06]).
Chapter overview
This chapter briefly introduces the security requirements for electronic voting in
Section 2.1 and provides an overview over the common cryptographic primitives
used in electronic voting schemes in Section 2.2.
2.1. Security requirements
An approved set of security requirements for electronic voting schemes has been es-
tablished to date. In the following we give common definitions of these requirements
(see for example [Rie98, Hir01, BM03, Smi05, Cet07, Pas07]) in order to introduce
them to the reader prior to considering specific requirements more thoroughly in the
following chapters.
2.1.1. Accuracy
Accuracy (also referred to as “correctness” [Pie08] or “integrity” [Rya08]) is the
primary goal of any voting system. It comprises the following subrequirements
[LGT+03, Jon09]:
soundness: all counted votes are valid
completeness: all valid votes are counted
inalterability: any cast vote cannot be altered
According to [LK02, Pas07], inalterability is already included in the notion of com-
pleteness which then requires that all valid votes are counted correctly. The term
“valid” means that the vote is not spoilt; however, some authors also associate the
fact that the vote was legitimately cast with the notion of accuracy [Cet07, Rya08].
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2.1.2. Democracy
Democracy is also referred to as “authenticity” [Pie08] and comprises two subre-
quirements according to [Rie98, BM03, JdV06]:
eligibility: only eligible voters can vote
uniqueness: each eligible voter casts at most one vote that counts
The first subrequirement is referred to as “eligibility” in [Hir01, LK02, LGT+03,
Jon09], whereas [SP06, DKR09] use this expression for both subrequirements (and
thus synonymously with our definition of democracy). The second subrequirement
is referred to as unreusability in [LK02, LGT+03] and named “no double-voting” in
[Hir01].
2.1.3. Fairness
Fairness requires that all votes remain secret until the voting phase ends as vot-
ers must not be influenced by intermediate results [Rie98, LGT+03, SP06, Cet07,
DKR09].
2.1.4. Privacy
Privacy is also known as “secrecy” [Hir01] and requires that no one can tell how
a voter voted. This requirement is rarely also referred to as “anonymity” [Rie98],
whereas Hirt [Hir01] understands anonymity as the infeasibility of determining whether
or not a particular voter has participated in the election. We consider the various
existing definitions of privacy more thoroughly in Section 3.1.
2.1.5. Receipt-freeness
The notion of receipt-freeness was introduced in [BT94]. It requires that no voter
can prove his vote to an adversary by showing a receipt, even if he wants to do so.
This requirement shows that privacy is not a mere option for the voter but rather
must be enforced. We consider receipt-freeness more thoroughly in Section 3.1.
2.1.6. Coercion-resistance
Coercion-resistance (also referred to as “uncoercibility” [Rie98] or “incoercibility”
[Hir01]) requires that no voter can be coerced to vote in a specific way. It has
been introduced by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson [JCJ05] as an amplification of
receipt-freeness. According to [JCJ05], a voting scheme is coercion-resistant if it is
receipt-free and not susceptible to the following attacks:
randomization: the voter is forced to cast a vote for a random candidate
forced-abstention: the voter is forced to abstain from voting
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simulation: the voter is forced to disclose his private keying material
We consider coercion-resistance more thoroughly in Section 3.1.
2.1.7. Verifiability
Verifiability is required for electronic voting schemes in order to assure the partici-
pants that the election has been performed correctly. This requirement comes in two
different forms:
individual verifiability: each voter can verify that his (valid) vote was counted
universal verifiability: anyone can verify that all valid votes have been counted
Universal verifiability is also referred to as “auditability” [Sch00]. We consider ver-
ifiability and related concepts such as cast-as-intended or counted-as-cast [KSW05]
more thoroughly in Section 3.2.
2.2. Cryptographic primitives
In the following we briefly describe the cryptographic primitives which are usually
employed to meet the security requirements for electronic voting.
2.2.1. ElGamal cryptosystem
The ElGamal encryption scheme is a probabilistic public-key cryptosystem named
after its inventor Taher ElGamal [Gam84]. Its security relies on the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption, which implies the hardness of computing discrete loga-
rithms [DH76].
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order q with generator g. The secret
key x is randomly chosen from Zq, and the corresponding public key is computed as
h = gx. To encrypt a message m ∈ G, pick a random value r ∈ Zq and compute the
ciphertext Er(m) = (c1, c2) = (g
r, hrm) ∈ G × G. To decrypt a ciphertext (c1, c2),
compute c2/c
x
1 = h
rm/grx = m.
ElGamal encryption is semantically secure, provided that the decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem [Bon98] is hard in G. Therefore, G usually is a multiplicative
subgroup of Z∗p of prime order q.
Application to electronic voting. ElGamal encryption is frequently used in elec-
tronic voting schemes due to its homomorphic property (see also Section 2.2.5) and
because it allows reencryption, i.e. changing the ciphertext of a message without
changing the corresponding plaintext (see also Section 2.2.6): suppose we have a
ciphertext Er(m) = (c1, c2) = (g
r, hrm). This ciphertext is reencrypted by choosing
a random s and computing (c1g
s, c2h
s) = (gr+s, hr+sm) = Er+s(m). As c2/c
x
1 still
yields m, reencryption does not affect the decryption process—in fact, reencryption
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equals multiplication by Es(1), i.e. the ElGamal encryption of 1 [Adi06]. Further-
more, reencryption does not require knowledge of the message m or the secret key
x.
2.2.2. Secret sharing
Secret sharing techniques are used to distribute the knowledge of a secret s between
n trustees such that a subset of k trustees must cooperate in order to reconstruct s,
whereas any number of trustees below this threshold cannot learn anything about s.
The method described in the following goes back to Shamir [Sha79]: to share a
secret s ∈ Fp, a random polynomial f ∈ Fp [X] of degree k is picked such that
f(0) = s. Shares si = f(i), i = 1, . . . , n are computed and distributed among the
trustees. s is recovered from k shares with indices S by computing s =
∑
i∈S siλi,S ,
where λi,S =
∏
j∈S\{j}
j
j−i are the Lagrange coefficients.
Application to electronic voting. Secret sharing is mostly used in electronic voting
to distribute the decryption key of an election authority, for example in homomorphic
encryption schemes (see Section 2.2.5). Another application is a reencryption mixnet:
the decryption key is shared in order to achieve robustness [Adi06] (see Section 2.2.6).
2.2.3. Zero-knowledge proofs
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a cryptographic protocol which allows one party
(the prover P) to convince another party (the verifier V) of a certain statement in a
way such that V learns nothing beyond the truth of the statement. A ZKP usually
consists of three rounds:
1. P commits to a certain information
2. V submits a random challenge
3. P responds and V verifies the truth of the claim made by P.
Thus, ZKPs require interaction between P and V. However, interactive ZKPs can
be turned into non-interactive ZKPs by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86],
which replaces the random challenge by the output of a secure hash function.
In the following we briefly explain the ZKPs frequently used in electronic voting
schemes.
ZKP of knowledge of discrete logarithm
P wants to convince V of the fact that he knows the discrete logarithm of a given
value h = gx in a prime-order group G without revealing the value of x (g, h,G are
public). This can be accomplished using the Schnorr protocol [Sch91].
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ZKP of equality of discrete logarithms
P wants to convince V of the fact that two given values h = gx and l = kx in a group
G have the same discrete logarithm x without revealing the value of x (g, h, k, l,G
are public). This can be accomplished using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP92].
ORing ZKPs, I: designated-verifier ZKPs
A ZKP for the statement “A or B” can be established whenever we have a random-
challenge ZKP for each A and B separately [Smi05]. This can be taken advantage
of in the following situation: suppose P wants to issue a designated-verifier proof
[JSI96], i.e. P wants to prove a statement S to V without giving V the chance to reuse
this proof to convince W of S. P can accomplish this by proving the statement “S
is true or I am V” to V. The proof that “I am V” can be a ZKP of knowledge of V’s
secret key, for example. V will be convinced by this proof issued by P. Conversely,
W will not be convinced upon receiving this proof from V.1
ORing ZKPs, II: ZKP of exponential ElGamal encryption of ±1
Suppose we have an ElGamal encryption (c1, c2) = (g
r, hrv±1) of the message v±1
in a prime-order group G (g, h, v,G are public). P wants to prove to V that (c1, c2)
indeed is an ElGamal encryption of either v or v−1 without revealing which of both
is the case and, also, without revealing the value r. This amounts to proving the
equality of the base-g discrete logarithm of c1 and either the base-h discrete logarithm
of c2v or c2v
−1. An according protocol can be found in [CGS97].
Application to electronic voting. Provable exponential ElGamal encryption of ±1
is needed for proving well-formedness of ballots in electronic voting schemes with
homomorphic encryption (see Section 2.2.5).
The non-transferability of designated-verifier ZKPs is important with regard to
receipt-freeness in electronic voting: the voter must not be able to reuse a proof
obtained from an election authority to prove his vote to a vote-buyer or a coercer.
Equality of discrete logarithms is used to prove correct decryption in threshold
ElGamal encryption: the secret key x is divided into n shares x1, . . . , xn which are
distributed among n trustees. Each trustee commits to his share by publishing
his verification key hi = g
xi . To decrypt a ciphertext (c1, c2) = (g
r, hrm), the
trustees broadcast their decryption shares c1,i = c
xi
1
. The trustees with indices X
then implicitly2 reconstruct the secret x according to Section 2.2.2:
∏
i∈X c
λi,X
1,i =
∏
i∈X c
xiλi,X
1
= c
∑
i∈X xiλi,X
1
= cx1 . Dividing c2 by this term then yields the plaintext
m. A ZKP of correct decryption is then given by proving equality of two discrete
1Note that the prover must be certain that his designated-verifier ZKP is transmitted to the
designated verifier over an untappable channel. Otherwise, an eavesdropper could be certain
who authored the proof and thus be convinced by it [Smi05].
2Note that for decrypting the ciphertext it is not necessary to reconstruct the secret s.
13
2. Preliminaries
logarithms (decryption share and verification key): logc1 c1,i = logg hi, which is
equivalent to logc1 c
xi
1
= logg g
xi
ZKPs of equality of discrete logarithms can also be used for plaintext equal-
ity tests: suppose we have two ElGamal encryptions (c1, d1) = (g
r1 , hr1m1) and
(c2, d2) = (g
r2 , hr2m2) and want to prove that they encrypt the same plaintext,
i.e. that m1 = m2. This equals proving that (c1c
−1
2
, d1d
−1
2
) is an ElGamal encryp-
tion of 1. Since d1d
−1
2
= hr1−r2m1m
−1
2
and c1c
−1
2
= gr1−r2 , this amounts to proving
the equality of discrete logarithms.
2.2.4. Blind signatures
A blind signature provides the possibility to have a message signed without revealing
its content. Blind signatures have been proposed by Chaum [Cha82], who used
the following example to illustrate his idea: a paper document is covered with a
sheet of carbon paper and put into an envelope which is sealed. Upon signing the
envelope, the signature is transferred onto the document through the carbon paper.
Still, the signer is not able to inspect the signed document, nor will he recognize
it afterward. Blind signature schemes can be implemented using several common
public-key signature schemes such as RSA and DSA (see [CPS94]).
Application to electronic voting. Blind signatures can be used to authorize voters
while maintaining privacy: a designated election authority receives blinded votes
from voters who authenticate themselves, for example by providing their electronic
signature. Upon verifying the eligibility of the voters, the authority signs the blinded
vote and sends it back to the voter. The voter unblinds the received message and
obtains a signed vote. Thus, the voter can cast an authorized vote without revealing
its content to the authority who signed it (see for example [OMA+99]).
2.2.5. Homomorphic encryption
An encryption function E is said to be homomorphic if E(m1)⊗E(m2) = E(m1⊕m2)
for some appropriate algebraic operations ⊗,⊕; i.e. applying the operation ⊗ to
two ciphertexts equals the encryption of the plaintext obtained by applying the
operation ⊕ to the plaintexts m1,m2. The RSA [RSA83] and ElGamal [Gam84]
encryption systems, for example, are homomorphic with both ⊗,⊕ denoting mul-
tiplications. ElGamal encryption can also be made homomorphic such that ⊕ de-
notes an addition operation by putting the plaintext in the exponent: suppose we
modify ElGamal such that m is encrypted as Er(m) = (g
r, hrgm). This gives us
Er1(m1) = (g
r1 , hr1gm1), Er2(m2) = (g
r2 , hr2gm2). The product of these two encryp-
tions is (gr1+r2 , hr1+r2gm1+m2) = Er1+r2(m1 + m2) which equals the encryption of
the sum m1 +m2 using the random value r1 + r2.
Application to electronic voting. In many elections, tallying the votes simply
amounts to adding them. Thus, homomorphic encryption schemes can be used,
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and they bring about a significant advantage: tallying can be accomplished by sim-
ply decrypting the product of all encryptions using exponential ElGamal as noted
above, i.e. without ever decrypting individual ballots and revealing individual voting
decisions. Suppose we have n votes v1, . . . , vn, then multiplying their encryptions
(gr1 , hr1gv1), . . . , (grn , hrngvn) and subsequent decryption gives us g
∑n
i vi . To obtain
the election result
∑n
i vi, we then have to solve a discrete logarithm problem, which
is feasible using exhaustive search as long as
∑n
i vi is sufficiently small.
To make homomorphic voting schemes work, we need to be sure that each voter
provided a well-formed encryption of either +1 or −1. To accomplish this, ZKPs of
(exponential) ElGamal encryption of ±1 can be used (see Section 2.2.3).
The drawback of homomorphic encryption schemes is that they can only be used
if the votes are combined additively (see [Smi05, 7.2] for counterexamples).
2.2.6. Mixnets
A mix M receives a bunch of encrypted messages and processes them in a way that
hides the link between input and output without changing the messages. To achieve
robustness, a cascade of mixes M1, . . . ,Mn is normally used; this construction is
referred to as a mixnet. The communication among the mixes can be accomplished
through bulletin boards (see Section 2.2.7).
There exist two basic types of mixnets: decryption mixnets introduced by Chaum
[Cha81] and reencryption mixnets introduced by Park et al. [PIK93].
Each mix M1, . . . ,Mn in a decryption mixnet has an asymmetric encryption
key pair. The input messages have all been encrypted using the public keys of
Mn, . . . ,M1 (in this order). Mix Mi then removes one layer of encryption by using
his secret key, scrambles the messages (which are still encrypted with the public keys
of Mi+1, . . . ,Mn), and passes them on to mix Mi+1. The last mix Mn performs
the final decryption, permutes and outputs the plaintext messages. Note that if
one single mix denies its service, the messages cannot be decrypted. In particular,
the last mix may abort if it dislikes the decrypted messages. Although this can
be prevented by distributing the secret key of Mn among several parties (see also
Section 2.2.2), decryption mixnets are scarcely used in e-voting systems in practice.
A reencryption mixnetM1, . . . ,Mn receives a bunch of messages which have been
encrypted using a cryptosystem with reencryption property (for example ElGamal
[Gam84], see also Section 2.2.1). Mix Mi scrambles the encrypted messages and
reencrypts them, i.e. changes their ciphertexts without changing the corresponding
plaintexts. The reencrypted messages are then passed on to mixMi+1 which repeats
the procedure using random reencryption values. The output of the last mix Mn
then has to be decrypted in order to obtain the plaintext messages. Secret sharing
techniques are usually applied to the decryption key in order to achieve robustness
[Adi06] (see Section 2.2.2). Note that reencryption mixnets are more robust than
decryption mixnets as a single mix denying service does not disrupt the mixing
process.
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A mixnet is usually required to prove (or, at least, to provide strong evidence of)
the fact that it has processed the input messages correctly, i.e. that
1. each mix has decrypted or reencrypted the messages correctly, and
2. the output of each mix is indeed a permutation of its input.
Since the 1990s, a plenty of different techniques has been proposed for making
mixnets verifiable (for example [SK95, FS01, Nef01, JJR02]). The reader is referred
to [Adi06] for a detailed review of verifiable mixnets.
Application to electronic voting. Electronic voting schemes use mixnets to create
an anonymous channel for vote casting: voter privacy is established by hiding the
link between the received votes (i.e. the input of the voting system) and the tallied
votes (i.e. the output of the voting system). Thus, the voting decision of a specific
voter cannot be traced back by recording the time the vote was cast and checking
the bulletin board for the corresponding vote.
2.2.7. Bulletin boards
A bulletin board, as introduced by Benaloh et al. [Ben87, CF85], is a public broadcast
channel. Data is published by authorized parties only and, once published, cannot
be deleted or modified by anyone.
Bulletin boards are usually operated in a distributed setting to achieve robustness
and prevent denial of service. The reader is referred to [Rei95, LLR06] for possible
implementations of a bulletin board.
Application to electronic voting. Bulletin boards are crucial for individual as well
as universal verifiability: the information published allows voters to check upon
their own votes and provides the public with the data needed to verify the correct
processing of the ballots. The bulletin board may contain, for example, the voters’
register, encrypted votes next to voter names or identification numbers, and outputs
of the single stages of a mixnet including proofs of correctness.
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3. Survey of existing literature
In this chapter we review literature on electronic voting in terms of existing def-
initions of privacy and verifiability. We will see that, while the basic concept of
these security requirements is understood consistently (see common definitions in
Section 2.1), their content and scope has been interpreted in many different ways by
the e-voting community. This will lead us to considering different levels of privacy
and verifiability in Chapter 4.
Chapter overview
Definitions of privacy, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are considered in Sec-
tion 3.1, while definitions of individual and universal verifiability and related con-
cepts are considered in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 focuses on related work, i.e. other
frameworks comparing different voting protocols and measuring privacy and/or ver-
ifiability. A summary of the findings is given in Section 3.4.
3.1. Definitions of privacy, receipt-freeness and
coercion-resistance
In the literature reviewed there is a general consent that a voting scheme offers
privacy if it is not possible to link a vote with the voter who cast it. More precisely,
privacy means that nobody should learn more about any voter’s decision than what
is leaked by the tally [CMFP+06, MN06]: if all voters vote identically, then it is clear
how each voter voted. The notions of (voter) privacy and (ballot) secrecy are often
used synonymously [Hir01, CRS05, MN06]; Riera refers to anonymity instead [Rie98].
Hirt distinguishes between secrecy and anonymity: while secrecy is defined as the
infeasibility to assign votes to voters, anonymity refers to the impossibility to tell
whether a certain voter participated in the election or not [Hir01]. The importance
of long-term voter privacy is referred to in [CMFP+06, MN06, Cet07]: [CMFP+06]
uses the expression “unconditional privacy”, [MN06] uses “everlasting privacy”.
However, it is not sufficient for a voting system to offer privacy—as noted by Be-
naloh and Tuinstra [BT94], privacy must be enforced. Receipt-freeness is commonly
defined as the infeasibility for the voter to prove his vote even if he wants to do
so. Smith illustratively names this property “no sale” [Smi05]. Jonker and Pieters
[JP06] distinguish weak and strong receipt-freeness as follows: weak receipt-freeness
states that the voter cannot prove to the adversary that he sent a specific message
representing the vote. Strong receipt-freeness means that, for all possible votes, the
adversary cannot be certain that the voter did not cast this vote.
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Moran and Naor provide a very strong notion of receipt-freeness [MN06]: the
adversary can coerce the voter at any time during the execution of the voting protocol
and is not limited to passive queries. Similarly, for their definition of receipt-freeness,
Chevallier-Mames et al. allow interactions with the adversary before and after the
vote is cast [CMFP+06]. They also assume that the adversary can tap the channel
between the voter and the voting authority.
In contrast to this, Hirt and Sako state that receipt-freeness cannot be achieved
without some physical assumptions, the weakest assumption being one-way untap-
pable channels from the authorities to the voters [HS00]. In literature, the following
types of communication channels have been assumed as a precondition for receipt-
freeness [Jon09]:
– anonymous channels [JCJ05]
– private channels [CGS97]
– untappable channels (realized by tamper-resistant hardware devices [LK02],
voting booths [BT94], or mail service [JCJ05])
– anonymous untappable channels [Oka97]
Similarly, Juels et al. state that anonymous channels are a minimal requirement for
any coercion-resistant scheme, since if the attacker can identify who has participated,
he can mount a forced-abstention attack [JCJ05]. Resistance against this kind of
attack is one of the specifics of a coercion-resistant scheme according to Juels et al.:
they consider coercion-resistance to be an extension of receipt-freeness by resistance
against randomization, forced-abstention and simulation attacks [JCJ05]. In general,
coercion-resistance (also referred to as uncoercibility or incoercibility) is understood
as the infeasibility for an adversary to coerce a voter into casting his vote in a
particular way. Riera defines a voting scheme to be coercion-resistant if “no voter can
prove that he voted in a particular way” [Rie98] and hence takes coercion-resistance
for what is generally understood as receipt-freeness.
According to Hirt, “the concept of incoercibility is weaker than receipt-freeness”
[Hir01]. This is also claimed by Burmester and Magkos [BM03]: deniable encryp-
tion allows a voter to lie about his encrypted vote, but he can refrain from using
this mechanism if he wants to prove his vote. Thus, Burmester and Magkos assert
that it is possible to have a voting scheme which is coercion-resistant and yet not
receipt-free. However, the relation between receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance
is usually understood contrarily: coercion-resistance is stronger than receipt-freeness
[JCJ05, Smi05, Cet07, DKR09, KT09]. According to [DKR09] and [KT09], coercion-
resistance even implies receipt-freeness, which is formally proven by the authors.
Delaune et al. [DKR09] provide formal definitions for privacy-type properties of
voting schemes using the applied pi calculus. They model privacy as observational
equivalence of the process where voter A votes a and voter B votes b and the pro-
cess where voters A and B swap their votes (i.e. A votes b and B votes a). The
authors also prove the intuitive relation between the privacy-type properties, namely
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that coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness and receipt-freeness implies privacy.
However, their definition of coercion-resistance does not consider randomization and
forced-abstention attacks as introduced in [JCJ05]. Also, note that under a strict
interpretation, receipt-freeness does not imply privacy: consider an election where
each voter announces the candidate he is voting for. Without an official record, the
voter cannot prove afterward how he voted, which satisfies receipt-freeness. Yet there
is no privacy with respect to observers present during vote casting. In literature,
definitions of receipt-freeness are usually less strict and do include vote privacy.
Juels et al. provide formal definitions of coercion-resistance and universal verifiabil-
ity in a computational model [JCJ05]. Their definitions hinge on several experiments
involving an adversary in interaction with components of the voting system: the ad-
versary tries to guess whether the coerced voter complied with his demands. His
success is measured by comparison with another adversary in an ideal voting sys-
tem who is unable to determine whether coercion is successful or not. The formal
definition of coercion-resistance is tailored to the specific structure of the protocol
proposed by the authors.
Ku¨sters and Truderung propose a definition of coercion resistance in a symbolic
setting, following an epistemic approach [KT09]. Their definition is independent
of a specific adversary model. It requires that coerced voters can apply counter
strategies such that the voter always achieves his own goal and the coercer does not
know whether the coerced voter followed his instructions.
Chevallier-Mames et al. provide formal definitions of universal verifiability, un-
conditional privacy and receipt-freeness [CMFP+06]. The authors show that, in
their setting, one cannot achieve universal verifiability of the tally and unconditional
anonymity of the votes unless all the registered voters participate in the election.
Similarly, it is not possible to have both universal verifiability and receipt-freeness
unless the existence of secure channels is assumed.
3.2. Definitions of verifiability
Universal verifiability gives any observer the possibility to check that the tally has
been correctly computed from the ballots cast. It is closely related to accuracy,
which requires that no vote can be altered, duplicated or eliminated [Rie98, BM03].
Cetinkaya states that verifiability is “the provability that the election is accurate”
[Cet07]. However, he does not regard universal verifiability to be an actual security
requirement as accuracy should be provable anyway: “if a protocol claims that it
satisfies accuracy, it should be able to prove its claim” [Cet07]. Formal definitions of
universal verifiability have been provided in [JCJ05, CMFP+06] (see Section 3.1).
There is no consensus on the question whether universal verifiability comprises
verifying eligibility, i.e. the fact that only eligible voters cast a vote (this aspect of
verifiability is also referred to as “eligibility verifiability” by Smyth et al. [SRKK09],
but the authors subsume uniqueness under eligibility). An affirmative answer is given
in [AN06]. [CMFP+06, Smi05, Cet07] even go one step further and claim that univer-
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sal verifiability includes verifying eligibility and uniqueness (recall that uniqueness
requires that each eligible voter casts at most one vote that counts, cf. Section 2.1).
According to [Ben06], end-to-end verifiability (considered below) amounts to verify-
ing the “accurate count of legitimate votes”. Similarly, Schoenmakers claims that
anyone should be able to verify “that the published election result corresponds to
the ballots cast by legitimate voters” [Sch00]. However, in both cases it is not clear
whether this restricts to eligibility, or whether it includes uniqueness. Eligibility is
not explicitly subject to verifiability according to [Hir01, MN06, Pie06, DKR09].
Individual verifiability is commonly referred to as the possibility for any voter
to verify that his vote was included in the tally [Hir01]. Some authors consider
individual verifiability to comprise the correct counting of the individual votes [Rie98,
CRS05, Smi05]. [Rie98, BM03, LGT+03] also take into account the chance for open
objections made by the voter: in case his vote has been miscounted, he should have
the possibility to file a complaint.
Concerning the relation between universal and individual verifiability, [LGT+03]
and [BM03] state that individual verifiability is weaker than universal verifiability.
In Section 4.4 we will see that both requirements are closely intertwined; however,
universal verifiability does not generally imply individual verifiability.
In the last couple of years, concepts such as cast-as-intended and counted-as-cast
have emerged and become common in parallel to the established terms of universal
and individual verifiability:
cast-as-intended: each voter can verify that the ballot correctly represents his choice
[KSW05, AN06, Riv06].
counted-as-cast: each voter can verify that his ballot has been counted as it was
cast, i.e. that it has been processed and tallied correctly [Riv06]. However,
it has also been claimed that counted-as-cast should be universally verifiable,
i.e. that anyone should be able to verify that the final tally is an accurate count
of the ballots cast [KSW05, Ben07].
Some authors also break counted-as-cast down into the following two concepts (see
for example [AN06, BMQR07, CCC+08]):
recorded-as-cast: each voter can verify that his ballot has been recorded by the
voting system as it was cast by the voter.
counted-as-recorded: anyone can verify that all ballots have been counted as they
were recorded by the voting system.
In [AN06], cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast are combined into the concept of
ballot casting assurance, which “complements universal verifiability” [AN06]. All
of these concepts are closely related to the notion of end-to-end (E2E) verifiability,
which postulates that each step of the election from casting one’s vote to comput-
ing the tally should be verifiable, thus providing a chain of custody [AN06, Riv06,
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CCC+08]. Chaum et al. state that “E2E systems allow voters to verify that their
ballots are processed correctly, giving voters assurance that their votes are cast,
collected, and counted as intended” [CCC+08]. According to Benaloh, end-to-end
verifiability also includes verifying eligibility [Ben06].
3.3. Related work
We consider related work to comprise
– other frameworks designed to measure or classify privacy and verifiability, and
– other approaches that have been used to evaluate voting protocols in light of
the security requirements.
We also consider the adversary models which are assumed in each case.
3.3.1. Other classifications of privacy and verifiability
Lambrinoudakis et al. provide only a rough distinction between different levels of
privacy and verifiability by distinguishing computational and information-theoretic
privacy, and individual verifiability with(out) open objection [LGT+03]. The same
differentiation of privacy is made by Sampigethaya and Poovendran [SP06].
Pieters [Pie06] distinguishes a “classical” and a “constructive” variant of both
individual and universal verifiability: constructive individual verifiability allows the
voter to verify that his vote has been counted correctly by reconstructing his vote
from the information provided about the received votes, while for the classical form
the voter cannot reconstruct his vote from this information. Similarly, constructive
universal verifiability means that the correct calculation of the election result from
the received votes can be publicly verified by retallying the votes independently of the
election authorities, while the classical form provides the possibility for verification
without publishing the information necessary for performing the tally.
Jonker provides a framework which allows to quantify privacy and, as such, can
be used to measure the privacy offered by different voting schemes [Jon09]. A voter’s
choice group is defined to contain all candidates that a voter might have chosen. Any
modification to voter privacy is captured by changes to the size of this voter’s choice
group. Jonker uses an adversary model following the standard one as suggested
by Dolev and Yao [DY83]: cryptography works perfectly, and all communication
channels except the untappable ones are under control of the adversary.
3.3.2. Other evaluations of voting protocols
Lambrinoudakis et al. [LGT+03] provide definitions of the security requirements for
electronic voting and analyze several voting protocols in light of these requirements.
Their definitions of the security requirements are rather imprecise. For example, uni-
versal verifiability is defined as the ability for anyone to “verify the election outcome
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after the announcement of the tally” [LGT+03]. The term “election outcome” is not
specified; it is thus not clear whether universal verifiability is limited to retallying
the votes or whether it includes verifying that all votes cast by legitimate voters
(and only those) have been counted. The authors provide only a rough distinction
between different levels of the respective property, such as computational versus
information-theoretic privacy and individual verifiability with(out) open objection.
The voting protocols are classified into three categories: involving trusted authori-
ties, anonymous voting using tokens, and homomorphic encryption. An adversary
model is not provided.
Sampigethaya and Poovendran [SP06] provide a framework for comparing elec-
tronic voting schemes. The authors specify different types of requirements: security
requirements, counter-attack requirements, and system requirements. The protocols
are classified into three types according to the way in which voter anonymity is estab-
lished: hidden voter, hidden vote, and hidden voter with hidden vote. It is checked
whether the protocols considered meet the different types of requirements. Besides
distinguishing computational and information-theoretic privacy, the authors do not
discern different levels of the security requirements. They do, however, distinguish
security requirements from resilience requirements aimed at preventing adversarial
attacks, thus reflecting that for example receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are
of a different nature than the other security requirements.
Some of the protocols considered both in [LGT+03] and [SP06] are rated differently
in the two works. For example, the protocol proposed by Hirt and Sako [HS00] is
rated to be universally verifiable in [SP06], but not in [LGT+03]. The same protocol
is said to be coercion-resistant in [LGT+03], but not in [SP06]. While [LGT+03]
assigns fairness to [HS00] and [BFP+01], [SP06] assesses the fairness provided by
both protocols to be only conditional.
Cetinkaya [Cet07] provides a taxonomy of cryptographic voting protocols by adapt-
ing [SP06] with minor changes. Again, some of the protocols are rated differently in
[SP06] and [Cet07], respectively. As for the discrepancies between the evaluation in
[SP06] and [LGT+03], this is due to the different definitions of the security require-
ments by the authors, in particular with regard to verifiability. While individual and
universal verifiability are seen as either one side of verifiability in [SP06], [Cet07]
argues that universal verifiability is redundant to the set of security requirements as
it is equivalent to “the provability that the election is accurate” (cf. Section 3.2).
Common Criteria
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), accom-
panied by the CommonMethodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), is an international standard [Inta, Intb] which ensures that IT systems (such
as electronic voting systems) can be evaluated by independent licensed laboratories
against specific security requirements.1 CC allows developers to specify the security
1See also http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
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attributes of their products, and provides evaluators with the means to determine
if IT products indeed fulfill the security standards claimed [GKM+06]. The current
version CC v3.1 consists of three parts: Introduction and general model (Part I), Se-
curity functional requirements (Part II), and Security assurance requirements (Part
III) [CCp09a, CCp09b, CCp09c]. The accompanying document CEM v3.1 provides
evaluators with guidance on applying the CC [CEM09].
The core documents used in the the certification process are Protection Profiles
and Security Targets. A Protection Profile specifies security requirements for a fam-
ily of IT products, referred to as Targets of Evaluation, in a way which is independent
of implementation issues (see [VV08] for a Protection Profile for online voting prod-
ucts). More specifically, a Protection Profile defines a security problem, identifies
threats, states the assumptions that are made regarding the intended use and the
operational environment of the Target of Evaluation, and specifies security objec-
tives as well as security requirements. It also determines the Evaluation Assurance
Level indicating the depth of the security evaluation. A Security Target defines the
security properties of a specific IT product. It is to be defined by the product vendor
or the system developer, and usually complies with one or more Protection Profiles.
The assumed adversary model is inherent in the assumptions made within the
Protection Profile regarding the intended use and the operational environment of
the Target of Evaluation. For example, the assumption that nobody is watching the
voter while he casts his vote (see [VV08, Assumption 139]) implies that a remote
adversary is assumed. Furthermore, the attack potential for a given vulnerability,
which expresses the strength of the assumed adversary, is determined as a function
of elapsed time, expertise and equipment of the adversary, and knowledge of the
Target of Evaluation and access to it [CEM09, B.4.2.2]. The resulting attack poten-
tial (basic, enhanced-basic, moderate, high) determines the level of the vulnerability
analysis (1 to 5). This level correlates with the Evaluation Assurance Level as in-
dicated by Part 3 of the CC [CCp09c, Table 1], which implies that the assumed
strength of the adversary affects the Protection Profile and is, in particular, fixed
for each Protection Profile. The strength of cryptographic algorithms is outside the
scope of the CC [CEM09, B.2.1.3].
Overall, the CC is an approved method to define specific security requirements
that apply to the given Target of Evaluation, and to evaluate the latter against
these requirements. However, as our goal is to classify existing security requirements
by identifying the levels which are conceivable, in the following we use a different
approach which also allows us to define security requirement levels independent of
adversary capabilities.
3.4. Summary
We have seen that various definitions have been proposed for privacy, receipt-freeness,
coercion-resistance as well as individual and universal verifiability. Obviously, there is
no consensus on the exact scope and content of the considered security requirements,
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and some of the existing interpretations are even contradictory. Also, the relation
between the privacy-related properties is not well understood, as well as the relation
between individual and universal verifiability. While the informal definitions tend
to be sketchy and imprecise, the formal definitions are precise, but quite complex.
Moreover, the formal definitions are usually tailored for specific scenarios given in
specific voting protocols or assuming particular adversary models. Therefore, these
definitions are in general not suitable for comparing different voting protocols.
In light of security engineering, the desired properties (captured by the security
requirements) should be separated from the assumed adversary model (defined by
the adversary capabilities). However, assumptions regarding adversary capabilities
are inherent for example in the notion of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance.
Thus, the security requirements and the adversary models are not clearly separated
at present, which complicates the analysis of voting schemes.
The remainder of Part I deals with a taxonomy for privacy and verifiability in
electronic voting. In Chapter 4 we define the conceivable levels of these security
requirements and provide a conceptual model which captures both privacy and veri-
fiability. Different adversary capabilities are compiled in Chapter 5 in order to allow
for a fine-tuned adversary model. In Chapter 6 the taxonomy is applied to several
state-of-the-art voting schemes.
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The variety of definitions that have been proposed for privacy and verifiability in
electronic voting (see Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively) indicates that these security
requirements are still not well understood. Therefore, this chapter sets out to com-
pile the conceivable levels of privacy and verifiability and to investigate the relation
between the two. To this end, we introduce a conceptual model capturing both
privacy and verifiability.
Chapter overview
After some remarks on terminology and notation in Section 4.1, an (un)linkability
model capturing both privacy and verifiability in voting is introduced in Section 4.2.
Different levels of privacy and verifiability are identified in Section 4.3 and 4.4, re-
spectively. Section 4.5 considers interrelations between specific levels of privacy and
verifiability.
Section 4.2 is joint work with Hugo Jonker and Wolter Pieters published in [5],
while the Sections 4.3 and 4.4 are based on joint work with Melanie Volkamer and,
in an earlier version, have been published in [11].
4.1. Terminology and notation
On a high level, any election can be described as follows: each eligible voter prefers
a certain candidate and expresses this preference via his vote.1 The vote is input to
the voting system in form of the ballot: the ballot represents the vote and usually
conceals it at the same time, for example by means of cryptography. It can be
thought of as an envelope containing the vote. Thus, a ballot is what the voter
inputs to the voting system in order to cast a vote for a specific candidate.
Distinguishing between vote and candidate may seem artificial; however, we want
to clearly differentiate between real-life persons (voters, candidates) and objects
(votes, ballots) belonging to the voting system. We consider the voting phase as the
stage during which votes may be cast, and the tallying phase as the stage in which
cast votes are processed and tallied.2
1Spoiling one’s vote can be modeled by voting for an empty candidate. Such votes do not affect
the election result.
2Here, we restrict our model to voting and tallying phase. However, verifiability must be considered
also beyond the end of the election. This long-term aspect of verifiability is dealt with in Part
II of this thesis.
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We use the following notation for the entities present in our model:
– V: set of all eligible voters
– C: set of all selectable candidates
– B: set of possible ballots
– S: set of possible votes (or selections)
The links between these entities are expressed by the following functions:
– γ : V → C maps a voter v to his preferred candidate c
– β : V → B maps a voter v to his ballot b
– σ : V → S maps a voter v to his vote s
– τ : B → S maps a ballot b to the contained vote s
– pi : S → C maps a vote s to the selected candidate c
Note that τ ◦β = σ and pi◦σ = pi◦τ ◦β = γ. We also use common logical connectives
(¬, ∧, ∨, →) and quantifiers (∀, ∃) in the following.
4.2. (Un)linkability model
Both privacy and verifiability can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while pri-
vacy requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of vot-
ers and election result. Therefore, this section introduces an intuitive (un)linkability
model for voting which captures privacy as well as verifiability. At the same time,
this model provides an introduction to the classification of privacy and verifiability
which follows in Section 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
4.2.1. Modeling privacy as unlinkability
Since privacy concerns individuals, we consider an individual-related model first.
It considers individual entities (i.e. a single voter, ballot, vote, candidate) and the
mappings between them as introduced in Section 4.1: voter v inputs a ballot b = β(v)
to the voting system in order to cast a vote s = τ(b) for his preferred candidate
c = pi(s) (see Figure 4.1).
Privacy requires unlinkability of voter v and selected candidate c = γ(v), meaning
that this link—which certainly exists at the moment the voter casts his ballot con-
taining the vote for the preferred candidate—must remain secret. We assume that
there is no direct link between the voter and his preferred candidate since such a link
would not be under the control of the voting system. Hence, in practice, we always
have the decomposition γ = pi ◦ τ ◦ β. The function pi which maps a vote to the
selected candidate is assumed to be public.
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voting system
voter v
ballot b vote s
candidate c
β σ pi
γ
τ
Figure 4.1.: Individual-related model
Thus, privacy can be broken down to unlinkability of voter v and vote σ(v), which
(due to σ = τ ◦ β) can be established in two ways:
1. unlinkability of voter v and ballot β(v)
2. unlinkability of ballot b and contained vote τ(b)
Either approach is commonly used in electronic voting schemes: for example, cryp-
tographic primitives such as blind signatures (see Section 2.2.4) or mixnets (see
Section 2.2.6) can be used to conceal the link between voter and ballot. Unlinkabil-
ity of ballot and vote is provided in homomorphic schemes (see Section 2.2.5) where
an individual ballot is never decrypted, which means that the corresponding vote is
not revealed.
4.2.2. Modeling verifiability as linkability
As (universal) verifiability concerns groups of individuals and sets of ballots/votes,
we now extend our model related to individuals (i.e. a single voter, ballot, vote, can-
didate) to a scenario which considers sets (i.e. all voters, ballots, votes, candidates):
the set of received ballots B(V) cast by all voters V is transformed to the set of all
votes Σ(V) which determine the election result (see Figure 4.2). We now look at
these sets and the mappings between them more closely.
Consider the set of all received ballots:
B(V) = {b ∈ B|∃v ∈ V : β(v) = b}
Here we assume that all ballots are unique, which is justified as otherwise ballot
duplications (for example by replay attacks) would be easy. Note that B(V) = β(V),
which is the image of V under β. However, we stick to the upper-case notation here
in order to ensure consistency with the following definitions.
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voting system
all voters V
rec. ballots B(V) all votes Σ(V)
result
B Σ Π
Γ
T
Figure 4.2.: Set-related model
We define
Σ(V) = {(s, n) ∈ S × N|∃b ∈ B : τ(b) = s ∧ n = (#b ∈ B : τ(b) = s)}
as the set of all votes that have been cast, where each cast vote originates from a
ballot. Using the definition of B(V) as well as τ ◦ β = σ (see Section 4.1), we also
have
Σ(V) = {(s, n) ∈ S × N|∃v ∈ V : σ(v) = s ∧ n = (#v ∈ V : σ(v) = s)} .
Note that we do not assume uniqueness of the votes, which means that all votes
for candidate c have the same form. The set of received ballots is mapped to the
set of cast votes by some transformation T . The election result, for example the
number of seats held by different parties in parliament, is obtained by some public
transformation Π of the set of all votes Σ(V). In the model, the election result is
also determined by applying a transformation Γ to the set of all voters V.
Universal verifiability (as introduced in Section 2.1.7) is established by the link
between the set of received ballots B(V) and the set of cast votes Σ(V) as this link
expresses that the received ballots have been transformed into the votes correctly.
Eligibility and uniqueness verifiability (see Section 3.2) both refer to the relation
between voters and ballots, and are therefore expressed by the link between the
set of received ballots B(V) and the set of all voters V. Since the link between
the result and the set of all votes is public, universal verifiability (as introduced in
Section 2.1.7) is thus expressed by linkability of the set of all eligible voters V and
the election result.
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Individual verifiability is established by the sum of the following links:
1. v 7→ β(v): the voter is able to identify his ballot
2. b 7→ τ(b): the ballot contains the correct vote
3. b ∈ B(V): the ballot is contained in the set of received ballots
The sum of the first two links corresponds to the concept of cast-as-intended (see
Section 3.2): each voter can verify that his ballot correctly represents his choice
[KSW05, AN06, Riv06]. The third link matches the established notion of recorded-
as-cast: each voter can verify that his ballot has been recorded by the voting system
correctly [AN06, BMQR07]. The combination of cast-as-intended and recorded-as-
cast has been named “ballot casting assurance” in [AN06]; our definition of individual
verifiability matches this concept. By the link between the vote s and the set of all
votes Σ(V), the voter knows that his vote is included in the tally. Still, the voter
cannot pinpoint his vote within the set of all votes as we assume that the votes are
not unique.
4.2.3. Unified (un)linkability model
We now merge the individual-related and the set-related model into one (un)link-
ability model which captures privacy (i.e. desired unlinkability) as well as verifiability
(i.e. desired linkability). This model is depicted in Figure 4.3. The individual-related
part (see Figure 4.1) is at the bottom, while the set-related part (see Figure 4.2)
appears at the top of Figure 4.3, oriented upside down. For better readability we
have omitted the function names alongside the arrows as provided in Figure 4.1
and 4.2.
In Section 4.2.1 we have shown that privacy is expressed as unlinkability of voter
v and selected candidate c = γ(v), while in Section 4.2.2 we have explained that
universal verifiability is expressed as linkability of the set of all eligible voters V and
the election result Γ(V). Correspondingly, at the bottom of Figure 4.3, privacy is
depicted with a “×” alongside the link between voter v and selected candidate γ(v),
and, at the top of Figure 4.3, universal verifiability is depicted with a “X” alongside
the link between the set of all eligible voters V and the election result Γ(V).
At this point a remarkable symmetry of the proposed (un)linkability model be-
comes apparent: with respect to privacy, we require unlinkability of voter and can-
didate, whereas, from the set-related perspective, it is exactly the linkability of all
voters with the election result that we want in terms of verifiability. Although there
is an obvious trade-off between privacy and verifiability, in our model, both are
expressed by the same link in the individual-related and the set-related scenario,
respectively, which shows the close relation between privacy and verifiability in elec-
tronic voting. In the following sections we will frequently refer to our (un)linkability
model and consider in more detail how it captures different levels of privacy and
verifiability.
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voting system
voter v
ballot β(v) vote σ(v)
candidate γ(v)
all voters V
rec. ballots B(V) all votes Σ(V)
result Γ(V)
privacy
verifiability
Figure 4.3.: (Un)linkability model
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4.3. Privacy
The (un)linkability model introduced in the previous section has provided us with
a better intuition for privacy and verifiability in voting and the relation between
the two. Our next goal is to gain a deeper and more precise understanding for
both properties by decomposing them into different levels. We start by considering
different levels of privacy; verifiability is considered in Section 4.4. Note that we
consider only levels that are more or less desirable, i.e. we do not provide zero levels
such as no privacy at all. In separate paragraphs we investigate whether there exists
an order for the different levels, consider these levels in terms of the (un)linkability
model provided, and give examples in existing literature that match our definitions.
Recall that voter privacy can be expressed as unlinkability of voter and vote (see
Section 4.2), and that voters might also wish to keep it private whether they partici-
pated in the election or not (see Section 3.1). Receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance
are not considered here; these privacy-related requirements depend on specific ad-
versary capabilities and will therefore be considered within our adversary model in
Chapter 5.
Levels
Voter privacy comprises two components: unlinkability of voter and vote (UL) and
undecidable voter abstention (A). Unlinkability of voter and vote requires unlinka-
bility of either voter and ballot or voter and vote (see Section 4.2). Furthermore,
any of these relations may be provable or not. Thus, we distinguish the following
levels of privacy, considering an arbitrary voter:
A.1 Undecidable abstention. It is not possible to decide whether a voter abstained
from voting.
A.2 Unprovable abstention. If it is possible to decide whether a voter abstained
from voting, then this fact is not provable to third parties.
UL.1 Unlinkability.
a It is not possible to establish a link between voter and ballot.
b It is not possible to establish a link between ballot and vote.
UL.2 Unprovable linkability.
a If it is possible to establish a link between voter and ballot, then the link is
not provable to third parties.
b If it is possible to establish a link between ballot and vote, then the link is
not provable to third parties.
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Order
In order to achieve a better understanding of the different privacy levels, we now
investigate the (logical) relations between them. UL.1a establishes unlinkability of
voter and ballot, whereas UL.1b establishes unlinkability of ballot and vote. Thus,
UL.1a and UL.1b are orthogonal in the sense that they correspond to the two ways in
which unlinkability of voter and vote can be established (see Section 4.2). Similarly,
UL.2a and UL.2b are orthogonal as UL.2a refers to unprovable linkability of voter
and ballot, whereas UL.2b refers to unprovable linkability of ballot and vote. Let
therefore UL.1 denote the disjunction UL.1a ∨ UL.1b, which reflects that unlinka-
bility of voter and vote is established by means of unlinkability of voter and ballot
or unlinkability of ballot and vote (see Section 4.2). Analogously, let UL.2 denote
the disjunction UL.2a ∨ UL.2b.
Note that UL.2a can be expressed as p → ¬q, where p is the proposition “it is
possible to establish a link between voter and ballot” (which is, in fact, ¬UL.1a),
and q is the proposition “the link between voter and ballot is provable to third
parties”. As p → ¬q is equivalent to ¬p ∨ ¬q, ¬UL.2a is equivalent to p ∧ q, which
means that “it is possible to establish a link between voter and ballot, and this
link is provable to third parties”. Therefore, ¬UL.2a expresses that a provable link
between voter and ballot can be established. Analogously, ¬UL.2b expresses that
a provable link between ballot and vote can be established. An unprovable link
between voter and ballot or between ballot and vote is expressed by ¬UL.1a ∧ UL.2a
or ¬UL.1b ∧ UL.2b, respectively.
Furthermore, the following logical relations can be identified:
– A.1 → A.2: while A.1 is a statement of the form ¬x, A.2 can be expressed as
x → y, which is equivalent to ¬x ∨ y. Thus, A.1 → A.2 can be expressed as
x ∨ ¬x ∨ y, which is true.
– UL.1a → UL.2a (for the same reason why A.1 → A.2)
– UL.1b → UL.2b (for the same reason why A.1 → A.2)
– A.1 → UL.1a: if a link between voter v and his ballot can be established, then
v must have voted. Thus, ¬UL.1a → ¬A.1 or, equivalently, A.1 → UL.1a.
– A.2 → UL.2a: if a provable link between a voter v and his ballot can be estab-
lished, then v must have voted, which can also be proven. Thus, ¬UL.2a →
¬A.2, or, equivalently, A.2 → UL.2a.
Summary. Since in Chapter 6 we will frequently refer to the relations just estab-
lished, let us recall the key findings.
The logical relations between the different privacy levels are summarized in Fig-
ure 4.4, where the arrows represent implications. Furthermore, we have defined UL.1
and UL.2 as UL.1a ∨ UL.1b and UL.2a ∨ UL.2b, respectively, thus expressing the
following:
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Figure 4.4.: Logical relations between different privacy levels
UL.1 It is not possible to establish a link between voter and vote.
UL.2 If it is possible to establish a link between voter and vote, then the link is not
provable to third parties.
We have also learned that we can use the following logical abbreviations in order
to derive certain levels of privacy from the original ones defined at the beginning of
Section 4.3:
¬UL.2a It is possible to establish a provable link between voter and ballot.
¬UL.2b It is possible to establish a provable link between ballot and vote.
¬UL.1a ∧ UL.2a It is possible to establish an unprovable link between voter and
ballot.
¬UL.1b ∧ UL.2b It is possible to establish an unprovable link between ballot and
vote.
Reference to model
UL.1a corresponds to unlinkability of voter v and ballot β(v) in our model introduced
in Section 4.2, while UL.1b refers to unlinkability of ballot b and vote τ(b) (see
Figure 4.5). If at least one of them is provided, unlinkability of voter v and vote σ(v)
is ensured, which corresponds to UL.1. UL.2a and UL.2b are not directly evident
from the model, but refer to the link between voter and ballot or, respectively, to
the link between ballot and vote. Voter abstention is not evident from the model.
Examples
Undecidable abstention (A.1) is referred to as invisible abstention by Smith [Smi05],
while Hirt names it anonymity [Hir01]. Lambrinoudakis et al. [LGT+03] understand
this privacy level contrarily: with regard to cases where voter participation is com-
pulsory and must be verifiable (for example in Belgium, Greece, or Australia), it
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Figure 4.5.: Privacy in the (un)linkability model
must be ascertainable that a certain voter has indeed cast a vote. Thus, they refer
to this privacy level as verifiable participation or declarability [LGT+03].
Unlinkability of voter and ballot (UL.1a) is referred to in [VV08, Objective 162]:
“the data [. . .] cannot be used to link the voter to his vote (in plaintext or in encrypted
form)”. Recall that, in our terms, the encrypted vote is the ballot, see Section 4.1.
The definitions of privacy provided in [Rie98, BM03, LGT+03, Cet07] correspond
to our definition of unlinkability of voter and vote (UL.1). Unprovable linkability of
voter and vote (UL.2) is referred to in [VK06].
4.4. Verifiability
Verifiability is, first of all, closely related to accuracy. However, it has also been
claimed that eligibility and uniqueness should be verifiable (see Section 3.2). There-
fore, we consider these security requirements first. The existence of a public bulletin
board is assumed as a precondition for verifiability in the following.3
Accuracy
Accuracy states that only valid votes should be counted (soundness), and that each
valid vote should be counted correctly (completeness and inalterability), see Sec-
tion 2.1.1. This is equivalent to requiring that no cast vote may be altered, deleted
or duplicated, and no invalid votes may be counted in the final tally (i.e. spoilt votes
are to be counted as such without incorporating them into the tally). Thus, accuracy
3Electronic voting schemes using direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines usually provide
for a paper trail which can be used for a manual recount without referring to a public bulletin
board. However, as we explicitly include online voting in our considerations, the existence of a
public broadcast channel must be assumed for verifiability.
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essentially refers to the integrity of the votes.4 In voting systems, we have two types
of integrity:
Integrity of the individual vote: no vote is deleted or altered in voting and tallying
phase.
Integrity of the set of all votes: no vote is deleted or altered in tallying phase, and
no vote is added to the set of all votes in tallying phase.
The latter is restricted to the tallying phase since the integrity of the set of all
votes can only be assessed once this collection is complete, that is, after the voting
phase has ended (cf. [Pie06]). Note that we speak about integrity of votes as the
ballots may be processed and, thus, modified in tallying phase, for example by a
reencryption mixnet [JJR02].
While individual verifiability refers to the integrity of the individual vote, universal
verifiability usually refers to the integrity of the set of all votes: each voter can verify
the integrity of his own vote, and anyone can verify the integrity of the set of all
votes. However, it has been claimed that eligibility and uniqueness should also be
universally verifiable, i.e. verifiable by anyone (see Section 3.2). Therefore, both
must be considered to be potentially subject to universal verifiability. Thus, we refer
to the accuracy-related component of universal verifiability as accuracy verifiability
in the following.5
Eligibility and uniqueness
Eligibility requires that only eligible voters cast a vote, while uniqueness requires that
each voter casts at most one vote that is counted; together they are referred to as
democracy (see Section 2.1.2). This security requirement should also be universally
verifiable, i.e. anyone should be able to verify that only eligible voters cast a vote,
and that each voter cast at most one vote. As for accuracy verifiability, we consider
eligibility verifiability and uniqueness verifiability to be components of universal
verifiability.
4.4.1. Universal verifiability
Levels
In the previous paragraphs we have seen that accuracy as well as eligibility and
uniqueness should be universally verifiable. Thus, we distinguish the following levels
of universal verifiability:
4According to Pieters, integrity is the security variant of the safety property of accuracy: safety aims
at preventing errors (i.e. unintentional failure), while security refers to preventing unauthorized
data manipulation (i.e. intentional tampering) [Pie08].
5Note an important difference between privacy and accuracy: while privacy must not be compro-
mised, accuracy must not be compromised unnoticed. It is, of course, preferable to prevent any
violations of accuracy in order to avoid having to rerun the election. Still, privacy is usually not
considered to be subject to verifiability (cf. [VSL+09]).
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AV.1 Continuous accuracy verifiability. Anyone can verify all parts of the correct
processing of the ballots in tallying phase.6
AV.2 Discrete accuracy verifiability. Anyone can verify certain (but not all) parts
of the correct processing of the ballots in tallying phase.
EV.1 Unconditional eligibility verifiability. Anyone can verify that only eligible
voters cast votes without having to trust any party involved in establishing
eligibility.
EV.2 Conditional eligibility verifiability. Anyone can verify that only eligible voters
cast votes; however, it is required to trust certain parties involved in establish-
ing eligibility.
QV.1 Unconditional uniqueness verifiability. Anyone can verify that each voter
cast at most one vote that has been counted without having to trust any party
involved in establishing uniqueness.
QV.2 Conditional uniqueness verifiability. Anyone can verify that each voter cast
at most one vote that has been counted; however, it is required to trust certain
parties involved in establishing uniqueness.
Order
There is no relation between the different levels of universal verifiability in terms of
logic. However, one thing is common to all three components: the two main levels
distinguish the two cases that you either can verify all steps by yourself, or that you
have to trust certain parties involved. If a voting scheme offers discrete accuracy
verifiability, this implies that you have to trust certain parties involved in processing
the votes, while this is not required for continuous accuracy verifiability. Uncon-
ditional eligibility verifiability allows to verify that ballots have been cast only by
eligible voters without having to trust anyone, while conditional eligibility verifiabil-
ity requires trust in certain parties involved in establishing eligibility. Analogously,
unconditional uniqueness verifiability allows to verify that each voter cast at most
one vote without having to trust anyone, while conditional uniqueness verifiability
requires trust in certain parties involved in establishing uniqueness. Thus, the level
of universal verifiability is directly related to the level of trust which must be put into
the voting system. A high level of verifiability is, of course, preferable to a strong
need for trust.
Reference to model
In terms of linkability, universal verifiability comprises
6Recall that accuracy verifiability refers to the integrity of the set of all votes and, therefore, is
restricted to the tallying phase since the integrity of the set of all votes can only be assessed once
this collection is complete, that is, after the voting phase has ended (cf. [Pie06]).
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1. linkability of all voters with the set of received ballots (eligibility and uniqueness
verifiability), and
2. linkability of received ballots and counted votes (accuracy verifiability).
In terms of the (un)linkability model introduced in Section 4.2, accuracy verifiability
refers to the link between the received ballots B(V) and the set of all votes Σ(V)
(and, thus, matches the concept of counted-as-recorded [AN06]). Eligibility and
uniqueness verifiability are expressed by the link between all voters V and the set of
received ballots B(V). These relations are depicted in Figure 4.6.
In the model, eligibility requires that for each ballot in the set of received ballots,
there is a voter in the set of all eligible voters whomaps to this ballot. This is provided
due to our definition of the set of received ballots B(V) (see Section 4.2). Uniqueness
additionally requires that each voter is mapped to one ballot only. The difference
between the two levels of each component of universal verifiability (i.e. AV.1 and
AV.2, EV.1 and EV.2, QV.1 and QV.2) is not evident from the model.
Examples
The definitions of universal verifiability provided in [CMFP+06, Cet07, Smi05] cor-
respond to our definition of continuous accuracy verifiability including verifiability
of eligibility and even uniqueness, while the definition in [AN06] corresponds to con-
tinuous accuracy verifiability including verifying eligibility, but not uniqueness. The
definitions of universal verifiability provided in [Hir01, MN06, Pie06, DKR09] match
continuous accuracy verifiability without verifying eligibility or uniqueness.
4.4.2. Individual verifiability
Levels
Recall that individual verifiability gives the voter the possibility to verify that his
ballot is contained in the set of received ballots and contains the correct vote, i.e. the
vote which the voter intended to cast (see Section 4.2). Also, individual verifiability
is useless unless the voter can file a complaint in case there is something wrong with
his ballot (see Section 3.2). Thus, we distinguish the following levels of individual
verifiability:
IV.1 Inner individual verifiability. The voter can verify whether his ballot contains
the vote which the voter intended to cast.
IV.2 Outer individual verifiability. The voter can verify whether his ballot is cor-
rectly included in the set of received ballots which will be counted.
CO.1 Chance of objection w.r.t. inner individual verifiability. If his ballot does not
contain the vote which the voter intended to cast, the voter can claim this and
prove that his objection is justified.
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Figure 4.6.: Verifiability in the (un)linkability model
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CO.2 Chance of objection w.r.t. outer individual verifiability. If his ballot does
not appear on the bulletin board correctly, the voter can claim this and prove
that his objection is justified.
Order
IV.1 and IV.2 are orthogonal in the following sense: IV.1 refers to the vote contained
in the ballot, and IV.2 refers to the ballot contained in the set of received ballots. In
particular, the ballot referred to by IV.1 has not necessarily been cast yet. Therefore,
it may be a different ballot than the one referred to by IV.2. For instance, IV.1 can
refer to dummy ballots which are audited by the voter before he casts his actual
vote (we will see examples for this in Section 6). Therefore, in line with our above
definitions, the voter can only be assured that his cast ballot contains the vote he
intended to cast if IV.1 applies to the cast ballot, in which case IV.1 and IV.2 refer
to the same ballot.
Furthermore, CO.1 implies IV.1: if the voter cannot verify whether his ballot
contains the vote he intended to cast, he has no chance of objection. Similarly, CO.2
implies IV.2: if the voter cannot verify whether his ballot has been published on
the bulletin board, he has no chance of objection. On the other hand, if individual
verifiability without a chance of objection is provided, this means that the voter is
able to recognize that his ballot was not processed correctly, but has no chance to
claim this. This implies that the voter’s preference is not captured by the voting
system correctly, or even not at all.
Reference to model
IV.1 refers to the link between the ballot b and the vote τ(b). IV.2 refers to the
link between the ballot b and the set of received ballots B(V) and, additionally,
requires the voter to recognize his own ballot, which is expressed by the link be-
tween the voter v and his ballot β(v). These relations are depicted in Figure 4.6.
Note that IV.1 ∧ IV.2 matches the definition of ballot casting assurance in [AN06]
(cf. Section 4.2). The voter’s chance of objection is not captured by the model.
Examples
The definitions of individual verifiability provided in [Hir01, SP06, DKR09] cor-
respond to our definition of outer individual verifiability, while the definitions in
[Cet07, LGT+03, Smi05] match inner individual verifiability. The voter’s chance of
objection is also considered in [Rie98, BM03, LGT+03]. [LGT+03] distinguishes a
privacy-preserving and a privacy-compromising variant hereof. We do not consider
this differentiation since any chance of objection seems to be useless if it forces the
voter to disclose his voting decision.
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4.5. Interrelations
In the following we analyze the interrelations between universal and individual ver-
ifiability on the one hand and privacy and verifiability on the other hand. We also
investigate whether certain levels of privacy and verifiability are incompatible in
our model. Relations between different levels of either privacy, universal or indi-
vidual verifiability are not considered here as these have already been addressed in
Section 4.3, 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, respectively.
First we consider the relation between individual and universal verifiability. Re-
call that individual verifiability refers to the integrity of the individual vote in voting
phase. Note that the corresponding property in terms of being universally verifi-
able is accuracy verifiability, not universal verifiability, since the latter comprises the
possibility to verify other properties (i.e. eligibility and uniqueness) as well. Accu-
racy verifiability refers to the integrity of the set of all votes in tallying phase (see
Section 4.4). Both properties are related with each other as follows: by individual
verifiability, the voter can be assured that his ballot contains the correct vote (IV.1)
and that it has been included in the set of received ballots which will be counted
(IV.2). By continuous accuracy verifiability (AV.1), anyone can be assured that the
received ballots have been processed correctly and revealed exactly the votes that had
been cast in voting phase. If only discrete accuracy verifiability (AV.2) is provided,
some of the steps involved when processing the ballots may not be verifiable.
A sequential view of individual verifiability and accuracy verifiability is depicted
in Figure 4.7, assuming that the voter verifies his cast ballot after the voting phase
has ended. The lines delimited by arrows denote the range of the different levels of
individual verifiability and accuracy verifiability, respectively. The dashed line used
to depict AV.2 indicates that, for discrete accuracy verifiability, not all steps of the
correct processing of the ballots in tallying phase are verifiable. The dashed line
used for extending IV.1 toward the end of the voting phase indicates that IV.1 can
apply both to cast and uncast ballots (see Section 4.4.2). If IV.1 applies to the cast
ballot, both IV.1 and IV.2 refer to the same ballot (i.e. the one cast by the voter),
and the two corresponding lines can be thought of as collapsing into one single line.
In that case, accuracy is verifiable throughout the whole voting and tallying phase.
The transition from individual votes in voting phase to all votes in tallying phase is
required since we do not want anyone (not even the voter himself) to be able to track
individual votes in tallying phase, as this would imply establishing a link between
voter and vote.
Now we turn to the relation between privacy and verifiability. We have already
seen that, in the (un)linkability model, both privacy and verifiability are expressed
by the same link in the individual-related and the set-related scenario, respectively
(see Section 4.2). Viewed more closely, the following correspondence between our
definitions of privacy and verifiability becomes apparent: UL.1a, UL.2a and IV.2
refer to the link between voter v and ballot β(v) (see Figures 4.5 and 4.6): UL.1a
requires unlinkability of voter and ballot, while UL.2a requires unprovable linkability
of voter and ballot. IV.2 presupposes that the voter recognizes his ballot, which is
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Figure 4.7.: Sequential view of individual verifiability and accuracy verifiability
as well expressed by the link between voter and ballot, and additionally requires
that the ballot can be linked to the set of received ballots. If both UL.1a and IV.2
are supposed to hold, then the link between the voter and his ballot must not be
identifiable by any other entity. If both UL.2a and IV.2 shall hold, then any link
between the voter and his ballot must not be provable to third parties. In particular,
this implies that the ballot must not be published on the bulletin board next to the
voter’s name.
Similarly, UL.1b, UL.2b and IV.1 refer to the link between ballot b and vote τ(b):
UL.1b requires unlinkability of ballot and vote, while UL.2b requires unprovable
linkability of ballot and vote. IV.1 requires that the voter is able to link ballot and
vote. If both UL.1b and IV.1 are supposed to hold, then it must not be possible for
any other entity to establish the link between the ballot and the contained vote, while
for providing UL.2b and IV.1 at the same time, this link must not be provable to
third parties. Therefore, inner individual verifiability (IV.1) can easily be reconciled
with unlinkability of ballot and vote if IV.1 is provided for uncast ballots only. We
get back to this in Chapter 6.
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In the previous chapter we have proposed an (un)linkability model for voting, and
we have compiled the conceivable levels of privacy and verifiability. We can already
apply the results to existing voting schemes by determining the level of privacy and
verifiability provided. However, for a more profound analysis we need to consider
the scheme in the presence of an adversary.
One approach would be to take the adversary model proposed by Dolev and Yao
[DY83]. However, this model has two drawbacks:
1. It may be too strong: with respect to our goal of establishing a taxonomy for
privacy and verifiability in voting, we want to differentiate not only between
several levels of these security properties, but also between different levels of
adversarial power. For example, elections in associations may require a less
powerful adversary than parliamentary elections, or it may be of interest to
determine the impact of a single person with limited power, not an adversary
who can control all communications. The Dolev-Yao attacker model lacks the
flexibility required to accomplish this.
2. It may be too weak : the Dolev-Yao model assumes that that cryptography
works perfectly. However, cryptographic schemes may turn out to be broken,
and messages encrypted with such schemes may eventually be decrypted with-
out using the secret key. In electronic voting schemes, encrypted data is often
published for the sake of verifiability (for example encrypted votes posted to
a bulletin board next to the voters’ names). Thus, such attack scenarios con-
stitute a serious threat in electronic voting, but they are not captured by the
Dolev-Yao model.
Therefore, this chapter provides a comprehensive collection of different adversary
capabilities. They constitute building blocks which can be combined in order to
obtain a fine-tuned adversary model for specific use cases. We also analyze how
the individual adversary capabilities can be used to mount attacks on privacy and
verifiability.
Chapter overview
In Section 5.1 we define the setting which is taken as a basis for the following consid-
erations. Subsequently, we consider different adversary capabilities in Section 5.2. In
Section 5.3 and 5.4 we consider which attacks on privacy or, respectively, verifiability
arise from specific adversary capabilities. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this chapter are
joint work with Hugo Jonker and Wolter Pieters published in [5].
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Figure 5.1.: Adversary communication model
5.1. Setting
In order to define our setting, we consider the components of a generic electronic
voting system in the presence of an adversary (see Figure 5.1). Such a system consists
of voters, several election authorities (EAs), a public bulletin board (BB), and an
adversary. The voters are registered by the election authorities and subsequently cast
ballots which are processed by (possibly different) election authorities. The bulletin
board is used by the voters and the election authorities in order to post messages
for reasons of verifiability. We assume that the election authorities communicate via
the bulletin board. Thus, in our setting, the following communication channels do
exist, and are represented by solid lines in Figure 5.1:
– from the voter and each election authority to the bulletin board
– between the voter and each election authority
The communication occurring over any of these channels may employ a range of
cryptographic primitives such as encryption or blind signatures (see Section 2.2).
Besides affecting the existing communication channels, the adversary can possibly
also create new communication channels (represented by dashed lines in Figure 5.1)
to existing entities. Note that, even if the adversary has none of the capabilities
considered below, he learns the information posted to the bulletin board as it is
assumed to be public knowledge (see Section 2.2.7).
We restrict ourselves to protocol level in the following and, therefore, we do not
consider implementation aspects such as corrupted software developers or adminis-
trators.1
1For the same reason, we do not consider side channel attacks, for example those exploiting elec-
tromagnetic radiation emanating from voting machines, see the Tempest discussion [Pie09].
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5.2. Adversary capabilities
We consider two different categories of adversary capabilities: communication abil-
ities and cryptographic abilities. For the former, we further distinguish between
the adversary’s abilities concerning existing communication channels, and his abil-
ity to create new channels. This leads to the following categorization of adversary
capabilities:
I. Existing communication channels
II. New communication channels
III. Cryptography
We consider each of them more thoroughly in the following.
5.2.1. Capabilities concerning existing communication channels
We distinguish the following adversary capabilities regarding the ways in which the
adversary can affect existing communication channels:
Ia. The adversary is able to detect channel usage.
Ib. The adversary is able to determine the sender of a message.
Ic. The adversary is able to eavesdrop on the communication channels.
Id. The adversary is able to block communication channels and thus suppress mes-
sages that are sent via these channels.
Ie. The adversary is able to inject messages into the communication channels.
If. The adversary is able to modify messages sent over the communication channels.
An untappable channel provides perfect privacy [JCJ05] and thus protects against an
adversary with any of the above capabilities. An anonymous channel protects against
an adversary with capability Ib, but is still subject to attacks by an adversary with
any of the capabilities Ia and Ic-f. Thus, when analyzing voting schemes in light
of the adversary capabilities, Ib and Ia-f are not considered for channels which are
assumed to be anonymous or untappable, respectively.
5.2.2. Capabilities concerning new communication channels
For the second category, we consider the following adversary capabilities:
IIa. The voter can send messages to the adversary.
IIb. An election authority can send messages to the adversary.
IIc. The adversary can send messages to a voter.
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IId. The adversary can send messages to an election authority.
IIe. The adversary can post messages to the bulletin board.
By repeated use of powers IIa-d, the adversary establishes one-way or two-way com-
munications with groups of voters and/or groups of election authorities. Scenarios
IIb and IId can refer both to different authorities (for example registration authority
or tallying authority) and to different members of the same authority in a distributed
setting (for example a tallying authority divided into several tellers).
Scenarios IIa and IIb model voters or, respectively, election authorities who coop-
erate with the adversary by leaking secrets, whereas IIc and IId model an adversary
who coerces election authorities or voters, respectively (this is considered more thor-
oughly in the next paragraph). The difference between Ic and IIa, respectively IIb,
is that for Ic, the adversary can know all information sent via the affected chan-
nel, while for the other two variants he is restricted to the information provided to
him by the collaborating party, i.e. the voter or the election authority, respectively.2
Capability IIe models an adversary who can corrupt the bulletin board by posting
unauthorized messages.
Receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance
The scenarios IIa and IIc are inspired by [KT09] and aim at modeling receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance, respectively: scenario IIa models a voter who cooperates
with the adversary by leaking secrets (for example receipts proving his vote). Sce-
nario IIc models an adversary who is trying to coerce the voter, for example by
furnishing the voter with voting material in order to cast a specific (or a random)
vote. Combining IIa and IIc models interaction between voter and adversary and
covers simulation, randomization and forced-abstention attacks (cf. Section 2.1.6 and
[JCJ05]). This scenario corresponds to the two-way communication channel consid-
ered in [KT09]. Similarly, IIb and IId model the case that an election authority
cooperates with the adversary or, respectively, is coerced by the adversary.
5.2.3. Cryptographic capabilities
For the third category, we do not assume that cryptography works perfectly as
opposed to the standard Dolev-Yao attacker model [DY83]:
IIIa. The adversary is able to break any cryptography which provides only compu-
tational security.
As noted above, it makes sense to consider the case that the adversary can break
cryptography in order to identify breaches of privacy that may occur, for example,
at a time when cryptographic algorithms have become insecure. Thus, even if voter
and ballot or ballot and vote cannot be linked at present, in the long term this may
2This information, however, has not necessarily been sent elsewhere before.
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become feasible, for example because cryptographic schemes providing only com-
putational security have become insecure.3 A voting scheme using cryptographic
algorithms which provide information-theoretic security is secure against an adver-
sary with capability IIIa.
5.3. Attacks on privacy
So far in this chapter we have defined a set of adversary capabilities which are
independent of the security properties considered in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6 we
will analyze to what extent an adversary with different capabilities can affect the
level of privacy and verifiability provided by different voting protocols. Therefore,
in preparation for Chapter 6, we now consider how the adversary can use these ca-
pabilities to attack privacy or verifiability. Note that the following considerations
are preliminary: more precise statements regarding the relation between the adver-
sary capabilities and possible attack scenarios require focusing on a specific voting
protocol; we will do so in Chapter 6.
We start by considering the adversary capabilities which are relevant for attacks
on voter privacy, and subsequently consider the capabilities which can be used to
attack verifiability in Section 5.4. Each time we go through the different categories
of adversary capabilities as defined in Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.3.
5.3.1. Capabilities concerning existing communication channels
If the adversary is able to detect usage of the channel from the voter to the voting
system (Ia) and, additionally, can determine the sender of a message (Ib), he will
most certainly be able to decide whether a certain voter cast a ballot. Undecidable
voter abstention (A.1, see Section 4.3) is lost in this case (supposed that this privacy
level had been provided before).
If the adversary can determine the sender of a message (Ib) and, at the same
time, eavesdrop on the channel which is used by the voter to cast his ballot (Ic), the
adversary can link the voter and his ballot. This implies that unlinkability of voter
and ballot (UL.1a) is lost, although the link is not provable (UL.2a), unless the voter
has signed his ballot. Note that this attack may, however, not necessarily degrade
the privacy level provided, for example in a voting system which posts ballots next
to the names of voters who cast them, thereby publishing the link between the voter
and his ballot.
As we will see in Section 5.4, the remaining capabilities of category I can mostly
be exploited to compromise accuracy and eligibility.
3Long-term security in electronic voting and long-term privacy in particular has been addressed
for example in [VH04], [VK06] and [GKM+06].
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5.3.2. Capabilities concerning new communication channels
A channel from the voter to the adversary (IIa) can be used by the voter to disclose
his ballot or even his voting decision to the adversary, in which case either unlink-
ability of voter and ballot (UL.1a) or even unlinkability of voter and vote (UL.1) is
compromised. If the adversary obtains sensitive information (such as private keys)
from corrupted election authorities (IIb), this information may reveal the link be-
tween ballot and vote (recall that the ballot is the encrypted or otherwise concealed
vote, cf. Section 4.1). In this case unlinkability of ballot and vote (UL.1b) is lost,
and if the link between the voter and his ballot is public, then voter and vote can
be linked (i.e. UL.1 is lost). Note that this attack is particularly dangerous since the
according link may be revealed for all voters at the same time. An adversary with
capability IIc can provide the voter with a predetermined ballot to be cast. Thus,
voter and vote can obviously be linked (no UL.1). Moreover, as the adversary acts
as the voter in this case, the voter is excluded from the election. As we will see in
Section 5.4, the remaining capabilities of category II (i.e. IId and IIe) can rather be
exploited to compromise eligibility.
5.3.3. Cryptographic capabilities
If the ballot is an encryption of the vote (which holds for most voting schemes),
an adversary who can break cryptography (IIIa) is able to link ballot and vote.
Unlinkability of ballot and vote (UL.1b) is compromised in this case, which may lead
to a total loss of privacy in case the link between voter and ballot is public. Note
that the threat posed by an adversary with capability IIIa is far more dangerous for
privacy than most of the capabilities we considered so far (besides IIb): the attacks
can be established on a massive scale, i.e. for all voters at the same time.
5.4. Attacks on verifiability
Unlike with privacy, verifiability is a requirement for which attack scenarios cannot
be defined straightforwardly. To understand this, let us recall what verifiability
comprises according to Section 4.4: while universal verifiability allows the public
to verify that the integrity of the collection of cast votes (AV) as well as eligibility
(EV) and uniqueness (QV) have been maintained, individual verifiability allows each
voter to verify the correctness of ballot preparation and the integrity of his individual
vote or ballot (IV). Thus, verifiability aims at proving that accuracy, eligibility and
uniqueness have been met, and thus helps to detect attacks aimed at these properties.
Consequently, verifiability is compromised if a violation of any of these properties
remains undetected. In the following we thus consider specific attacks on accuracy,
eligibility and uniqueness which are enabled by the adversary capabilities defined in
Section 5.2.
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5.4.1. Capabilities concerning existing communication channels
As explained in Section 5.3, the capabilities Ia-c can be exploited to compromise
privacy. An adversary limited to such abilities cannot actively interfere with the
voting system and, therefore, cannot compromise verifiability.
An adversary able to block the channel from the voter to the voting system (Id)
can prevent the cast ballot from being received by the voting system. This attack
may be recognized by the voter due to outer individual verifiability (IV.2) and also
claimed if an according chance of objection (CO.2) is provided. Otherwise, the
integrity of the individual vote is compromised since a legitimately cast ballot is not
captured by the voting system (and therefore lost). If the adversary injects his own
ballot into the communication channel from any voter to the voting system (Ie),
he may seize this voter’s right to vote. Should the voter not have cast his ballot
yet, he is deprived of this possibility, which compromises eligibility. The voter may
be able to recognize the fraud due to outer individual verifiability (IV.2), and also
be able to claim it if an according chance of objection (CO.2) is provided. It is,
however, unlikely for a voter who has not voted yet to verify whether someone has
cast a ballot in his place (cf. [Adi08] and Section 6.1.2). If the voter has already
cast his ballot and the adversary, in addition to injecting messages, has also the
capability to block this channel (Id), he may substitute this voter’s ballot with his
own illegal one, thus infringing both accuracy (i.e. integrity of the individual vote)
and eligibility. Again, the voter may recognize (IV.2) and claim this (CO.2). An
adversary equipped with capability If is able to modify ballots that are being sent to
the voting system, thus compromising accuracy. Such attacks can be detected by the
voter if outer individual verifiability (IV.2) is ensured, and reported if an according
chance of objection (CO.2) is provided. If the option of multiple voting is provided,
the voter can also recast his vote.
5.4.2. Capabilities concerning new communication channels
As explained in Section 5.3, the capabilities IIa-c can mostly be used to compromise
privacy. If limited to capability IIa or IIb, the adversary can merely obtain mes-
sages from the voter (IIa) or an election authority (IIb), which is not sufficient to
compromise verifiability. Similarly, only privacy is affected by an adversary sending
messages to a voter (IIc) in terms of providing this voter with a predetermined ballot.
Capability IId allows the adversary to send messages to election authorities. This
can be exploited in registration phase by forcing the registration authority to add
the adversary to the voter list, thus compromising eligibility. Listing ineligible voters
may be noticed if unconditional eligibility verifiability (EV.1) is provided; in case only
conditional eligibility verifiability (EV.2) is provided, an election authority must
be trusted for the verification. An adversary capable of sending messages to the
bulletin board (IIe) can post unauthorized ballots which may be counted by the
voting system. If this attack happens in voting phase, it affects eligibility, and may
51
5. Adversary model
be detected by eligibility verifiability (EV).4 If the adversary mounts this attack in
tallying phase, then integrity of the set of all votes is as well compromised, which may
be detected by accuracy verifiability (AV). Note that, if the adversary is an eligible
voter, this attack affects uniqueness as well, and may be detected by uniqueness
verifiability (QV).
5.4.3. Cryptographic capabilities
An adversary able to break cryptography (IIIa) can mount attacks on privacy as
explained in Section 5.3. In a voting scheme which uses electronic signatures to
authenticate voters, the adversary can use this capability to forge a voter’s signature.
This way an unauthorized ballot is authenticated, which compromises eligibility.
5.5. Summary
In Section 5.2 of this chapter we provided several adversary capabilities, divided
into different categories related to communication and cryptography. These capa-
bilities can be used as building blocks for defining a fine-tuned adversary model for
specific election scenarios. In Section 5.3 and 5.4 we assessed how the adversary
capabilities defined in Section 5.2 can be used to mount attacks on privacy and ver-
ifiability, respectively. Overall, it turned out that attacks on privacy are usually
passive (e.g. eavesdropping, obtaining information from corrupted voters or election
authorities), while attacks on verifiability (i.e. undetected attacks on accuracy, eli-
gibility and uniqueness) require the adversary to actively interfere with the voting
system (e.g. by modifying sent messages or injecting new messages). Table 5.1 pro-
vides an overview of the results. We will reconsider the attack types enabled by the
different adversary capabilities at the end of Chapter 6.
4Note that integrity of the set of all votes is not affected in this case since this collection is not
complete until the voting phase has ended, cf. Section 4.4.
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Table 5.1.: Adversary capabilities affecting the security requirements
privacy verifiability
accuracy eligibility uniqueness
Ia+b X
Ib+c X
Id X
Ie X
If X
IIa X
IIb X
IIc X
IId X
IIe X X X
IIIa X X
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In Chapters 4 and 5, we have
1. introduced an (un)linkability model for voting which captures privacy as well
as verifiability,
2. compiled different levels of privacy and verifiability, referring to our (un)link-
ability model, and
3. provided a list of different adversary capabilities that can be employed to attack
privacy and verifiability.
Together, these three components form our taxonomy for privacy and verifiability in
electronic voting. In this chapter we demonstrate the applicability of the taxonomy
by using it to analyze the security of several state-of-the-art voting schemes.
Chapter overview
We apply the taxonomy to Helios 1.0 [Adi08] in Section 6.1, Helios 2.0 [AdMPQ09] in
Section 6.2, and Preˆt a` Voter [CRS05] in Section 6.3. After giving a brief description
of the respective scheme, we first classify the basic level of privacy and verifiability
provided, and subsequently consider attacks on privacy and verifiability which can be
mounted by an adversary with different capabilities. We use the notation introduced
in Chapters 4 and 5. In particular, we abstract from implementation details and
express each voting protocol in terms of the setting described in Section 5.1. The
results of our analysis are discussed in Section 6.4.
An earlier version of Section 6.1 and 6.2 has been published as [7], while Section 6.3
has been published in [5].
6.1. Helios 1.0
6.1.1. Description
Helios 1.0 is a remote electronic voting system [Adi08] which has been designed for
elections where the risk of coercion can be considered low, as for example universities
and local clubs. Helios 1.0 has a single trusted component, the Helios server, and
uses a public bulletin board. Since there is no direct communication between the
voter and the bulletin board, the latter can be considered part of the Helios server.
In registration phase, voters obtain an email with their user name and the ran-
domly generated election-specific password. This email also contains the Internet
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address of the virtual voting booth provided by the Helios server as well as a hash
of the election parameters. Upon entering the Internet address, all parameters and
templates required for preparing the ballot are downloaded. Ballot preparation hap-
pens oﬄine and is separated from ballot casting: anyone can generate and audit
ballots; voters are authenticated only at ballot casting time.
After the user has made his choices and finished ballot preparation by sealing the
ballot, the voting system commits to the encrypted vote by displaying a hash of
the ciphertext. Next, the correct preparation of the ballot can either be audited, or
the ballot can be cast after the voter has been authenticated (Benaloh challenge,
see [Ben07]). If the user chooses to audit the ballot, the ciphertext and the random-
ness used for encryption is displayed, which allows for checking that the vote was
correctly transformed into the ballot.1 The voter can either run his own verification
code to ensure that the encryption was correct, or he can use the Ballot Encryption
Verification program provided. If the voter chooses to cast the ballot, he is authen-
ticated and his ballot is recorded and posted to the bulletin board next to the voter
name. The voter obtains a confirmation email containing his encrypted vote and its
hash.
In tallying phase the ballots are processed by a mixnet (see Section 2.2.6). Proofs
of correct shuﬄing and correct decryption are provided using the method proposed
in [SK95] and published on the bulletin board. After all proofs have been generated
and the result has been tallied, the Helios server deletes the permutation, random-
ness, and secret key for that election.
6.1.2. Analysis
Basic level of privacy and verifiability
The hashed encrypted vote is published next to the voter name on the bulletin board,
and the encrypted vote is visible as well. This establishes a provable2 link between
voter and ballot as anyone can verify the link on the bulletin board. Thus, if the
adversary is restricted to public information, he can provably link voter and ballot,
but cannot link ballot and vote, i.e. we have UL.1b, but no UL.1a and no UL.2a
(see the first row of Table 6.1). Voter abstention is decidable and provable (no A.1,
no A.2) as the bulletin board shows which voters have cast a vote by publishing the
hashed encrypted vote next to their name.
The correct processing of the cast votes is continuously verifiable by the public
(AV.1) due to the proofs of correct mixing and tallying. Eligibility is verifiable since
Helios 1.0 publishes a voters’ register containing the names of all eligible voters
[Adi08, Section 4.2]. Thus, anyone can check, without having to trust anyone, that
1If the vote is cast hereafter, a different random value is used for encryption, thus producing a
different ciphertext.
2We assume that all public information is provable. The contents of the bulletin board are assumed
to be signed by an election authority.
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ballots were cast only by voters listed in the voters’ register and that each voter cast
at most one vote (EV.1, QV.1).3
Helios 1.0 allows the voter to verify that his hashed encrypted vote is published
next to his name on the bulletin board (linkability of voter and ballot). Thus, outer
individual verifiability (IV.2) is provided. As the voter can check that the prepared
ballot contains the correct vote, inner individual verifiability of the uncast ballot
is provided (IV.1 (uncast)).4 A failure of this check can be claimed (CO.1) as the
according verification program is public. Note that this check can be performed by
anyone, thus providing universal verifiability of correct ballot preparation. If the
value published does not match the receipt which the voter obtained, the voter can
claim this by showing the confirmation email. However, as this email is not signed
by any election authority, it does not prove anything. Thus, no chance of objection
is given (no CO.2).
The levels of verifiability provided by Helios 1.0 are summarized in the second row
of Table 6.1.
Table 6.1.: Levels of privacy and verifiability provided by Helios 1.0
privacy UL.1b, no A.1, no A.2, no UL.1a, no UL.2a
verifiability AV.1, EV.1, QV.1, IV.1 (uncast), IV.2, CO.1, no CO.2
Ia no additional power
Ib + Ic no additional power
Ic no additional power
Id IV.2, but no CO.2 → voter excluded
Ie IV.2, but no CO.2 → voter excluded
If IV.2, but no CO.2 → voter excluded
IIa no UL.1b → no UL.1
IIb no UL.1b → no UL.1
IIc no UL.1, voter excluded
IId eligibility compromised, detected by EV.1
IIe voter impersonated (i.e. excluded)
IIIa eligibility compromised; no UL.2, no UL.1b → no UL.1
3We assume that publishing a voters’ register which contains voter names is sufficient to establish
unconditional eligibility and uniqueness as listing ineligible voters would be noticed with high
probability.
4In the following, inner individual verifiability referring to ballots which are not cast is denoted by
IV.1 (uncast), see Section 4.4.2.
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Privacy and verifiability in the presence of an adversary
Now we consider how the different adversary capabilities introduced in Section 5.2
can be employed to establish either undesired linkability, i.e. a loss of privacy, or
undesired unlinkability, i.e. a loss of verifiability. We also state whether the attacks
can be detected and claimed by the voter.
Capabilities concerning existing communication channels. There is only one ex-
isting communication channel, namely between the voter and the Helios server. The
ability to detect channel usage (Ia) does not add any power to the adversary as the
fact which voter cast a vote is public knowledge anyway. If the adversary can eaves-
drop on the communication channel from the voter to the Helios server (Ic) and, at
the same time, determine the sender of a message (Ib), he can link the voter and his
ballot (no UL.1a). This, however, does not add any power to the adversary as this
link is public. Unlinkability of ballot and vote (UL.1b) is provided in this scenario
as the randomness used for encrypting the vote never leaves the voting terminal.
The adversary can use capability Id to block the channel from the voter to the
Helios server and, thus, prevent this voter’s ballot from being listed in the set of
received ballots. The voter can recognize this (IV.2), but cannot claim it (no CO.2):
the confirmation email sent to the voter upon vote casting is not signed and, thus,
does not constitute a valid receipt which could be used to prove the fraud. Also, if
the adversary is blocking the channel between the voter and the Helios server, the
voter will will most likely not obtain this email. Thus, the voter is excluded from
the election.
If the adversary can inject messages into the communication channel from the
voter to the Helios server (Ie) before this voter has cast his vote, he can inject
his own ballot, thus excluding that voter from the election. As already noted, the
voter recognizes this (IV.2), but has no means to claim this due to the unsigned
confirmation email (no CO.2). As multiple voting is not provided, the voter cannot
escape this attack by just recasting his vote.
An adversary equipped with capability If is able to modify ballots that are being
sent to the Helios server. Such attacks can be detected by the voter due to IV.2;
however, they cannot be reported (no CO.2) due to the deficient receipt. Here as
well, the voter cannot recast his vote as multiple voting is not provided.
Capabilities concerning new communication channels. If the voter gives away his
ballot information (for example by using the “Coerce Me!” button provided for voter
education [Adi08], adversary capability IIa), the adversary can link ballot and vote
(no UL.1b). As the link between voter and ballot is public (no UL.1a), voter and
vote can be linked (no UL.1).
If the election server leaks the private decryption key (IIb), ballot and vote can be
linked (no UL.1b), which again implies that voter and vote can be linked (no UL.1).
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An adversary with capability IIc can provide the voter with a predetermined ballot
to be cast, thus linking voter and vote (no UL.1) and excluding the voter from the
election.
If equipped with capability IId, the adversary can force the Helios server to add his
name to the voter list in registration phase and thus compromise eligibility. However,
listing ineligible voters is noticed with high probability due to EV.1.
If the adversary tries to post unauthorized votes to the bulletin board (scenario
IIe), he either has to ensure that his name has been entered in the list of eligible
voters (see IId), or he has to use the name of an authorized voter who is abstaining.
While in [Adi08] it is claimed that impersonating abstaining voters is detected by
means of individual verifiability, we argue that it is not realistic to assume that
an abstaining voter will audit the bulletin board to see whether someone tried to
impersonate him.
Cryptographic capabilities. An adversary who is able to break the encryption
scheme (IIIa) can link each ballot to the contained vote (no UL.1b). As the en-
crypted vote is posted next to the voter name on the bulletin board, the adversary
can thus link each voter to his vote (no UL.1). The link is provable as anyone can
verify the decryption (no UL.2b implies no UL.2 due to no UL.2a).
An adversary able to break the signature scheme used for signing the voter’s
registration data (IIIa) can issue fake registration material to voters. Any voter
affected by this attack will have his vote refused by the election server in voting
phase. Upon showing the signed receipt, however, the voter is probably granted
access to the voting system, even though he may not be eligible. Thus, eligibility is
compromised in this case.
The levels of privacy and verifiability provided by Helios 1.0 depending on the
different adversary capabilities are summarized in Table 6.1. In this table, each
row shows which levels of privacy or verifiability are (not) provided depending on
the adversary capabilities assumed. If several attacks are feasible, these have been
unified in the table.
6.2. Helios 2.0
6.2.1. Description
Helios 2.0 was used in the 2009 presidential election at the Universite´ catholique de
Louvain (UCL) in Belgium [AdMPQ09]. It differs from Helios 1.0 mainly by pro-
viding modular authentication based on existing UCL credentials, publishing voter
aliases instead of voter names, using homomorphic encryption instead of a mixnet
for anonymizing the votes, and employing a distributed tallying authority. Table 6.2
shows the main differences between Helios 1.0 and 2.0.
Helios 2.0 comprises an election server, a registration authority and a distributed
tallying authority. Like for Helios 1.0, a public bulletin board is used, which is
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Table 6.2.: Main differences between Helios 1.0 and 2.0
Helios 1.0 Helios 2.0
voter authentication user name + password credentials
ballot posted next to voter name voter alias
anonymization of votes mixnet homomorphic encryption
tallying authority centralized distributed
assumed to be part of the election server in the following. The ballot is composed
of an encryption of a yes/no vote for each candidate and a zero-knowledge proof of
the validity of the contained plaintexts (see Section 2.2.3). In registration phase,
voters use their UCL credentials to register and obtain their alias5 and the election-
specific password in a pdf file signed by the registration authority. Ballot preparation
is separated from ballot casting; both are carried out as for Helios 1.0, with one
difference: multiple voting is allowed. Verification programs provided by third parties
can be used by the voters to verify the proper encryption of their ballot. Each voter
obtains a receipt on having voted, i.e. an email which is signed by the election server
and contains the hash of his encrypted vote. This receipt is also posted to the
bulletin board next to the voter alias. Tallying the votes6 comprises verifying the
zero-knowledge proofs included in each ballot and jointly decrypting the encrypted
sum of the votes. The votes are tallied oﬄine. Each teller publishes his decryption
share and a zero-knowledge proof of correct decryption.
6.2.2. Analysis
Basic level of privacy and verifiability
The hashed encrypted vote is published next to a voter alias on the bulletin board.
A list containing the encrypted vote associated to each voter alias can also be down-
loaded for audit. This establishes a link between voter alias and ballot. The link
between the voter alias and the voter name is only known to the registration author-
ity (and, of course, to the voter). If the adversary is restricted to public information,
Helios 2.0 thus provides undecidable voter abstention (A.1), unlinkability of voter
and ballot (UL.1a), and unlinkability of ballot and vote (UL.1b) (see the first row
of Table 6.3). This implies that A.2, UL.1b and UL.2b are provided as well (see
Section 4.3).
Since the decryption shares held by the tellers are published together with a zero-
knowledge proof of correct decryption, the correct processing of the cast votes is
5For the UCL election, this was the letters “ER” followed by six digits.
6In the UCL election, a sophisticated vote weighting according to the voter category was carried
out before tallying. We do not consider this as it is not relevant to our analysis. For details refer
to [AdMPQ09].
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continuously verifiable by the public (AV.1). Helios 2.0 publishes a voters’ register
containing the aliases of all eligible voters. Hence, anyone can check that ballots were
cast only under aliases listed in the voters’ register. Eligibility is thus verifiable under
the assumption that the registration authority did not issue voter aliases to persons
not authorized to vote (EV.2), and uniqueness is verifiable under the assumption
that the registration authority did not issue multiple aliases to single voters (QV.2).
Helios 2.0 allows the voter to verify that his hashed encrypted vote is published
next to his alias on the bulletin board and thus provides outer individual verifiability
(IV.2). As the voter can check that the prepared ballot contains the correct vote,
inner individual verifiability of the uncast ballot is provided (IV.1 (uncast)). Due to
the verification programs provided by independent third parties, a failed check on
ballot preparation can be publicly claimed (CO.1). If the value published does not
match the receipt which the voter obtained, the voter can claim this by showing the
receipt which was signed by the election authority (CO.2). However, if the adversary
manages to seize the receipt which the voter needs to prove a fraud (either by cor-
rupting the registration authority, scenario IIb, or by blocking the communication
channels, scenario Id), the chance of objection is lost.
The levels of verifiability provided by Helios 2.0 are summarized in the second row
of Table 6.3.
Privacy and verifiability in the presence of an adversary
Now we consider how the different adversary capabilities introduced in Section 5.2
can be employed to establish either undesired linkability, i.e. a loss of privacy, or
undesired unlinkability, i.e. a loss of verifiability. We also state whether the attacks
can be detected and claimed by the voter.
Capabilities concerning existing communication channels. The following commu-
nication channels do exist:
1. between the registration authority and the voter, and
2. between the voter and the election server.
The communication channel from the tellers to the election server is not considered
as tallying happens oﬄine (the tellers only publish their decryption shares, and
robustness is achieved by having backups of the keys).
First we consider the communication channel from the registration authority to the
voter. This channel is used to provide the voter with his voting credentials (i.e. voter
alias and password). By detecting channel usage (Ia) and identifying the sender of
the registration request (Ib), the adversary knows that a certain voter registered for
the election, but does not learn his alias. However, this does not mean that this
voter will also cast a vote and, thus, does not affect privacy. Identifying the sender
of the registration request (Ib) and eavesdropping on this channel when the alias is
sent (Ic) provides the link between a voter and his alias. Thus, upon visiting the
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Table 6.3.: Levels of privacy and verifiability provided by Helios 2.0
privacy (A.1, UL.1a, UL.1b) → (A.2, UL.2a, UL.2b)
verifiability AV.1, EV.2, QV.2, IV.1 (uncast), IV.2, CO.1, CO.2
Ia no additional power
Ia + Ib A.2, no A.1
Ib + Ic A.2, UL.2a, no A.1, no UL.1a
Id IV.2, no CO.2 → voter excluded
Ie salvageable due to multiple voting
If IV.2, CO.2
IIa A.2, UL.2a, no A.1, no UL.2b, no UL.1a, no UL.1b → no UL.1
IIb
reg. auth. A.2, UL.2a, no A.1, no UL.1a
reg. + tall. auth. A.2, UL.2a, no A.1, no UL.2b, no UL.1a, no UL.1b → no UL.1
IIc no UL.1, voter excluded
IIe + Ic IV.2, CO.2
IIe + IIb voter impersonated (i.e. excluded)
IIe + IId eligibility compromised, no voter harmed
IIIa no UL.1b, no UL.2b
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bulletin board at the end of the voting phase, voter abstention is decidable (no A.1),
yet not provable (A.2). Also, the adversary learns the link between the voter and
his ballot (no UL.1a), although he cannot prove it (UL.2a). The adversary can use
capability Id to block the channel between the registration authority and the voter.
This prevents the affected voter from obtaining his credentials and, thus, from voting.
He cannot claim this as the signed confirmation email is sent over the same, blocked
channel. Injecting messages into this channel (Ie) in order to supply the voter with
fake credentials requires the signature of the registration authority and, thus, does
not help the adversary unless the registration authority is corrupted. However, the
adversary could send an unsigned pdf file to the voter and hope that the voter will
not realize that the signature of the registration authority is missing. This could, in
effect, exclude the voter from the election as he would cast his ballot using invalid
credentials. Modifying valid credentials that are being sent over the affected channel
(If) does not help the adversary as this attack is recognized by the voter due to the
signature provided.
Now we consider the communication channel between the voter and the election
server. This channel is used by the voter to cast a ballot under his alias. If the
adversary detects channel usage and identifies the sender (Ia and Ib), he knows that
this voter participated in the election. Thus, voter abstention is decidable, yet not
provable (A.2, no A.1). If the adversary is able to eavesdrop on this channel (Ic) and
additionally can identify the sender (Ib), he can link the voter to his alias. As the
link between the alias and the ballot is public, this establishes a link between the
voter and his ballot (no UL.1a). Still, if no party is corrupt, unlinkability of voter
and vote is provided (due to UL.1b) as the randomness used for encrypting the vote
never leaves the voting terminal. Blocking this channel (Id) prevents the ballot from
being received by the election server. The voter recognizes this attack by visiting the
bulletin board (IV.2). However, as the adversary is blocking the channel between
the voter and the election server, the voter will most likely not obtain the receipt on
having voted and, thus, cannot object (no CO.2).
The adversary can use capability Ie to inject a ballot into the channel between
voter and election server. If this happens after the voter cast a ballot, the voter can
object by showing his signed receipt on the original ballot. If this happens before the
voter cast a ballot, the voter can complain by pointing out that he did not receive
a receipt on this ballot.7 In any case, he can recast his vote as multiple voting is
allowed. If the adversary can only modify ballots that are being sent to the bulletin
board (If), the voter recognizes this (IV.2) and is able to complain by showing his
receipt (CO.2).
Capabilities concerning new communication channels. If the voter (IIa) or the
registration authority (IIb) reveals the link between voter alias and voter name, then
voter abstention is decidable (no A.1) and voter and ballot can be linked (no UL.1a),
7It is questionable whether such a complaint would be successful as the confirmation emails are
supposed to provide a positive proof, not a negative one (by their absence).
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although both is not provable (A.2, UL.2a). If, additionally, the voter reveals the
randomness used for encryption (IIa), ballot and vote can be linked (no UL.1b,
which implies no UL.1 due to no UL.1a). The link is provable as it can be verified
using the information that has been published on the bulletin board (no UL.2b). If
both registration and tallying authority are corrupt (scenario IIb for all authorities),
voter and vote can be linked (no UL.1): the registration authority leaks the link
between voter name and alias, which makes voter abstention decidable (no A.1) and
establishes a link between voter and ballot (no UL.1a), and the tallying authority
leaks the private decryption key, which establishes a link between ballot and vote (no
UL.1b). Only the link between ballot and vote is provable as it can be verified using
the public information provided (no UL.2b). Note that, for the tallying authority to
be corrupt, it suffices if enough tellers are corrupt.
An adversary with capability IIc can provide the voter with a predetermined ballot
to be cast, thus linking voter and vote (no UL.1) and excluding the voter from the
election. If the adversary tries to post unauthorized ballots to the bulletin board
(scenario IIe), he has to use a valid alias. There are two possibilities to accomplish
this:
1. cooperate with a corrupt registration authority, or
2. use the alias of an abstaining voter.
If the adversary cooperates with a corrupt registration authority, he can either obtain
an alias from it (scenario IIb) or provide the registration authority with an alias which
is to be validated (scenario IId). If the registration authority provides the adversary
with an alias of an existing voter, then this voter is excluded from the election; in
case the alias does not belong to any other voter, then no voter is harmed. To use
the alias of an abstaining voter, the adversary must either corrupt the registration
authority in order to obtain the alias (which refers to IIb) or eavesdrop on the
communication channel from the registration authority to the voter (Ic). Using the
alias of an abstaining voter is detected by this voter if he visits the bulletin board
(IV.2); however, this is not a realistic assumption as already noted in Section 6.1.2.
The voter can claim that his vote was stolen as the signed hash of the encrypted
vote is missing on the bulletin board (CO.2). However, this chance of objection is
lost if a corrupt election server has signed the hash of the adversary’s ballot (IIb).
Cryptographic capabilities. As the link between the voter alias and the voter name
is only known to the registration authority (and to the voter), unlinkability of voter
and vote holds even if the encryption scheme is broken. In that case, only the link
between the ballot and the vote is provably revealed (no UL.1b, no UL.2b).
The levels of privacy and verifiability provided by Helios 2.0 depending on the
different adversary capabilities are summarized in Table 6.3. In this table, each
row shows which levels of privacy or verifiability are (not) provided depending on
the adversary capabilities assumed. If several attacks are feasible, these have been
unified in the table.
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6.3. Preˆt a` Voter
6.3.1. Description
Preˆt a` Voter [CRS05] is an electronic voting system that uses paper ballot forms
which are scanned. The voter retains part of the ballot as his encrypted receipt.
The scheme was originally developed by Ryan [Rya05] and since then extended many
times [CRS05, RS06b, LR08, Rya08]. For our analysis we refer to the version [CRS05]
which uses decryption mixnets.
The participants are voters, a vote scanning device (VSD), an election authority,
and k tellers.8 Prior to the election, the election authority generates9 a large number
of ballot forms consisting of two columns: while the left column contains a candidate
list determined by a cyclic offset from the base candidate ordering, the right column
holds a random value at the bottom, the onion, which cryptographically buries the
information necessary for reconstructing the candidate ordering on the left column.
Preˆt a` Voter allows for pre-election auditing by revealing the construction of se-
lected ballot forms. Thus, anyone can compute the onion as well as the offset for
the candidate ordering and thereby verify that the ballot form was prepared cor-
rectly. Each voter can also cast a dummy vote for a specific candidate. The ballot is
thereupon decrypted by the tellers, and the voter can verify that the decrypted vote
matches the one he intended to cast.
To cast the actual vote, the voter registers at the polling station and randomly
selects a ballot form. In the polling booth the voter marks the ballot with an X in
the right column next to the selected candidate (see Figure 6.1), removes the left
column showing the candidate ordering and shreds it. The right column is fed into
the VSD and subsequently retained by the voter as a receipt. Note that the VSD
does not learn the voter’s decision.
Once the election has closed, the VSD transmits the ballots to the bulletin board.
Each teller performs an anonymizing mix and decryption by subsequently operating
on the onions. Proper mixing is verifiable by randomized partial checking [JJR02].
6.3.2. Analysis
Basic level of privacy and verifiability
The voter casts his vote in a voting booth which establishes an untappable channel
between the voter and the VSD [XS06]. We assume that the adversary cannot enter
the voting booth, although he may be physically present at the polling station. Thus,
the adversary can spot which voter cast a vote, i.e. voter abstention is decidable
(no A.1). Still, he cannot prove this to anyone who is not present, which gives us
unprovable abstention (A.2). The ballots which are input to the voting system do
not contain any personal information of the voter (UL.1a). Also, individual ballots
8In terms of our model, EA1 is the election authority and EA2, . . ., EAk+1 are the tellers.
9There have to be significantly more ballot forms than the amount of eligible voters due to the
audit process which will be described later.
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Figure 6.1.: Marked ballot form in Preˆt a` Voter
cannot be linked to the contained votes (UL.1b) due to the mixing. If restricted
to public information, Preˆt a` Voter thus provides unlinkability of voter and ballot
(UL.1a) and unlinkability of ballot and vote (UL.1b) (see the first row of Table 6.4).
The correct processing of the ballots in the tallying phase can be publicly verified
by randomized partial checking [JJR02]. This establishes (probabilistic) linkability of
the set of received ballots and the set of all votes (AV.1). Eligibility and uniqueness
verifiability are not provided as no voters’ register is published and the voters are
not associated with the ballots cast (no EV, no QV). The election officials checking
voter eligibility and uniqueness at the polling station must be fully trusted not to
authorize ineligible persons for voting.
The voter can visit the bulletin board to check that his receipt is correctly posted
and hence correctly entered into the tallying process. This establishes linkability of
voter and ballot, i.e. outer individual verifiability (IV.2). If the value published does
not match the receipt which the voter obtained, the voter can claim this by showing
the receipt (CO.2). However, the voter does not obtain any proof that the random
onion belongs to the candidate order in the left column and will, thus, be decrypted
to the vote he intended to cast. Hence, inner individual verifiability of the cast ballot
is not provided.
Pre-election auditing, i.e. revealing the construction of selected ballot forms, es-
tablishes linkability of the ballot form and the candidate ordering and allows anyone
to verify correct ballot preparation. Upon casting a dummy vote, the ballot is de-
crypted by the tellers, and the voter can verify that the decrypted vote matches the
one he intended to cast (IV.1 of the uncast ballot). This establishes a link between
the (dummy) ballot and the (dummy) vote and assures the voter that his actual
ballot will contain the correct vote as well. As this auditing process is public, failed
checks can be claimed (CO.1).
The levels of verifiability provided by Preˆt a` Voter are summarized in the second
row of Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4.: Levels of privacy and verifiability provided by Preˆt a` Voter
privacy A.2, UL.1a, UL.1b, no A.1
verifiability AV.1, IV.1 (uncast), IV.2, CO.1, CO.2, no EV, no QV
Ia no additional power
Ib no additional power
Ic UL.2a, no UL.1a
Id IV.2, CO.2
Id + IIa IV.2, no CO.2 → voter excluded
Id + Ie eligibility compromised, no voter harmed
If IV.2, CO.2
If + IIa IV.2, no CO.2 → voter excluded
IIa UL.2a, no UL.1a
IIb no UL.1b, no UL.2b
IIa + IIb + IIc UL.2a, no UL.1a, no UL.1b → no UL.1
IId no UL.1b, no UL.2b
IIe eligibility compromised, no voter harmed
IIIa no UL.1b, no UL.2b
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Privacy and verifiability in the presence of an adversary
Now we consider how the different adversary capabilities introduced in Section 5.2
can be employed to establish either undesired linkability, i.e. a loss of privacy, or
undesired unlinkability, i.e. a loss of verifiability. We also state whether the attacks
can be detected and claimed by the voter.
Capabilities concerning existing communication channels. The only function of
the VSD is to transmit the information on the ballot to the bulletin board. We
consider this to be done by the voter directly. Thus, in our model, voter and VSD
are equal. Also, there is no remote communication between the voter and any of
the election authorities as voter authentication is established at the polling station.
Thus, we have two existing communication channels:
1. from the voter to the bulletin board, and
2. from the tellers to the bulletin board.10
First, we consider the communication channel from the voter to the bulletin board.
Capabilities Ia and Ib do not add any power to the adversary as he can be present at
the polling station anyway, thus knowing which voter cast a vote. Using capability Ic,
the adversary learns the link between the voter and his ballot (no UL.1a). However,
he cannot prove this link to anyone (UL.2a).
Blocking the channel from the voter to the bulletin board (Id) is detected as the
voter can check the bulletin board for his vote and additionally show his receipt
to prove that he cast a vote (CO.2). However, this possibility of recovery is lost if
the voter gives away his receipt (IIa). Equipped with capability Ie, the adversary is
able to inject ballots that are posted to the bulletin board. Due to the anonymity
provided by the voting booth, cast ballots are not associated with the voters who
cast them. Thus, no valid vote is lost if an adversary injects ballots. This attack
compromises eligibility, but can be detected if the number of participating voters is
compared to the total number of received ballots. However, this comparison does not
help if the adversary can block the channel at the same time (Id), thus suppressing
as many cast ballots as he injected.
An adversary with capability If is able to modify ballots sent to the bulletin board.
As for Id, such attacks can be detected by the voter and reported (CO.2) unless he
gives away his receipt (IIa).
Now we consider the communication channel from the tellers to the bulletin board.
Capabilities Ia and Ib are not relevant as the adversary is supposed to know who
the tellers are (public information). Similarly, Ic does not add any power to the
adversary as the messages sent are published anyway.
Blocking the channels (Id) is detected (CO.2) due to missing ballots as long as the
adversary cannot inject messages (Ie) and vice versa. Modifications to the ballots
10The election authority generating the ballot forms does not access the bulletin board and is
therefore not considered here.
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that are being tallied (If) are detected with high probability due to randomized
partial checking (AV.1).
Capabilities concerning new communication channels. If the adversary obtains a
receipt from the voter (IIa), he can establish a link between the voter and his ballot
(no UL.1a). This link is not provable (UL.2a) unless the third party which wants to
obtain the proof can spot which voter gave his receipt to the adversary.
Using capability IIb, the link between the ballot and the vote can be established (no
UL.1b): either the election authority reveals the association between the candidate
ordering and the onion for each ballot, or each teller reveals his private key. The link
between ballot and vote is provable in this case (no UL.2b) as the published data
can be used to verify the values revealed.
Equipped with capability IIc, the adversary can furnish the voter with a marked
ballot before he enters the polling station (provided that the adversary managed to
get a ballot form, for example from the election authority who generated them, IIb)
and coerce him to hand back a new, unmarked ballot (IIa), thus proving that he cast
the ballot provided by the adversary. As the unmarked ballot can thereupon be used
in like manner by the adversary, this attack is referred to as “chain voting” [RP05].
Voter and ballot can be linked in this case as well as voter and vote (no UL.1a, no
UL.1b). Still, the link is not provable (UL.2a) unless the third party which wants to
obtain the proof knows which voter was coerced.
If the adversary can send messages to an election authority (IId) prior to the
election, he can furnish EA1 with the secret values needed for generating each of the
ballot forms. Thus, the adversary knows the link between each ballot and each vote,
i.e. unlinkability of voter and ballot (UL.1b) is lost. The link between ballot and
vote is provable in this case (no UL.2b) as the published data can be used to verify
that the predetermined values have been used for generating the ballot forms.
If equipped with capability IIe, the adversary can compromise eligibility by sending
ballots to the bulletin board as for Ie. The difference between injecting a ballot in
the existing communication channel from voter to bulletin board (Ie) and creating a
new channel to the bulletin board (IIe) is that in the latter case, the injected ballot
is not associated with a specific voter. However, as Preˆt a` Voter does not associate
cast ballots with the voters who cast them, capability IIe is already implied by Ie.
Cryptographic capabilities. If the adversary can break the pre-image resistance of
the hash function (IIIa), he can trace back votes through the mixnet as follows:11
based on the position of the chosen candidate in step i, the adversary guesses the
position in step i + 1, computes the offset for step i + 1 and verifies the guess by
computing the onion for that step. This establishes a link between ballot and vote
(no UL.1b). The link is provable as anyone can verify it using the data published on
the bulletin board (no UL.2b).
11Note that the mixnet is traversed from step 2k to step 0, using two key pairs per teller due to
randomized partial checking.
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If the adversary can break the encryption scheme (IIIa), the ballot transformation
is revealed and the adversary learns the link between each ballot and the correspond-
ing vote. Thus, unlinkability of ballot and vote is lost (no UL.1b), and the link is
provable as it can be verified on the basis of the public information provided (no
UL.2b).
The levels of privacy and verifiability provided by Preˆt a` Voter with respect to
different adversary capabilities are summarized in Table 6.4. In this table, each
row shows which levels of privacy or verifiability are (not) provided depending on
the adversary capabilities assumed. If several attacks are feasible, these have been
unified in the table.
6.4. Discussion
So far, this chapter has shown how our taxonomy for privacy and verifiability in
voting can be used to analyze the security of voting schemes. To conclude the
application of our taxonomy, we summarize and elaborate on the results and consider
differences as well as similarities between the protocols under analysis.
Applying the taxonomy. We have seen how the taxonomy provides a unified ap-
proach to assess the security of voting schemes. Thus, different voting schemes can
be compared in an intuitive, informal, yet precise way. By revealing the strengths
and weaknesses of the respective scheme, its suitability for election scenarios with
different priorities becomes apparent. If a specific adversary model has been deter-
mined for an election that is to be carried out, the assumptions made by the relevant
protocols are to be compared with this adversary model in order to reveal incompati-
bilities. For example, a protocol assuming a trusted registration authority cannot be
used in an election scenario for which an adversary capable of corrupting all election
authorities is assumed.
Comparing the protocols. Our analysis shows that, although Helios 1.0 and 2.0
are similar voting schemes (for example, both use the Benaloh challenge in voting
phase), they provide different levels of privacy and verifiability:
1. Helios 1.0 does not provide the voter with a chance of objection (CO), while
Helios 2.0 does so by means of the signed confirmation emails.
2. Helios 1.0 provides eligibility and uniqueness verifiability without the need for
trust (EV.1, QV.1), while for Helios 2.0, the registration authority must be
trusted (EV.2, QV.2).
The first difference demonstrates that any receipt the voter is provided with is use-
less if its probative value is insufficient (for example an unsigned email or ordinary
paper used for paper audit trail). The second difference originates in the fact that
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Helios 1.0 publishes a voters’ register with voter names, while Helios 2.0 uses voter
aliases. Enhanced eligibility and uniqueness verifiability, however, come at a price:
publishing the ballots next to the voter names provides a link between voter and
ballot (no UL.1a). Thus, privacy is compromised if the link between the ballot and
the vote is revealed, for example by cryptanalysis. The use of voter aliases provides
a second layer of security here (cf. [AdMPQ09]), but impairs eligibility verifiability
at the same time: it cannot be publicly verified whether each alias corresponds to
an eligible voter. Thus, the use of voter aliases is preferable if the priority is set
on undecidable voter abstention and unlinkability of voter and vote, whereas using
voter names on the bulletin board enhances eligibility and uniqueness verifiability.
Viewed more generally, this also shows that there is a trade-off between undecidable
voter abstention and verifying eligibility and uniqueness.
Although the tallying phase is quite different for Helios 1.0 and 2.0, both proto-
cols provide proofs on its correct implementation and, thus, both offer continuous
accuracy verifiability. The level of individual verifiability is the same for both Helios
1.0 and 2.0 as the same mechanisms are used to establish it (Benaloh cast-or-audit
protocol [Ben07] for inner individual verifiability; and publishing the ballot on the
bulletin board next to the voter name or alias for outer individual verifiability).
Assessing the adversary capabilities. We now reconsider the types of attacks en-
abled by the different adversary capabilities in light of the results gained from the
voting schemes analyzed hitherto. In general, the capabilities of category I are not
fatal. Passive attacks of this category (Ia-c) either do not add any power to the
adversary at all, or help to establish a link between voter and ballot (no UL.1a)
which, though, is not provable (UL.2a). Active attacks of this category (Id-f) aim
at suppressing (Id), adding (Ie) or modifying ballots (If). As already noted in Sec-
tion 5.4, adding ballots is an attack on eligibility. Modifying ballots can usually be
countered by the voter showing his receipt (CO.2), which emphasizes the importance
of providing the voter with a fair chance of objection. However, blocking the channel
between the voter and the election server nullifies this advantage as the receipt is
suppressed as well. Here, a significant advantage of Preˆt a` Voter (and, basically,
any poll-site voting scheme providing paper receipts) becomes evident: blocking a
remote communication channel cannot prevent the voter from obtaining his receipt.
The capabilities of categories II and III are much more severe for two reasons:
they can be used to (provably) reveal the link between the ballot and the vote, thus
establishing a link between voter and vote and breaching voter privacy. Moreover,
using capability IIb (corrupt election authority) or IIIa (breaking cryptography),
this can be established on a massive scale, i.e. for all voters at the same time. An
exception is Helios 2.0 which is, at least partly, safe against a total loss of voter
privacy due to the second layer of security established by the use of voter aliases as
explained above.
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Reconsidering verifiability. Each of the protocols we have analyzed provides univer-
sal verifiability of correct ballot preparation: for Helios, anyone can generate ballots
and verify that the ballot was created correctly. Preˆt a` Voter offers pre-election au-
diting of selected ballot forms by revealing their construction.12 In both cases, inner
individual verifiability of the uncast ballot is not limited to the voter, but rather
extended to any interested party. This indicates a paradigm shift: universal veri-
fiability (in terms of accuracy verifiability) seems to be no longer restricted to the
tallying phase, but is rather already incorporated in the voting or pre-voting phase.
This should be kept in mind when designing future voting systems.
Another feature is common to all the protocols under analysis: inner individual
verifiability is provided only for uncast ballots. This approach of indirect verifiability
allows the voter to be assured that his vote will be counted as intended without
providing him with a receipt that could be used to prove his actual vote. While
individual verifiability is still widely understood as the ability for the voter to check
the correct form of his cast ballot rather than verifying uncast ballots, the indirect
form provided for example by Helios or Preˆt a` Voter is much better suitable for
reconciling verifiability and voter privacy.
12Note however that, to meet the level of verifiability provided by Helios, the ballot forms used for
auditing Preˆt a` Voter have to be selected truly at random (cf. [CRS05]).
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In Part I we have, among other issues, taken a closer look at verifiability in voting.
We have seen that each voter should have the possibility to check that his vote was
properly taken into account, and anyone should be able to verify that all legitimately
cast votes have been counted correctly. These verifications are usually thought of
as being carried out during or shortly after the election. However, legal regulations
apply for example to political elections, requiring the proper conduct of the election
to be provable even years after the election was carried out. Therefore, in Part II we
turn to long-term verifiability and consider the legal issues and technical implications
of keeping election records beyond the tallying phase.
In this part of the thesis we do not consider voting machines since these are used
in polling stations and, thus, are more close to classical paper-based voting. We
rather focus on remote electronic voting as the underlying problem, i.e. which data
should be retained and how this should be accomplished, is more challenging and,
therefore, more interesting in this case.
Chapter overview
This chapter sets the stage for the following considerations. Section 7.1 provides
background information on long-term retention of election data. Related work is
presented in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3 we explain the methodology used in the
following two chapters.
7.1. Background
Secure long-term retention of relevant documents is an important issue in the pub-
lic (as well as the private) sector. The correct implementation of administrative
processes must be verifiable and provable for years or even decades. Strict regula-
tions are imposed here, and this applies in particular to elections as they embody
democratic decision-making: relevant documents such as the ballots or the voters’
register must be retained for a specific period of time in order to allow for a recount
in case the election is challenged. In Germany, this holds for parliamentary elections
as well as works council elections. Regarding Elections for the Federal Parliament
(Bundestag), § 2 (2, 4) of the Law on the Scrutiny of Elections (Wahlpru¨fungsgesetz,
WPru¨fG1) specifies that any eligible voter, any Returning Officer and the Presi-
dent of the Bundestag may file an appeal within a term of two months after the
1English version available at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/europawahlen/
rechtsgrundlagen/wahlpruefungsgesetz.html.
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election day; the President of the Bundestag may file an objection even after this
period has expired. Therefore, most of the election documents are retained for four
years, which corresponds to the legislative period of the German Bundestag. This
holds for other election types as well: election documents are usually retained for
the term of office of the elected body. Overall, the legislative period of the elected
body ranges from two years for associations [Ges04] to six years for elections for the
governing boards of social security institutions (see § 58 (2) of the German Social
Security Code IV (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB IV)). The retention period may be ex-
tended if scrutiny procedures are pending. Thus, it should be assumed that election
data must be retained for up to ten years. Such legal retention obligations apply
not only to common paper-based elections, but also to their electronic equivalent.
But contrary to the case of paper-based elections, general legal regulations on reten-
tion of remote electronic election data have not been issued so far, and there are no
according specifications or guidelines.
In Germany, there have been several pilot applications of remote electronic voting
in nationwide societies. The German Informatics Society (Gesellschaft fu¨r Infor-
matik, GI) has been electing its executive committee over the Internet since 2004,
while still retaining the option for postal voting. To this end, the GI has devel-
oped a catalog of requirements for online elections in non-governmental organizations
[Ges05, GKM+06]. The German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft, DFG) adopted online elections for the review boards in 2007. Both GI and
DFG have adopted their own regulations for online elections which comprise also
regulations on the retention of election data: the evaluation records of the election
are supposed to be retained for the term of office of the elected body, i.e. two and
four years, respectively [Ges04, Deu06]. The evaluation records are, however, not
specified in the regulations.
At present it is common practice to implement a hybrid form of retention: relevant
election data is retained electronically and, at the same time, parts of it are printed
and retained as a hard copy (see for example [Rii02, Deu06]). However, proper elec-
tronic retention eliminates the need for retaining hard copies in parallel. Moreover,
printing electronic data always involves a loss of information [RS06a]. Nevertheless,
retaining electronic data requires a different approach than the paper-based variant—
whereas secure storage of paper documents is achieved by locking them in a safe once
and for all, several challenges have to be faced when retaining electronic documents
over a long period of time: electronic data can easily be changed, therefore issues like
integrity and authenticity must be addressed. Moreover, it is well known that the
suitability of many cryptographic algorithms decreases with time. Furthermore, due
to hardware and software obsolescence, difficulties in terms of readability emerge.
Thus, long-term retention of electronic data truly is a long-term task. In the fol-
lowing chapters we will also see that a major challenge specific to the retention of
election documents is to maintain voter privacy.
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7.2. Related work
We consider related work to comprise
– previous work concerning long-term retention in general,
– previous work concerning long-term verifiability in electronic voting, and
– the significance of legal requirements in electronic voting.
7.2.1. Long-term retention in general
The overall aspects of preserving digital data in the long term have been treated
in textbooks like [BRSS06] and [Gla07]. Secure long-term retention of electronic
documents has also been addressed by many research projects and working groups.
InterPARES (International Research on Permanent Authentic Records in Electronic
Systems)2 is a major international research initiative which aims at developing
the knowledge necessary to provide policies, strategies and standards ensuring the
longevity and authenticity of digital material. The long-term preservation of elec-
tronically signed documents has also been addressed by the European Telecommu-
nications Standards Institute (ETSI) [ETS08, ETS06]. The Long-Term Archive and
Notary Services (LTANS)3 working group brings forward the standardization in this
area by defining requirements, protocols and data structures for the secure usage of
archive and notary services.
In Germany, NESTOR4 (Network of Expertise in Long-Term Storage of Digi-
tal Resources) is a competence network concerned with long-term preservation and
accessibility of digital documents. The DOMEA5 concept (in German: “Dokumen-
ten-Management und elektronische Archivierung”) defines requirements for docu-
ment management and electronic archiving in public administration. Conclusive
and secure long-term retention of electronically signed documents has also been ad-
dressed by the project ArchiSig6 and its follow-up project TransiDoc7. Recently, the
German Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik, BSI) developed a Technical Directive [Bun09] which regulates
trustworthy long-term retention for German government agencies. Based on the
Evidence Record Syntax (ERS) standard [GBP07] and the results of the ArchiSig
and ArchiSafe [ZLH08] projects, the Directive addresses long-term integrity and au-
thenticity. In [8], the approach of [Bun09] has been refined and extended by also
considering confidentiality and availability.
2http://www.interpares.org/
3http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ltans-charter.html
4http://www.langzeitarchivierung.de/eng/index.htm
5http://www.verwaltung-innovativ.de/cln_110/nn_685150/DE/Organisation/
domea_konzept/domea_konzept_node.html?_nnn=true
6http://www.archisig.de/english/index.html
7http://www.transidoc.de/website-transidoc/index-en.html
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7.2.2. Long-term verifiability in electronic voting
Although plenty of research has been conducted into long-term preservation in gen-
eral, retention and long-term verifiability in electronic voting has not been studied
thoroughly yet. The importance of appropriate record keeping for secure electronic
voting has already been recognized by the Council of Europe, who recommends that
“any data retained after the election or referendum period shall be stored securely”
[Cou05, Standard No. 75]. And furthermore,
“the e-voting system shall maintain the availability and integrity of the
electronic ballot box and the output of the counting process as long as
required” [Cou05, Standard No. 99],
which is specified as follows:
“The information kept in the electronic ballot box must be securely saved
for as long as this is necessary to permit any recount or legal challenge or
for the period after the election required by the electoral process in the
member state in question.” [Cou05, Standard No. 163]
Concrete measures are not specified and regarded as a matter for national legislature.
The Common Criteria Protection Profile [VV08] defines a basic set of security
requirements for online voting systems. Although requirements for the post-election
phase are not addressed, the importance of long-term integrity and privacy has been
recognized:
“The server-sided TOE [Target of Evaluation] ensures that after the tal-
lying including the determination of the election result, the election data,
the election result and, if required, the audit records or further data are
stored in a way that they are protected against manipulations. This
protection is effective outside the TOE’s scope of control and outside
the election server. Subsequent forgeries or fraudulent manipulations are
detectable.” [VV08, Objective No. 161]
Thus, it is required that integrity protection remains effective even beyond the control
of the voting system. But before protective measures can be considered, the question
which data should be retained must first be answered. A naive approach would be
to simply retain any data occurring during the online election. This approach falls
short for several reasons:
1. The data generated during the election (on the basis of the voting protocol
used) may be insufficient or inappropriate to meet legal requirements on reten-
tion of election documents. We will see in the following chapters that retention
issues have to be considered already when designing and implementing an elec-
tronic voting protocol.
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2. The principle of data minimization must be considered: according to §6 (1) of
the EU Directive8 95/46/EC, personal data must only be collected for speci-
fied, explicit and legitimate purposes, and must not be excessive in relation to
these purposes. Personal data is any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (§ 2 (a) of the EU Directive 95/46/EC). As we will
see in the following chapter, personal data occurs for example in the voters’
register or on the forms with supporting signatures for nominated candidates.
3. The records retained must not reveal any voter’s preference. In particular,
it must not be possible to compromise voter privacy by combining certain
records which, though, may not be a threat to privacy individually. Therefore,
the data occurring during the election must be carefully checked as to not allow
conclusions to be drawn about the voter’s choice at some point later.
A one-to-one mapping from the documentation of a paper-based election at the
polling station to keeping records of a remote electronic election is not possible due
to their differing implementation. Thus, other ways of identifying the according
documents in an online election must be found, and provisions must be established
to ensure their security and longevity.
7.2.3. Legal requirements
If the results of high-stakes elections shall become legally binding, legal requirements
must be considered. It is commonly accepted that parliamentary elections have to
be free, equal and secret. The principles of freedom and secrecy are also enshrined in
the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights [Cou03] and
are thus supposed to be reflected by national electoral law of the European countries.
According to [MGKQ03], the principles of universal and direct elections belong to
the European electoral heritage. Together, these form the five basic principles of
electoral law according to German Constitutional Law. [MGKQ03, VH04, GKM+06]
have interpreted the five basic principles of electoral law in terms of online voting. In
a similar way, the Council of Europe has considered legal standards for e-voting by
deriving general requirements from the principles of universal, equal, free and secret
suffrage [Cou05, Standards No. 1–19].
[MGKQ03] emphasizes the importance of transparency and public scrutiny: ver-
ification procedures for the tallying hardware and software are postulated, and it
is claimed that the possibility of recount must be given. In Germany, a judgment
of the Federal Constitutional Court emphasized the importance of both verifiability
and legal compliance of electronic voting systems: in March 2009, the use of specific
electronic voting machines in the 2005 Federal Elections for the German Bundestag
was ruled unconstitutional [Fed09b]. The reason for this decision was that the voting
machines in use failed to provide a sufficient level of verifiability. In particular, the
8English version available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:31995D0466:EN:HTML.
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judgment claimed that the voter must be able to verify that his vote was recorded
as intended without having detailed knowledge of computer technology. Although
the judgment refers to voting machines, which are not considered in the following, it
still reflects the fact that law and technology go hand in hand in electronic voting,
and close collaboration between computer scientists and jurists is a precondition for
establishing secure and legally binding electronic elections.
7.3. Methodology
The methodology used in the following chapters is referred to as KORA (“Kon-
kretisierung rechtlicher Anforderungen”, Implementation of Legal Requirements)
[HPR92]. KORA is an approved method to bridge the gap between law and technol-
ogy by translating abstract legal norms into concrete technical measures, and can be
used whenever a certain (existing or new) technology has to be (re)designed such that
it complies with law. In a four-stage process, legal requirements are substantiated
into technical implementation proposals:
1. Legal requirements. At the first stage, legal requirements are derived from fun-
damental legal norms such as constitutional law and its specifications in statute
law. These legal requirements provide a starting point for the evaluation and
the design of information technology (IT) systems. Usually, the legal require-
ments refer to the social aspects affected by the information technology under
consideration, for example human communication [HPR92].
2. Legal criteria. In order to assess whether the considered IT system meets the legal
requirements specified at stage 1, these requirements have to be broken down
into legal criteria. These criteria characterize solutions which meet the legal
requirements, yet they do not not refer to a concrete technical or organizational
approach.
3. Implementation requirements. Next, technical implementation requirements are
derived from the legal criteria established at stage 2. These implementation
requirements abstract from the technical features of the IT system. They can
refer, for example, to aspects of the system architecture or its functionality. If
an existing IT system is to be redesigned using KORA, then the requirements at
this stage can also be obtained by abstracting from existing technical features.
4. Implementation proposals. At the last stage technical implementation proposals
are developed, taking into account the implementation requirements identified
at stage 3. The implementation proposals refer to technical specifications or
features of the IT system, and constitute measures that are to be taken from
a legal point of view.
In the following we use KORA to answer both parts of our research question for Part
II of this thesis (see Section 1.2):
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– In Chapter 8 we use KORA to identify the records which should be retained
after a remote electronic election has been carried out.
– In Chapter 9 we identify constraints to the record keeping, and use KORA to
derive according protective measures.
In both cases we take German Constitutional Law and existing electoral laws to be
our starting point.
81
8. Identifying the records to be kept
This chapter sets out to identify the documents which have to be retained after a
remote electronic election on a parliamentary level has been carried out. We use
the method KORA (see Section 7.3) to derive implementation proposals from legal
requirements. As such requirements have not yet been specified for online elections,
we take the present legal framework on conventional paper-based elections as a basis.
This approach is reasonable since electronic voting should be at least as secure as
conventional paper-based voting [BBG07, DSJ06]. More specifically, we run through
the four stages provided for by KORA as follows:
1. Legal requirements. First of all, we identify the relevant legal requirements laid
down in German Constitutional Law and Federal Electoral Law. To this end,
we ascertain the reasons why election documents need to be retained.
2. Legal criteria. In order to obtain legal criteria, we take advantage of the fact that
legal retention obligations for paper-based elections already exist. Therefore,
we compile the retention obligations for paper-based parliamentary elections
as specified by the Federal Electoral Regulations. Next, we consider the back-
ground of these obligations (i.e. the purpose of keeping each individual record),
relating to the legal requirements identified at the previous stage. Since the
Federal Electoral Regulations are meant to specify the Federal Electoral Law,
this approach is consistent with KORA.
3. Implementation requirements. As the retention obligations specified by the Fed-
eral Electoral Regulations are very explicit and bound to the scenario of paper-
based voting, they cannot be transferred to the scenario of online elections
directly. Therefore, we abstract from the retention purposes identified at the
previous stage in order to obtain general implementation requirements for keep-
ing election records.
4. Implementation proposals. Finally we interpret the implementation requirements
for the scenario of remote online elections and derive implementation propos-
als by identifying the records which shall be retained in order to meet the
implementation requirements specified at stage 3.
Note that in this chapter we only address the question which records should at least
be kept; the questions how this should be established and whether there are records
which must not be retained are considered in Chapter 9. Earlier versions of this
chapter have been published as [13] and [1].
83
8. Identifying the records to be kept
Chapter overview
The structure of this chapter corresponds to the four stages provided for by KORA
as specified above: in Section 8.1 we identify the legal requirements which apply to
keeping records of parliamentary elections. In Section 8.2 legal criteria are derived by
compiling the retention obligations laid down in current German law on conventional
paper-based elections and analyzing the retention purposes in relation to the legal
requirements identified in Section 8.1. In Section 8.3 we derive implementation
requirements from the retention purposes identified in Section 8.2. In Section 8.4 we
specify the records to be retained in order to meet the implementation requirements
found in Section 8.3. Section 8.5 summarizes and discusses the results.
8.1. Legal requirements
The primary reason for retaining election records is to prepare for scrutiny proceed-
ings: according to § 2 (2, 4) WPru¨fG, any eligible voter, each Land Returning Officer,
the Federal Returning Officer and the President of the Bundestag may challenge the
election within a period of two months after the poll; the President of the Bundestag
may challenge the election even after this period has expired (§ 2 (4) WPru¨fG).
Hence, the proper conduct of the election must be provable and thus conclusively
documented. But what does the proper conduct of an election comprise?
First of all, the election has been conducted properly if the basic principles of
electoral law have been followed (cf. Section 7.2.3). These principles are of prime
importance and are thus laid down in German Constitutional Law (Grundgesetz,
GG1) and also stated at the beginning of the German Federal Electoral Law (Bun-
deswahlgesetz, BWG2): according to § 38 GG and § 1 (1) BWG, the members of the
German Bundestag are elected in universal, direct, free, equal and secret elections
by the Germans who have the right to vote. In the following we explain briefly what
the five basic principles of electoral law mean. Similar interpretations have been
provided, for example, by Mitrou et al. [MGKQ03].
1. An election is universal if it is guaranteed that any eligible voter can participate
and cast his vote. The right to vote may not be denied because of political,
economic or social reasons [Sch90].
2. The principle of direct elections postulates that the voters alone determine the
composition of the parliament [Sch90]. Nobody may influence the outcome
of the election after the voting phase has terminated. Furthermore, a voter
cannot transfer his right to vote to someone else who then votes on his behalf
(§ 14 (4) BWG). However, auxiliary persons may help disabled voters (§ 33 (2)
BWG).
1English version available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm.
2English version available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BWG.htm.
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3. Free elections exclude the possibility that voters are influenced unlawfully by
others or even coerced to vote in a particular way. This applies also to the
period after the votes have been cast: any possibility to check a ballot cast
by a particular voter must be excluded. Furthermore, voters must not be
influenced by intermediate results of the election [Sch90].
4. All votes cast by eligible voters have equal influence on the election results.
This principle applies also to the eligible candidates in the sense that equal
opportunities for all candidates should be ensured [Sch90].
5. Finally, the principle of secret elections postulates that the voter’s decision
must be kept secret. It must not be possible to associate a vote with the voter
who cast it (this is also known as voter privacy or unlinkability, cf. Chapter 4).
Secrecy of the vote is a precondition for unrestricted freedom of vote [Sch90].
In addition to provable compliance with the five basic principles of electoral law,
another legal requirement must be provably met: according to § 31 BWG, Federal
Elections for the German Parliament must be conducted in public. The principle of
public elections can also be derived from German Constitutional Law: according to
§ 20 (2) GG, “all state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised
by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative,
executive, and judicial bodies.” As the voter confers the state authority to the
elected representatives, he shall maintain confidence in his successful participation
[BR09]. Thus, all essential steps of an election are subject to the possibility of
public scrutiny unless other constitutional interests justify an exception [Fed09b]. In
conventional paper-based elections taking place at polling stations, the principle of
public elections is implemented by allowing the interested public to be present during
the poll. This kind of physical observation is not achievable for remote electronic
elections as the voting system is based on information technology and the underlying
procedures are implemented by computers. Thus, compliance with the principle of
public elections is a particular challenge in remote electronic voting.
So far, we have identified the following legal requirements:
The proper conduct of the election must be verifiable. This comprises verifiable
compliance with the five basic principles of electoral law, i.e.
I. the principle of universality,
II. the principle of directness,
III. the principle of freedom,
IV. the principle of equality,
V. the principle of secrecy,
and, additionally, verifiable compliance with
VI. the principle of public elections.
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Note the difference between investigating how the respective principle is complied
with (i.e. which measures are taken to satisfy it) and investigating how it can be
documented that this principle has been complied with. We attend to the second task
in the following. However, both questions are related with respect to the principle
of public elections: publishing selected parts of the records that are kept supports
the principle of public elections by establishing transparency, and at the same time
documents that this principle has been complied with.
8.2. Legal criteria
As observed in Section 8.1, the legal requirements for keeping records of parliamen-
tary elections comprise documenting compliance with the basic principles of electoral
law, and documenting compliance with (and thereby also satisfying) the principle
of public elections. In order to further specify these legal requirements according
to KORA, we take advantage of the fact that legal retention obligations for paper-
based elections already exist. Therefore, in this section we analyze the retention
obligations laid down in present German electoral law on Federal Elections. At first,
in Section 8.2.1 we ascertain which documents have to be retained for which period
of time. Then, in Section 8.2.2, we identify the concrete purpose of each individual
retention obligation, relating to the legal requirements identified in Section 8.1. We
refer to the Federal Electoral Regulations in the following, which are a specification
of the Federal Electoral Law. Therefore, our analysis is consistent with KORA.
8.2.1. Retention obligations for paper-based elections
Federal Elections for the German Bundestag are held every four years. They are
subject to the German Federal Electoral Law and specified by the according Federal
Electoral Regulations (Bundeswahlordnung, BWO). The federal territory is subdi-
vided into 299 constituencies, each of which comprises several polling districts. In
each polling district an Electoral Board including an Electoral Officer is appointed
(§ 6 BWO). Furthermore, each constituency appoints a Constituency Returning Of-
ficer (§ 3 BWO). The Land Returning Officers and the Federal Returning Officer are
appointed for an indeterminate period (§ 1, § 2 BWO).
The voters’ register must be closed the day before the election at the latest. Closure
of the register is certified by completing annex 8 of the BWO. Polling cards may be
issued to voters registered in the voters’ register upon application (§ 25 (1) BWO).3
A notice is placed in the voters’ register next to the name of each voter who applied
for a polling card. The polling card issued may thereafter be used for absentee voting
or for voting in a different polling district of the same constituency. If the polling
3Until the end of 2008, voters could only apply for a polling card if they declared to be outside
of their polling district on election day or unable to go to the polling station due to physical or
other reasons. This was amended on December 3, 2008 (cf. Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2378). At
present, the application for a polling card does not have to be substantiated.
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card is used for absentee voting, the voter must sign an affidavit on the polling card,
thus certifying that he has voted personally.
The Electoral Officer opens the poll by informing the members of the Electoral
Board about their duty of impartiality and discretion (§ 53 (1) BWO). Before the
voting phase begins, the Electoral Officer amends the voters’ register by placing
marks beside the name of voters who have been issued a polling card after the
closure of the voters’ register (§ 53 (2) BWO). Finally, the Electoral Officer checks
that the ballot box is empty and locks or seals it (§ 53 (3) BWO).
According to § 72 BWO, the clerk in each polling district shall compile an elec-
tion record pursuant to the model provided in annex 29 of the BWO. The election
record documents the polling procedure and the determination of the election results.
Furthermore, the election record contains decisions on the following issues:
– admission or exclusion of voters whose voting right was questionable (§ 56 (7)
BWO)
– validity and content of questionable ballots (§ 69 (6) BWO)
– validity or legal ownership of questionable polling cards (§ 59 BWO)
The ballots and the polling cards which correspond to the latter two items are
enclosed in the election record. The completed election record must be approved
and signed by each member of the Electoral Board. It is handed over to the local
authority of the commune immediately, whence it is forwarded to the Constituency
Returning Officer (§ 72 (3, 4) BWO). All authorities in charge have to ensure that
the election records including the annexes are protected against unauthorized access
(§ 72 (4) BWO). Separate election records are compiled for absentee voting according
to annex 31 of the BWO (§ 75 (5) BWO), and must as well be protected against
unauthorized access (§ 75 (6, 7) BWO).
After the poll has been closed, the Electoral Board shall establish the election
result in the polling district (§ 67 BWO). Hereafter the ballots are collected and the
pile of ballots as well as the pile of received polling cards is sealed by the Electoral
Officer and handed over to the local authority of the commune. Each authority in
charge must protect these documents against unauthorized access (§ 73 (1, 2) BWO).
The absentee voting documents are treated in like manner (§ 77 (7) BWO).
According to § 89 (1) BWO, the following documents must be retained and pro-
tected against unauthorized access:
– voters’ register
– polling card register
– register of polling cards which have been declared invalid according to § 28
(8) BWO (affecting voters whose names have been canceled from the voters’
register)
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– register of voters that shall vote before a moving Electoral Board according to
§ 29 (1) BWO
– forms with supporting signatures for nominated candidates
– voter’s notices which have been collected
While the voter’s notices have to be discarded immediately to ensure data protection
and voter privacy (§ 90 (1) BWO), all other documents listed have to be retained for
at least six months after the election (§ 90 (2) BWO). If electoral scrutiny proceedings
are pending, further retention may be ordered by the Federal Returning Officer (§ 90
(2) BWO). According to § 89 (2, 3) BWO, information on these documents may
only be provided to official authorities and may only be used for election statistics,
scrutiny procedures or in case an election fraud according to § 107 and § 108 of the
German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB4) is suspected.
All other election documents, i.e.
– ballots,
– absentee voting documents (polling cards and ballots), and
– election records
must be protected against unauthorized access (§ 73 (2), § 75 (7), § 72 (4) BWO)
and may be discarded 60 days before a new German Bundestag is elected (§ 90 (3)
BWO).
8.2.2. Purposes of the retention obligations
In the following we refer to the documents which have to be retained according to
Section 8.2.1 and consider the specific purpose of their retention, relating to the legal
requirements identified in Section 8.1. We start with the election documents which,
according to § 90 (3) BWO, have to be retained for almost the whole election period
and therefore are of special importance.
Each election record sets out that the election has been duly performed. The
record documents that the members of the Electoral Board have been instructed on
the proper conduct of the election and informed about their duties and responsi-
bilities, in particular discretion and impartiality. If the Electoral Board could un-
duly influence the election results this would violate the principle of equal elections
[Wil02]. Moreover, discretion of the election staff supports freedom and secrecy of
the vote.
If any changes to the voters’ register are required (for example due to belatedly
issued polling cards which require an according mark to be set beside the name of the
affected voters), these must be documented in the election record. While authorized
4English version available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/
englisch_stgb.html.
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corrections to the voters’ register during preparation phase are still possible, the
voters’ register must be closed before the election starts. This prevents illegal changes
to the voters’ register and hence may be viewed as supporting universal elections
in the sense that no eligible voters are denied the right to vote, and no ineligible
persons are permitted to vote. Any special incidents such as turning away voters in
accordance with § 56 (6) BWO (for example because they are not registered in the
voters’ register and do not possess a polling card) must be thoroughly documented
in the election record. This accounts for the fact that no eligible voter has been
excluded from the election and thus supports the principle of universal elections.
The record also accounts for the fact that proper surroundings for vote casting
have been established: the tables which are used for vote casting are supposed to
be equipped with shields to protect voter privacy (§ 50 BWO) and hence support
secrecy and freedom of the vote. The ballot box must be in a proper condition
and empty before the voting phase starts, which aims at fulfilling the principle of
universal elections in terms of excluding illegal ballots. Also, the ballot box must be
locked or sealed before the voting phase begins, and it must not be opened again until
the poll has been closed (§ 53 (3) BWO). This provides evidence that no ballots could
have been taken out as long as the ballot box was locked or, respectively, the seal
was unbroken. Obtaining intermediate results which could influence voters is thereby
prevented, which supports free elections. Each of these provisions is confirmed by
the election record.
Moreover, the election record accounts for proper vote casting: the Electoral Board
must take care and also confirm in writing that the voters have been unobserved
while voting and that they folded the ballot paper after having completed it. These
measures clearly aim at secret and free elections. The poll must be closed at 6 p.m.,
and only voters who are in line at that time are entitled to cast their ballots. Closing
the poll in due time while allowing the present voters to cast their ballots aims at
ensuring that voters who were present on time are not excluded from the poll, thus
supporting universal elections.
Furthermore, the correct evaluation of the election documents and determination
of the election results can be verified on the basis of the election record: the poll,
including the tallying of the votes, must be conducted in public (see also § 54 BWO).5
This is important with respect to the principle of public elections. For conventional
paper-based elections this condition is met by allowing anyone to be present in the
polling room as long as polling is not disrupted (§ 31 BWG, § 54 BWO).
The election record also documents that ballots have been counted by two mem-
bers of the Electoral Board independently. In case there are doubts about the values
written down in the election record, the ballots allow for retallying and hence veri-
fying the correctness of the announced election results. Ascertaining that all ballots
have been counted correctly and having the ballots counted by two members of the
Electoral Board independently supports universality and equality.
5Note that the poll is opened by the Electoral Officer by taking the actions as explained in Sec-
tion 8.2.1 and, thus, is not limited to the period of vote casting.
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The voters’ register allows for verifying the voting rights. It is retained to make
this verification possible even after the election, for example in case the election is
challenged because of alleged participation of persons who were not eligible to vote.
This contributes to universal elections in terms of ensuring that only persons who
have the legal right to vote are permitted to participate in the election. According
to § 14 (1) BWO, the voters’ register contains the first and last name of the voter
as well as his date of birth and mailing address. When a voter casts his ballot,
this is acknowledged by placing a mark beside his name in the voters’ register (§ 56
(4) BWO). Hence, the total of voters who have cast a ballot can be determined by
these marks after the election has ended. Thus, the voters’ register can be used to
check that this value matches the one written down in the election record and, if
required for verification, also the number of ballots cast. Note that, unless required
for ascertaining voter eligibility, the Electoral Board may not announce personal
data of the voter in such a way that these could be learned by anyone present (§ 56
(4) BWO).
The polling card register contains the names of voters who have been issued a
polling card for absentee voting or for voting in a different electoral district. This
register should match the voters’ register in the sense that each voter who is in
the polling card register should have a corresponding mark beside his name in the
voters’ register. This way it can be checked that a voter who has obtained a polling
card could not have voted twice. Since polling cards are first and foremost used
for absentee voting, this review may contribute to excluding the possibility that
someone has cast a ballot in person and an absentee ballot at the same time: if
multiple voting channels are provided, it must be ensured that only one vote per
voter is accounted. Mutual exclusion of voting in person and absentee voting as well
as checking the acknowledgments of voting provides for equality in terms of giving
each voter equal influence on the election result. Furthermore, by comparing the
polling cards received during the election with the register of polling cards which
have been declared invalid, it can be verified that only valid polling cards have
been used for voting. This contributes to universal elections in terms of ensuring
that only persons who have the legal right to vote are permitted to participate in
the election. In case of absentee voting, the affidavit which has to be signed by the
voter to certify that the vote was cast personally aims at ensuring free and direct
elections.
The forms with supporting signatures for nominated candidates testify to suf-
ficient support for the candidates by the general public. These may be used as a
justification for nomination of the candidates if challenged. At the same time, they
guarantee equal opportunities for all candidates and hence support the principle of
equal elections.
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8.3. Implementation requirements
In Section 8.2 we have identified the legal criteria for keeping election records by
answering the following question:
What is the purpose of retaining this specific record, and which legal
requirement is this purpose related to?
For example, one purpose of retaining the election record is to document that the
physical ballot box did not contain any illegal ballot papers before the polls were
opened, which supports the principle of universal elections. In order to obtain im-
plementation proposals for remote electronic voting, we have to translate these le-
gal criteria into implementation requirements that are independent of whether the
election is implemented on paper or electronically. Therefore, the question to be
answered next is:
Which (general) implementation requirements can be derived from the
legal criteria?
We identify the implementation requirements by investigating which conditions must
be demonstrably satisfied and thus conclusively documented. Referring to our last
example, the corresponding implementation requirement is to account for the fact
that the ballot box has been empty before the voting phase started. This requirement
is independent of either paper-based or electronic implemenation of the election: the
ballot box could be both physical or electronic.
The implementation requirements apply to parliamentary elections in general, ir-
respective of whether the election is carried out electronically or in a conventional,
paper-based way. What makes the difference between the two scenarios is how these
implementation requirements are met and which data must be retained in order to
prove that they have been met. While the latter is addressed in Section 8.4, the for-
mer issue depends on the voting system used, and is not considered in the following.
In Section 8.1 we have learned that retention of election data aims at proving the
proper conduct of the election, which comprises verifiable compliance with the five
basic principles of electoral law and the principle of public elections. The proper
conduct has to be documented for all three phases of an election: preparation, vot-
ing, and evaluation. Therefore, we take a sequential approach in the following: we
structure the implementation requirements derived from the retention purposes ac-
cording to the election phase they refer to, i.e. preparation phase (Section 8.3.1),
voting phase (Section 8.3.2), and evaluation phase (Section 8.3.3), and interpret the
implementation requirements within the scenario of remote electronic elections.
8.3.1. Preparation phase
As shown in Section 8.2.2, documenting the correct preparation of the election
amounts to proving that the following implementation requirements have been sat-
isfied:
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Prep1: Trustworthy entities
Prep1.1 The trustworthiness of the election staff has been ascertained.
Prep1.2 The trustworthiness of the voting system has been ascertained.
Prep2: Proper installation and surroundings
Prep2.1 The ballot box has been empty before the voting phase started.
Prep2.2 The voter had the chance to complete the ballot unobserved.
Prep3: Closure of the voters’ register
Prep4: Justified nomination of candidates
Prep1.1 In an online election, not only the integrity and trustworthiness of
the Electoral Board should be ascertained. Several people are involved in
setting up and maintaining the voting system, for example software en-
gineers and system administrators. Appropriate measures such as back-
ground and reference checking should be applied and documented, and
compliance with due diligence procedures should be verified.
Prep1.2 In a conventional paper-based election, official authorities such as the
Electoral Board and the Returning Officers are the only entities who han-
dle the ballots. However, even passive components such as the ballot box
or the tables in the polling station have to conform with certain specifi-
cations (cf. § 51, § 52 BWO).6 As these components are merely passive,
this amounts to installing them properly (see Prep2). By contrast, an
electronic voting system is not only implemented and run by humans, but
rather contains components which actively process the ballots. There-
fore, checking on the trustworthiness of the election staff is not sufficient.
Due performance of any component involved in receiving, processing and
tallying the ballots must be ascertained. An approved way to establish
this is to evaluate the voting system using, for example, the Common
Criteria standard [Vol08]. An evaluation of the voting system according
to a high Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) should be mandatory for
parliamentary elections.7
Prep2.1 In a conventional paper-based election, the Electoral Board verifies
that the ballot box has been empty before the voting phase started (this
can also be verified by the public), and documents this fact in the election
record. In the scenario of online elections, the ballot box is electronic. As
for the physical ballot box, it must be documented that its electronic
equivalent has been empty before the election started—unless a voting
6In a paper-based election, the “voting system” consists of the tools and devices used, e.g. the
ballot box.
7The existing Protection Profile for electronic voting systems [VV08] requires a rather low evalua-
tion depth (EAL2+) which is not sufficient for parliamentary elections [VG08].
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protocol is used which requires the ballot box to be initialized with dummy
votes (see for example [ACvdG07, AR08], although these protocols have
been designed for poll-site electronic voting using paper ballots, which is
not considered here).
Prep2.2 In a conventional paper-based election, votes are cast in a controlled
environment: voter privacy is established physically by means of the pri-
vacy shields which the tables in the polling station are equipped with,
and voting in private is enforced by the Electoral Board and documented
in the election record. Moreover, this can be publicly verified by being
present in the polling room. In a remote electronic election, the Electoral
Board has no influence on the surroundings in which voters cast their
vote, thus this documentation requirement cannot be transferred directly
to remote electronic elections. We take this matter up in Section 8.3.2
(Vote3).
Prep3 Like in a conventional paper-based election, it must be documented that the
electronic voters’ register in an online election has been closed before the voting
phase started, and that it has not been modified hereafter.
Prep4 Justified nomination of candidates must be provable also in an online election.
The collection of supporting signatures may still be accomplished using pen
and paper. An electronic variant may be applicable in the case that electronic
signatures are available to the public, for example if electronic Citizen Cards
have been issued.8
8.3.2. Voting phase
As shown in Section 8.2.2, documentation of proper voting amounts to proving that
the following implementation requirements have been met:
Vote1: Special incidents
Vote2: Different voting channels
Vote3: Secrecy of the vote
Vote3.1 The content of the ballot was protected against unauthorized
inspection from the time the ballot was completed until the end of
the voting phase.
Vote3.2 If the vote has been cast in an uncontrolled environment, the
voter has affirmed having voted personally.
Vote4: Proper termination of the poll
Vote5: Public conduct of the poll
8The upcoming German Identity Card, which is to be introduced in November 2010, will
support qualified electronic signatures according to the German Signature Law. For
details refer to http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_174/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/PaesseAusweise/
ePersonalausweis/ePersonalausweis_node.html.
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Vote1 In a conventional paper-based election, any special incidents that occurred
during the poll (such as turning away ineligible voters) must be documented by
the Electoral Board, and can be observed by being present in the polling room.
System monitoring is an appropriate means to document any special incidents
in an online election, and can also be used to document the correct execution
of the voting software during the whole election, i.e. preparation, voting and
tallying.
Vote2 Any voting system must provide secure procedures to exclude the possibility
of having more than one vote per voter accounted, and these procedures have
to be documented. If multiple voting via one or more voting channels9 is
permitted, policies are required to determine which vote is to be counted. This
may be determined by a predefined priority mode of voting (e.g. voting in
person with a paper ballot) or by the time the ballot was cast (i.e. the latest
vote counts). This policy is to be published at least several days before the
election in order to inform the voters.
Vote3.1 For paper-based elections which take place at the polling station, the
Electoral Board must take care and also document in writing that polling
happens unobserved, and that the votes contained in the ballot box have
not been revealed as long as the voting phase has not terminated. The
scenario of remote electronic voting does not allow unobserved polling to
be enforced by any supervisory authority as voters complete their ballot
by means of an arbitrary computer. Therefore, the voter himself must take
care not to be observed when casting his vote. Concealing the content of
the ballot can be established by several means, for example by encrypting
the votes using a threshold encryption scheme and providing multiple
talliers who jointly decrypt the encrypted votes after the voting phase
has terminated (see Section 2.2.2). However, the voting platform used
by the voter might be compromised by malicious software which records
the vote before it is encrypted. It is obviously beyond the power of the
Electoral Board to check the voter’s private computer for malware. There
are, however, several measures to mitigate this threat: before casting
his vote, the voter should be informed on the duty to take appropriate
measures in order to keep his voting client free from malware. There could
as well be supervised public terminals for voters who are not sufficiently
confident in securing their home computers.
Vote3.2 As the scenario of voting at home in a remote electronic election is
similar to absentee voting due to the uncontrolled environment, the voter
shall as well be required to electronically sign an affidavit certifying that
the vote was cast personally. If electronic signatures are not available to
9For example, in the 2007 Estonian parliamentary elections, voters could change their electronic
vote either by voting again electronically or by voting with a ballot paper (§ 44 (6) of the
Riigikogu Election Act, available at http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/RKseadus_eng.pdf).
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the voter, he should at least be required to confirm having voted person-
ally.
Vote4 Proper termination of the poll is a challenge for remote electronic elections:
while it must not be possible for the voter to start filling out the ballot after
the polls have closed, it must still be ensured that votes which are pending can
enter the ballot box. This is in general referred to as the “last call problem”
and discussed for example in [MHR04]. Secure procedures for intermediate
storage must be provided to solve this problem, and their application has to
be documented. Deadlines regarding the period between closing the polls and
closing the ballot box must be determined and published. If a voter has started
to fill out the ballot and the voting phase is about to end, he shall be informed
about the time remaining until the ballot box is closed.
Vote5 As already noted in Section 8.1, the public conduct of an online election
cannot be implemented by physical observation. Therefore, other means to
establish a public poll have to be found. We elaborate on this issue in Sec-
tion 8.4.
8.3.3. Evaluation phase
As shown in Section 8.2.2, documenting the correct evaluation of the election out-
come amounts to proving that the following implementation requirements have been
satisfied:
Eval1: Repeated, independent tallying
Eval2: Public conduct of the tally
Eval1 In a conventional paper-based election, the ballots have to be counted by two
members of the Electoral Board independently. This can be publicly verified
and is also documented in the election record. For remote electronic elections,
requiring different members of the Electoral Board to tally the ballots does not
add any significant value if the same tallying routine is used for both runs.10
It is preferable to have third parties (for example election observers and offi-
cial scrutiny authorities) perform a recount using a different tallying routine
and checking whether the same result as for the original routine is obtained.
If this is not possible (for example because tallying requires using secret keys
that would have to be disclosed), the ballots should be recounted using a tal-
lying routine that has been written in a different programming language than
the original routine (cf. [AdMPQ09]). Due to universal verifiability (see Sec-
tions 2.1.7 and 4.4), retallying should also be open to the public. This is
10However, the approach of using two or more separate individuals or entities operating together
(commonly referred to as “dual control”) is an important method to enhance the security of an
online voting system. It should be adhered to where appropriate, for example when opening the
poll or tallying is initiated by the Electoral Board.
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addressed below (Eval2). Note that remote electronic elections usually do not
provide the possibility of a manual recount.
Eval2 Whereas the public scrutiny required for small-scale non-political elections
(for example in societies) is limited [BR09], electing a parliament should offer
a high level of transparency to the voters and must allow for comprehensive
assessment by election observers. The tallying process should be made trans-
parent by providing to the public a means to verify that the ballots were cor-
rectly transformed into the election result. If applicable, a certified (possibly
third-party) routine should be provided to recount the votes and verify the
election result. Voters could even be invited to implement their own routines
for a recount, provided that the according specification is published and fol-
lowed. Such an approach, however, requires a policy which states how to handle
discrepancies between the official election result and the result calculated by
self-made tallying routines.
8.4. Implementation proposals
Finally we give implementation proposals by determining the documents which have
to be retained in order to meet the implementation requirements identified in Sec-
tion 8.3. We follow the structure of Section 8.3. Here we only recommend which
records shall be retained, the question how this should be established is considered
in Chapter 9. We also specify whether the respective record shall be published (in
order to satisfy the principle of public elections) or whether it is confidential (since
it contains sensitive information). This decision is made according to the following
policies:
P1 If a record retained contains personal information of voters or other persons
involved, it shall be confidential. Personal information may include for exam-
ple the name, address or date of birth, as well as the fact whether a voter
participated in the election.
P2 If a record is retained in order to demonstrate compliance with conditions that
can be publicly verified in a conventional paper-based elections, it shall be
published. If possible, the public shall additionally be provided with a means
to actively verify the respective condition instead of merely acknowledging the
record retained.
8.4.1. Preparation phase
Prep1: Trustworthy entities
Prep1.1 Non-disclosure agreements as well as contracts requiring involved staff
to provide due diligence shall be retained. These records are confidential
as they contain personal information of the respective persons (P1).
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Prep1.2 The evaluation report setting out that the voting system conforms to
certain security requirements shall be retained. This record is public as
voters can verify the according condition (i.e. conformance of components
such as the ballot box or the tables in the polling station with given spec-
ifications) in conventional paper-based elections (P2).
Comments. The evaluation report has to be specified depending on the
evaluation standard used. In Common Criteria, the Evaluation Technical
Report, which is produced by the evaluator and submitted to an evalua-
tion authority, documents in detail the overall verdict and its justification
[CEM09]. The Certification Report summarizes the results and contains
the certificate. The Certification Report is public, whereas the Evaluation
Technical Report usually is confidential. For parliamentary elections, we
recommend that the Evaluation Technical Report should be published as
well. It must at least be open to election observers.
Prep2: Proper installation and surroundings
Prep2.1 A document certifying that the ballot box was empty before the voting
phase started shall be retained. This record is public as voters can verify
the according condition in conventional paper-based elections (P2).
Prep2.2 Not applicable.
Comments. As mentioned before, when allowing the voter to cast his
vote from an arbitrary computer, unobserved polling cannot be enforced,
nor can it be documented by any supervisory authority. The voter has to
take care of this on his own account.
Prep3: Closure of the voters’ register
The version of the voters’ register which was used to determine voter eligibility
shall be retained. This record is confidential as it contains personal information
of voters (P1), compare to its equivalent in conventional paper-based elections
(§ 89 (1) BWO). The number of eligible voters shall be publicly announced
(cf. § 78 BWO).
Prep4: Justified nomination of candidates
The collection of supporting signatures for candidate nominations shall be re-
tained. This record is confidential as it contains personal information of the
nominated candidates and the supporting voters (P1), compare to its equiva-
lent in conventional paper-based elections (§ 34 (4) and § 39 (3) BWO). The
nominated candidates shall be publicly announced (§ 38, § 43 (1) BWO).
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8.4.2. Voting phase
Vote1: Special incidents
The log files produced by the voting system shall be retained. This record is
public as voters can observe special incidents that occurred during the poll in
conventional paper-based elections (P2).
Vote2: Different voting channels
i. A record of all voters who have cast a vote shall be retained. This record is
confidential as it contains personal information of voters (P1), compare to
the amended voters’ register in conventional paper-based elections (§ 56
(4) and § 89 (1) BWO). The number of participating voters shall be
publicly announced (§ 78 BWO).
ii. If multiple voting channels are offered, a document providing evidence
of the channel used by each voter shall be retained. This record is con-
fidential as it contains personal information of voters (P1), compare to
the polling card register in conventional paper-based elections (§ 89 (1)
BWO).
Vote3: Secrecy of the vote
Vote3.1 A document setting out how the voting system ensures the secrecy of
the vote from the time the ballot is completed until the end of the voting
phase must be retained. This record is public as voters can verify the
according condition (i.e. folded ballots and a sealed or locked ballot box)
in conventional paper-based elections (P2).
Comments. This may also be established by setting out that the voting
system does not allow for ballots to be opened before the voting phase
has ended, for example on the basis of the evaluation report retained
according to Prep1.2 (see Section 8.4.1).
Vote3.2 A declaration of having voted personally made by each voter shall
be retained. If electronic signatures are available, the voter shall sign
an according affidavit. This record is confidential as it contains personal
information of voters (P1), compare to its equivalent (the polling cards)
in conventional paper-based elections (§ 75 (7) BWO).
Vote4: Proper termination of the poll
i. A document providing evidence of the timely termination of the poll shall
be retained. It may be part of the log files retained according to Vote1.
This record is public as the according condition can be publicly verified
in a conventional paper-based election (P2).
ii. A document providing evidence that voters have been notified about the
upcoming end of the voting phase shall be retained. It may be part of the
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log files retained according to Vote1. This record is public as the according
condition can be publicly verified in a conventional paper-based election
(P2).
Vote5: Public conduct of the poll
The log files produced by the voting system shall be retained (cf. Vote1). This
record is public as voters can observe the polling procedure in conventional
paper-based elections as well (P2).
Comments. The public conduct of an online election cannot be implemented
by physical observation (see also Eval2, Section 8.3.3). Publishing log files is a
substitute for physical observation and, thus, helps to establish a public poll.
Note that source code is protected by copyright according to § 2 and § 69a of
the German Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz, UrhG). Thus, if the voting
system has been implemented using proprietary software, the source code shall
be considered a trade secret. The source code shall, however, be open at least
to election observers. If the election is challenged, the judge may also decide
on an inspection of the source code within the election scrutiny proceedings.
8.4.3. Evaluation phase
Eval1: Repeated, independent tallying
A document containing the election results established on the basis of an inde-
pendent recount shall be retained. This record is public as the corresponding
procedure in paper-based elections (i.e. ballot counting by two members of the
Electoral Board) is public as well (P2).
Comments. The recount should either be performed by a third party, or, if this
is not possible (for example because of secret keys required for tallying), using
a tallying routine that has been written in a different programming language
than the original one (cf. [AdMPQ09]).
Eval2: Public conduct of the tally
i. The set of ballots received by the voting system shall be retained. This
record is public as anyone may be present when the ballot boxes are
opened and the ballots are disclosed in a conventional paper-based election
(P2).
ii. A document setting out that the received ballots have been correctly pro-
cessed and tallied shall be retained. This record is public as anyone may
be present during tallying in a conventional paper-based election (P2).
Comments. The ballots received by the voting system are the basis for
establishing the election result. Therefore, having transformed these bal-
lots correctly into the corresponding votes shall be publicly verifiable.
The according record may comprise, for example, zero-knowledge proofs
of correct decryption or proofs of correct mixing (see Section 2.2.3), and it
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shall be published as the tallying process cannot be physically observed.
It is preferable to provide the public with a means to actively verify the
tallying process or parts of it (for instance by publishing the secret key of
the teller after the poll has ended, see [2]).11 However, this depends on the
voting system and may not be applicable (for example in a voting system
using homomorphic encryption with distributed tellers, cf. Section 2.2.5).
iii. The number of valid and invalid votes shall be documented as well as the
the election results (i.e. number of votes for the different parties and can-
didates). This record is public as this data is published for conventional
paper-based elections as well (P2), see § 79 (1) BWO.
8.5. Summary
Legally binding remote electronic voting presupposes that the proper conduct of
the election is verifiable for several years. This requires appropriate record keeping.
While the retention obligations for paper-based elections are governed by electoral
law, according specifications for electronic voting have not yet been issued.
We have used KORA (see Section 7.3) to derive the records to be kept for online
elections from relevant legal requirements. This involved abstracting from existing
retention obligations laid down in German Electoral Law in order to identify the
implementation requirements that must be met to provide evidence of the proper
conduct of the election. These implementation requirements were interpreted within
the scenario of remote electronic voting. Finally, we have derived implementation
proposals, thus recommending which records should be kept in order to meet the im-
plementation requirements. Due to our approach, these recommendations are based
upon legal obligations regarding conventional paper-based elections and, therefore,
their consideration is an important step on the way toward legally binding online
elections for the German Bundestag. We have also recommended which of the respec-
tive records should be published in order to satisfy the principle of public elections,
and which of them should be kept confidential. An obvious way to implement our
recommendations regarding publication of specific data is to post them to a public
bulletin board (see Section 2.2.7).
In particular, we have seen that retaining merely data generated by the protocol
(such as the ballots or proofs of correct tallying) does not suffice to meet legal
retention requirements. It is necessary to keep further records, for example in order
to document trustworthiness and proper installation of the voting system. In the
following chapter we identify any constraints in terms of both the quantity and the
quality of the data retained.
11Cf. the concept of constructive universal verifiability introduced in [Pie06].
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In Section 8.1 we learned that the primary objective of retaining election data is to
conclusively document the proper conduct of the election, and in the remainder of
Chapter 8 we identified the records which must be kept to this end. In particular, we
have seen that documenting the proper conduct of the election means documenting
that the basic principles of electoral law and the principle of public elections have
been complied with during each phase of the election.
Now that we have established which records should be kept as a minimum, we need
to investigate whether there is also an upper limit to the records kept: the election
records not only have to document that the basic principles of electoral law have been
satisfied while the election was carried out; the records themselves also have to be
consistent with these principles. Moreover, we have to ascertain whether additional
relevant principles or rights could be infringed by the data retained, and whether
ensuring conclusiveness of the records requires special measures to be applied.
In this chapter we therefore identify any constraints to the record keeping in terms
of both the quantity and the quality of the data retained. As in Chapter 8, we
start from legal requirements and use KORA (see Section 7.3) to derive appropriate
implementation proposals. In particular, we investigate whether the records could
infringe the basic principles of electoral law or any other fundamental constitutional
rights, and analyze the way in which the record keeping should be accomplished in
order to preserve the probative value of the data retained.
As already noted in Section 7.2.1, measures to protect the security and longevity
of electronic records have been developed and established within several projects and
working groups. These measures are mostly generic and, thus, can basically also be
applied in order to securely retain electronic election data. However, merely apply-
ing these measures to any data occurring during the election is not sufficient since
specific challenges posed by the scenario of electronic voting, such as maintaining
voter privacy in the long term, have to be addressed.
This chapter is based on joint work with Zoi Opitz-Talidou; an earlier version has
been published as [3] (in German).
Chapter overview
The structure of this chapter corresponds to the four stages provided for by KORA:
In Section 9.1 we identify the legal requirements regarding secure and conclusive
retention of election data. Section 9.2 translates these legal requirements into le-
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gal criteria. In Section 9.3 we derive technical implementation requirements from
the legal criteria identified in Section 9.2. Implementation proposals fulfilling these
implementation requirements are made in Section 9.4. Section 9.5 summarizes the
chapter.
9.1. Legal requirements
As already stated in Section 8.1, the primary reason for retaining election records is
to prepare for scrutiny proceedings (§ 81 BWO). Recall that, according to § 2 (2, 4)
WPru¨fG, any eligible voter, each Land Returning Officer, the Federal Returning
Officer and the President of the Bundestag may challenge the election within a
period of two months after the poll; the President of the Bundestag may challenge
the election even after this period has expired (§ 2 (4) WPru¨fG). Evidence is collected
according to § 7 (2) WPru¨fG and requires measures to preserve the probative value
of the records retained: they can only be used as evidence of the proper conduct of
the election if they have sufficient probative value.
However, considering the matter of conclusiveness alone is not sufficient: the elec-
tion records kept are only admissible as evidence if they do not infringe the basic
principles of electoral law (cf. Section 7.2.3). In the following we therefore go through
these principles and analyze whether they may be interfered with by the election
records kept.
The principle of universality postulates that any eligible voter can participate in
the election and thereby execute his right to vote (cf. Section 8.1). This principle
relates to the quality of the access to the election provided to the voters and therefore
restricts to the voting phase. The principle of universal elections is thus not affected
by the election records that are kept after the election has been carried out.
The principle of directness postulates that the voters alone determine the election
result, and that nobody may influence the outcome of the election once the polls have
closed (cf. Section 8.1). However, illegal ballots could possibly be injected even after
the voting phase has terminated. Still, the principle of directness is not considered to
be affected by the occurrence of illegal ballots—forgeries rather affect the principle of
equality as explained below [Wil02, Kar05]. The principle of direct elections merely
excludes the possibility of having an electoral college determine the election result.
Therefore, this principle is not affected by the election records kept.
The principle of equality requires all votes cast by eligible voters to have equal
influence on the election results (cf. Section 8.1). Having ineligible voters cast il-
legal ballots which affect the election result is considered to infringe the principle
of equality [Wil02, Kar05], and such an infringement can possibly occur even after
the tallying phase has terminated and the retention period has commenced: illegal
ballots could be added to the legitimately cast votes after the end of the election,
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and a different election result than the one established before could be claimed. In
such a case the correct election result would have to be indisputably ascertainable
since otherwise the principle of equal elections would be infringed. Therefore, the
election result which has been established on the basis of the legitimately cast votes
must be unequivocally evident from the records kept.
The principle of freedom postulates that voters can freely express their intention
and must not be influenced unlawfully by others or even coerced to vote in a par-
ticular way (cf. Section 8.1). This applies also to the period after the votes have
been cast: it must not be possible to ascertain a voter’s voting decision. If the voter
fears that his decision becomes public in the future, his freedom of vote is limited.
Thus, the principle of free elections can be infringed even after the election has been
carried out, and is therefore essentially affected by the records retained.
The principle of secrecy postulates that the voter’s decision must be kept secret,
i.e. that it must not be possible to associate a vote with the voter who cast it
(cf. Section 8.1). This principle is closely related to the principle of freedom since
secrecy of the vote is a precondition for unrestricted freedom of vote [Sch90]. The
secrecy of the vote has to be maintained beyond the end of the election in order to
ensure unrestricted freedom of vote.1 Thus, the principle of secret elections is as well
affected by the records retained and must be considered in the following.
The principle of public elections postulates that all essential steps of an election
are subject to the possibility of public scrutiny unless other constitutional interests
justify an exception [Fed09b]. Keeping election records supports this principle rather
than conflicting with it since publishing selected parts of the records kept helps to
establish public elections (cf. Section 8.1). Recall that, with respect to retention
of election data, the principle of public elections is of a different kind than the
other five principles: while compliance with the five principles is documented by
the records kept, the principle of public elections is also satisfied by means of the
retention provisions. In order to comply with this principle, the records kept must
be made available to the public in an appropriate way. At the same time, this means
that the principle of public elections can only be infringed by the election records
if data under retention is withheld from the public without good cause. We have
already recommended which of the records should be published in order to satisfy
the principle of public elections (see Section 8.4). Therefore, this principle does not
have to be considered any more in the following.
In summary, we have thus figured out that the principles of secret, free and equal
elections can be interfered with by the records kept. Additionally, we have to take
1To date there is no consensus on how long one’s voting decision should be kept secret. It has been
claimed that, at least for Federal Elections, the secrecy of the vote should hold forever [Wil02];
however, it may also be sufficient to maintain the secrecy of the vote for the voter’s lifetime
(P. Richter, personal communication).
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into account the constitutional right to informational self-determination, which is
derived from § 2 (1) GG. It postulates that everyone shall personally decide on the
disclosure and use of his personal data [Fed83]. This fundamental right may only
be restricted in view of public interest, and it must not be restricted further than
necessary. It also encompasses protection against unlimited collection and storage
of personal data. Informational self-determination can be infringed by the election
records kept since they contain personal data of voters and candidates, and must
therefore be taken into account.
We have thus identified the following legal requirements:
I. The probative value of the records providing evidence of the proper conduct
of the election must be sufficient, and it must be preserved throughout the
retention period.
II. The principle of equal elections must not be infringed, i.e. the election result
established on the basis of the legitimately cast votes must be clearly and
unequivocally evident from the records kept.
III. The principles of free and secret elections must not be infringed, i.e. the
records kept must not reveal any voter’s voting decision.
IV. The fundamental right to informational self-determination must be preserved,
i.e. personal data of voters or other persons involved must be protected against
unauthorized access, and must not be used for any purpose other than specified
by electoral law.
The principles of free and secret elections have been considered in a single require-
ment since they are closely interrelated. The next step is to derive legal criteria from
the legal requirements we have just identified.
9.2. Legal criteria
The following legal criteria can be derived from the legal requirements identified in
the previous section:
1. First of all, the requirement of preserving the probative value of the records
retained (I) requires the information contained in the records to be readable
by humans. To this end, hardware to access the data as well as software to
interpret and visualize it must be available and trustworthy [RFDJ07].
2. Any records must be retained in a way that ensures their tamper-resistance.
This legal criterion is derived from two requirements: to preserve the probative
value of the records kept (I), and to establish unequivocal evidence on the
election results in order to prevent the principle of equal elections from being
infringed (II). It has to be ensured that the records cannot be maliciously
or accidentally altered or deleted [RFDJK07]. Thus, there must be a means
104
9.3. Implementation requirements
to detect whether a document has been altered or deleted, and the archiving
system must provide methods to prevent undue modifications and to retrieve
documents in their original condition.
3. The records retained must be authentic, and there must be ways to verify
their authenticity [RFDJ07]. This criterion follows from the requirement to
preserve the probative value of the records kept (I) and the requirement to
establish unequivocal evidence of the election results (II). In order to allow for
verification of authenticity, the issuer of a document which is part of the records
retained must be ascertainable—as long as this does not affect voter privacy.
Obviously, this criterion cannot be fulfilled independently of the criterion which
is derived from the legal requirements of secrecy and freedom (see 5. below).
4. In order to be able to use the records as evidence in a lawsuit, they must be
presentable to the court [FD06]. To this end, it must be possible to provide
the records on a portable data carrier, or to transmit the records electronically.
This criterion can be derived from the requirement to ensure a sufficient pro-
bative value of the records retained (I), since the probative value can only be
assessed by the court if the records are presentable to the judges.
5. From the legal requirements of secrecy and freedom (III) it can be derived that
any possibility to check a ballot cast by a particular voter must be excluded,
which holds even after the election has been carried out: the records retained
must not allow for establishing a link between any voter and his vote, thereby
revealing the voter’s voting decision.
6. From the requirement to preserve the right to informational self-determination
(IV) it can be derived that data protection provisions must be adhered to if
the records kept contain personal data, which holds for some of the election
records (e.g. the voters’ register or the collection of supporting signatures for
candidate nominations, cf. Section 8.4.1, Prep3, Prep4). The data protection
provisions are regulated by the Federal Data Protection Law (Bundesdaten-
schutzgesetz, BDSG). According to § 9 BDSG, appropriate technical and orga-
nizational measures must be taken to protect personal data. Data protection
also encompasses purpose specification: while it is legitimate to store personal
data within the scope of election documentation, it has to be ensured that the
data retained is not used for any purpose other than specified by electoral law.
9.3. Implementation requirements
In the following we derive technical implementation requirements from the legal
criteria identified in Section 9.2.
1. The first implementation requirement is to ensure the readability of the records
retained. To this end, standardized, generally accepted and widespread data
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formats should be used [BRSS06]: this increases the probability that appropri-
ate software is available and, thus, helps to avoid later format conversion. Since
election records have a retention period of up to ten years (see Section 7.1),
transformations during the retention period can be prevented if appropriate
data formats are used from the beginning, that is, already when implementing
the voting system.
2. The second implementation requirement is to ensure the integrity of the records
retained (cf. [VV08, Objective No. 161]). According to the corresponding legal
criterion, modifications shall not only be recognized, but rather have to be pre-
vented. Also, any compilation of interrelated documents must be preserved in
its entirety, i.e. the completeness of relevant documents must be ascertainable
[RS06a].
3. The third implementation requirement is to ascertain the authenticity of the
records retained. While paper records can be signed by hand of their issuer and
subsequently retained as such, establishing and preserving authenticity of elec-
tronic documents requires special measures. While providing for authenticity
of the cast votes, voter privacy must still be ensured (see 5., implementation
requirement of privacy).
4. The fourth implementation requirement is to ensure the negotiability of the
records. The according legal criterion requires that the records can be trans-
ferred electronically or physically via a portable data storage device. To this
end, protective measures to fulfill the implementation requirements should
preferably apply to the record itself instead of applying via the storage medium
or the archiving system (cf. [VV08, Objective No. 161]): document-related
protective measures are capable of protecting the retained documents directly,
irrespective of the storage medium and the archiving system which is used
[RFDJ07].
5. The fifth implementation requirement is to maintain voter privacy beyond the
end of the election. If the voting system produces separate records which, when
combined, may compromise voter privacy, these records must not be retained
to the extent that voter and vote can be linked. Since remote electronic voting
requires electronic procedures to authenticate voters before they cast a ballot,
voter authentication data has to be present in the system at some point in
time. This data might be existent even beyond the end of the election and
eventually can be used to ascertain the voter’s voting decision afterward. Here
we assume that the election records are stored centrally, i.e. we do not consider
the possibility of storing the records in a distributed way (this is addressed for
example in [8]).
6. The sixth implementation requirement is to ensure confidentiality of personal
data. Any confidential information stored must be protected against unau-
thorized access. Moreover, the purpose specification must be adhered to—the
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data retained must not be used for any purpose other than specified by electoral
law: according to § 89 (2, 3) BWO, information contained in
– the voters’ register
– the polling card register
– the register of polling cards which have been declared invalid according
to § 28 (8) BWO (affecting voters whose names have been canceled from
the voters’ register)
– the register of voters that shall vote before a moving Electoral Board
according to § 29 (1) BWO
– the forms with supporting signatures for nominated candidates
may only be provided to official authorities and may only be used for election
statistics, scrutiny procedures or in case an election fraud according to § 107
and § 108 StGB is suspected. These specifications must be adhered to.
9.4. Implementation proposals
In the following we make implementation proposals for each of the implementation
requirements listed in Section 9.3. First we explain methods appropriate to fulfill
each requirement, then we make concrete recommendations for the scenario of online
elections, referring to the records that have to be kept according to Section 8.4. We
assume the existence of a public bulletin board (see Section 2.2.7).
1. To ensure readability of the records retained, standardized and persistent
data formats shall be used. These are, for example, PDF/A [Intc] and XML
[BPSM+08] (see also [Bun06, M 4.170]). The latter is human-readable as well
as machine-readable and particularly suitable for structured data sets which
need to be easy to parse in different programming languages (see Section 8.4.3,
Eval1). Therefore we recommend to use XML for the record of ballots and the
voters’ register (cf. [Adi08]). XML signatures [ERS02] should be used to sign
these records as they are tailored to XML documents and provide for strong
flexibility (see 3., implementation proposals for authenticity).
Recommendations on readability
R1.1 Structured data sets such as the ballots (see Section 8.4.3, Eval2) or
the voters’ register (see Section 8.4.1, Prep3) should be generated and
retained in XML format.
R1.2 If records retained in XML format have to be signed (see 3., implemen-
tation proposals for authenticity), XML signatures should be used.
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R1.3 Self-contained documents that are not directly related to a specific elec-
tion such as the agreements and contracts according to Prep1.1 (see Sec-
tion 8.4.1) and the evaluation report (see Section 8.4.1, Prep1.2) should
be retained in PDF/A format.
2. Qualified timestamps [HS91] are an approved method to demonstrate the in-
tegrity of electronic records. They can prove that a document existed in a
certain form at a specific point in time and, thus, provide the possibility to
recognize alterations to the document [KOV07]. However, the fact that time-
stamps can be used to establish the chronological order of incoming messages
must not be exploited to compromise voter privacy. We take this up when
making according implementation proposals for privacy (see 5.).
Qualified timestamps are issued by a Certificate Service Provider who, accord-
ing to § 2 of the Signature Law (Signaturgesetz, SigG), must conform to specific
legal requirements. In order to minimize the number of qualified timestamps
required, one may use Merkle’s hash trees [Mer80] as standardized in [GBP07].
However, timestamps can only prove that a document has not changed since a
specific point in time. Unauthorized modification can be prevented by retaining
the records on non-rewritable storage media kept in a secure location. Both
approaches shall be combined; additionally, redundant safekeeping increases
the security and availability of the records kept.
Recommendations on integrity
R2.1 The voters’ register shall be provided with a qualified timestamp before
the election starts (see Section 8.4.1, Prep3). This documents conclusively
the state of the voters’ register in which it was referred to for checking
eligibility during the polling phase. It also allows for setting marks to
indicate that a voter has already cast his vote or that he has used a
specific voting channel.
R2.2 The ballot box shall be provided with a qualified timestamp at the very
beginning of the voting phase in order to prove that it was in a correct
state then (see Section 8.4.1, Prep2.1).
R2.3 When the voting phase has ended and pending votes have been resolved
(i.e. either cast or canceled), the contents of the ballot box should be
provided with a qualified timestamp. This provides evidence of the timely
termination of the poll (see Section 8.4.2, Vote4).
R2.4 Any of the records retained according to Section 8.4 should be kept on
non-rewritable, portable storage media and stored in a secure location
accessible by authorized persons only. A duplicate of each record shall be
kept in like manner, but in a different place.
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3. The method of choice in order to provide for authenticity is to use electronic
signatures: an electronic signature ensures that the originator of a signed doc-
ument can be identified. At the same time, signing a document can prove that
it has not been modified thereafter. Thus, electronic signatures establish au-
thenticity and demonstrate integrity. However, electronic signatures must not
be used in a way which would cause voter privacy to be compromised. We will
consider this when proposing according measures for maintaining privacy (see
5.).
According to § 371a and § 437 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivil-
prozessordnung, ZPO), authenticity of electronic documents is assumed if they
are provided with a qualified electronic signature as only these have a probative
value which equals those of signatures by hand. Thus, only qualified electronic
signatures should be used for conclusive retention. According to § 6 (1) SigG
and § 17 of the Signature Ordinance (Signaturverordnung, SigV), preserving
qualified electronic signatures requires renewing them before the security suit-
ability of the employed algorithms and parameters expires, and providing the
renewed signature with a qualified timestamp. According to annex 1 Section I
(2) SigV, the algorithms and parameters shall be suitable for at least six years.
Moreover, the verification data must be available for the whole retention period
[BPRS02]. According to § 14 (3) SigV, qualified certificates shall be valid for
no more than five years from the date of issuance.
Recommendations on authenticity
R3.1 We recommend to provide the individual votes with signatures in order to
prove their authenticity. However, this should not be accomplished after
the end of the election, but rather be provided for by the voting protocol.
Otherwise, alleged alterations during the poll cannot be disproved.2
Due to voter privacy, the cleartext vote must obviously not be signed
by the voter himself. An approved method to achieve authenticity of the
votes (and to confirm the voter’s eligibility at the same time) is having the
votes signed by a validating authority, see for example the voting protocols
[OMA+99] or [2]. Blind signatures can be used here in order to conceal
the vote from the validation authority (see Section 2.2.4). However, this
depends on the voting protocol used.
R3.2 If signing the votes is not provided for, the ballots shall be signed. There
are two possibilities to establish this: either the voter signs the individ-
ual ballot before he casts it, or the collection of received ballots is signed
2Note that an archiving system cannot make up for negligence in the preparation of documents. For
example, the integrity of a document which was created without appropriate safeguards cannot
be verified for the time before this document was entered into the archiving system [RFDJ07].
109
9. Identifying constraints and proposing protective measures
by an election authority.3 The first approach presupposes that electronic
signatures are available to the voters, and has been used for example in
the Estonian voting system [Est05]. However, this approach has the dis-
advantage that upon publishing the signed ballots, voter privacy may be
compromised in the long term if the encryption scheme becomes insecure.
Contrary to the option of voter signatures, having an election author-
ity sign the set of received ballots after the voting phase has terminated
(see Section 8.4.3, Eval2) shall be mandatory as this provides a proof of
integrity and completeness at the same time (see R3.4e).
R3.3 The evaluation report should be signed by the certification authority (see
Section 8.4.1, Prep1.2).
R3.4 The following documents shall be signed by an election authority:
a) the voters’ register (see Section 8.4.1, Prep3)
b) the list of nominated candidates including the supporting signatures
(see Section 8.4.1, Prep4)
c) the records on participating voters and voting channels used (see Sec-
tion 8.4.2, Vote2)
d) the log files of the voting system (see Section 8.4.2, Vote1 and Vote5)
e) the set of received ballots4 (see Section 8.4.3, Eval2)
f) the documents on the correct processing and tallying of the received
ballots (see Section 8.4.3, Eval2)
g) the records containing the number of valid and invalid votes and the
election results (see Section 8.4.3, Eval2)
h) the results of the recount (see Section 8.4.3, Eval1)
Note that voter privacy must be respected in any case (see 5., implemen-
tation proposals for privacy).
R3.5 Timely signature renewal must be taken care of for any signatures issued
along these recommendations. This applies also to any signatures issued
in terms of the contracts according to Prep1.1, the forms with supporting
signatures for nominated candidates according to Prep4, or the affidavits
according to Vote3.2 (see Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2).
3In the following, an election authority denotes the Electoral Officer or any other authorized party
provided by the respective voting scheme.
4We recommend having the ballots received in each polling district signed by the Electoral Officer.
Additionally, the overall record containing several sets of ballots from the individual polling dis-
tricts should be signed by the Constituency Returning Officer. Thus, the integrity, authenticity
and completeness of the respective record can be proven. This approach can be continued by
having the Land Returning Officer sign the record containing the ballots of the constituencies,
and having the Federal Returning Officer sign the record containing the ballots received in the
lands.
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4. Negotiability is achieved by combining several approved measures: using wide-
spread or standardized data formats supports negotiability since it increases the
probability that the records can be accessed without any difficulty [RFDJ07]
(see also the implementation proposals for readability). Keeping the records on
non-rewritable, portable storage media allows the records to be collected and
presented to the court (see also the implementation proposals for integrity).
Document-related protective measures such as signatures and timestamps can
be verified by anyone. They apply directly to the records kept, and therefore
remain effective irrespective of the storage medium and the archiving system
which is used [RFDJ07]. Thus, negotiability is achieved by taking appropriate
measures which are used primarily to meet the other legal criteria. Therefore,
we do not provide specific recommendations here.
5. Privacy is preserved by restricting the volume or the characteristics5 of the
records in an appropriate way. In particular, it must not be possible to com-
promise voter privacy by combining different records which, though, may not
be a threat to privacy individually. In Chapter 4 we have learned that privacy
can be established by either unlinkability of voter and ballot, or unlinkability of
ballot and contained vote (see Section 4.2). It follows that, in order to establish
long-term privacy, it must not be possible to reconstruct both links at the same
time from the records kept (or data otherwise remaining from the election). We
give an example to illustrate the issue: imagine a voting system which produces
a table listing ballots alongside the names of the voters who have cast them
(as is the case for the schemes proposed for instance in [AdMPQ09, JCJ05]).
This table should be retained according to recommendation Eval2 i. (see Sec-
tion 8.4.3). If the private key which was used to extract the votes from the
ballots is retained as well (for instance due to verifiability), then anyone who
is able to access the records kept may compromise voter privacy.
Restricting access to the records (see implementation proposals for confiden-
tiality) is not sufficient in this case: a crucial issue for maintaining privacy
is protection of private keys. For example in the 2007 Estonian parliamen-
tary elections, a core requirement for ensuring voter privacy was to prevent
anyone from gaining access to both the electronically signed votes and the
private key used for decrypting the encrypted votes [Est05]. Secure key man-
agement (i.e. secure generation, delivery, backup, usage, and deletion of keys,
see also [Bun06, M 2.46]) is a general requirement which applies to any vot-
ing system (cf. [VV08, Objective No. 193]). We focus on the aspect which is
affected by record keeping, namely secure deletion of private keys (cf. [Est05]).
The Estonian voting system shows another feature which may affect voter pri-
vacy: in order to prevent vote-buying, it allows for multiple voting, i.e. over-
writing a vote cast electronically by either a new electronic vote or a traditional
5Here, the characteristics are meant to refer to cryptographic attributes such as electronic signa-
tures or timestamps.
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vote on paper. This approach requires procedures to recognize a voter who has
already cast an electronic vote in order to be able to cancel this vote. This
is accomplished by storing the encrypted votes including the voter’s signa-
ture which is later on used to identify the affected ballots. The signatures are
separated from the encrypted ballots before the votes are counted. However,
retaining encrypted votes which have been signed by the voters may compro-
mise voter privacy in the long term when the encryption scheme has become
insecure (cf. R3.2) and, of course, in case the private decryption key is dis-
closed, as stated above. Therefore, the signed encrypted votes should not be
retained, but rather deleted as soon as the election result has been verified and
the period for contesting the election has expired (cf. § 2 (2, 4) WPru¨fG).
Finally, specific election results may allow inference on the voting decision of
individual voters with absolute or extremely high certainty: imagine an election
where solely one voter uses a specific voting channel (e.g. one single absentee
vote). In this case, retaining the list of participating voters and voting channels
used (cf. R3.4c) as well as the election result per voting channel (cf. R3.4g)
would reveal that voter’s voting decision. This can be prevented by either
organizational (e.g. separation of duty) or technical means (e.g. encryption).
Recommendations on privacy
R5.1 After the election has terminated, authentication data referring to the
identity of the voter (i.e. information used for authenticating the voter and
checking eligibility, such as the voter’s electronic signature, cf. R3.2) must
no longer be linkable to ballot data containing the vote (e.g. in encrypted
form).
R5.2 Any private keys used to extract the votes from the ballots shall be per-
manently deleted after the election results have been established and veri-
fied (for instance by checking proofs of correct tallying) and the two-month
period for contesting the election has expired (cf. § 2 (2, 4) WPru¨fG). If
the private keys have previously been distributed among several trustees
(secret sharing, cf. Section 2.2.2), according deletion policies must be en-
forced for each trustee.
R5.3 Any residual information linking the voter to his vote or allowing conclu-
sions to be drawn about the voter’s choice (for example the secret permu-
tations used by mixnets and the randomization values used by a reencryp-
tion mixnet) must be destroyed after the vote has been cast (cf. [VV08,
Objectives No. 162 and 192]). This holds also for residual information
stored on the voting device which has been used to cast the vote (for
example the random value used for blinding the vote in order to obtain a
blind signature, cf. [OMA+99]). If deletion cannot be accomplished auto-
matically by the voting system, the voter must be informed how to delete
such traces.
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R5.4 Ballots should not be provided with timestamps upon entering the elec-
tronic ballot box as conclusions regarding the chronological order of the
votes cast can be drawn from this (see Section 8.4.3, Eval2; cf. [VV08,
Objectives No. 162 and 192]).
R5.5 If the election result allows conclusions to be drawn about the voting
decision of individual voters (with absolute or extremely high certainty),
the relevant records must be kept secret. Appropriate measures are sepa-
ration of duty or encryption. These measures should be applied to those
records listed in R3.4 which are affected depending on the individual elec-
tion scenario.
6. The requirement of confidentiality and purpose specification can be fulfilled
by access control and encryption (cf. the annex to § 9 (1) BDSG). Implementing
access control in the archiving system helps to achieve confidentiality during
the retention period. The respective records shall be retained in such a way
that any user can inspect the documents he is authorized to see. For example,
the user can only access the voters’ register in the role of the Electoral Board.
A drawback of this approach is that access control ceases to be effective if
the protected document is collected from the archive, for example because it
has to be presented to the court (see also the implementation proposals for
negotiability).
To protect the confidential document directly, it can also be encrypted. In
this case, the decryption key has to be retained as well and must be protected
against unauthorized access. Since the retention period most probably does not
exceed ten years (see Section 7.1), reencryption can be avoided if the keylength
is chosen appropriately from the beginning, i.e. in such a way as to remain
secure for the whole retention period. This can be established, for example, on
the basis of the ECRYPT recommendations.6 However, it should be monitored
whether weaknesses of the used encryption scheme have been found in the
meantime, so that the affected records can be reencrypted if required.
Recommendations on confidentiality and purpose specification
R6.1 The persons who may challenge the election according to § 2 (2) WPru¨fG
(i.e. the eligible voters, each Land Returning Officer, the Federal Return-
ing Officer and the President of the Bundestag) shall have access to those
retention records which are public (see policy P2, Section 8.4) for the pe-
riod in which the election may be challenged by the respective person (see
§ 2 (4) WPru¨fG). We recommend using a bulletin board to this end.
R6.2 The confidential retention records (see policy P1, Section 8.4) shall only
be accessible to designated election authorities and official election ob-
6The ECRYPT Yearly Report on Algorithms and Key Lengths is available at http://www.ecrypt.
eu.org/ecrypt1/.
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servers. This applies to the records listed under Prep1.1, Prep3, Prep4,
Vote2, Vote3.2 in Section 8.4, and can be established using either encryp-
tion or role-based access control within the archiving system.
R6.3 Anyone who has access to election records containing personal data must
be informed on his duty not to use this data for any purpose other than
specified by electoral law, i.e. election statistics, scrutiny procedures or
in case an election fraud according to § 107 and § 108 StGB is suspected
(cf. § 89 (2, 3) BWO).
9.5. Summary
This chapter considered the constraints which apply to election records kept. Start-
ing from legal requirements and using KORA (see Section 7.3), we have derived legal
criteria and, as a next step, requirements for implementing the retention of online
election data. Then we proposed concrete recommendations on how to meet the im-
plementation requirements, referring to the records that have to be kept according
to Section 8.4. We have seen that some of these measures (such as signing the votes,
see R3.1) affect the voting protocol directly and, thus, should be considered already
when designing and implementing an electronic voting scheme.
We have considered the constraints which apply to the records kept after the
election. However, in order to comply with the implementation requirement of con-
fidentiality, the respective records must, first of all, not be published during the
election, for example on public bulletin boards (see Section 2.2.7). Still, this is of-
ten disregarded by current voting protocols; we will consider such an example in
the following chapter when we apply our findings to a state-of-the-art online voting
scheme.
When publishing election data, it should also be considered that even encrypted
data can lose its confidentiality in the long term if the cryptographic algorithms which
have been used become insecure. Thus, anyone can copy the information published
via the bulletin board and simply wait until the encryption system is broken in the
future. This may also compromise voter privacy in the long term if, for example,
encrypted votes are published next to the voters’ names.
Thus, if sensitive data is published negligently (or even well-intentioned and show-
ing awareness of the issue of verifiability), this may compromise confidentiality or
even privacy, though the latter may eventually be affected only in the long term.
Overall, verifiability is desirable only as far as privacy is not affected, and should
never allow for disclosing a voter’s voting decision (cf. [Pie08, Section 10.3] for a
different view).
114
10. Application
In this chapter we apply our results regarding secure and conclusive retention of elec-
tion data, which we established in Chapter 8 and 9, to the voting scheme [JCJ05]
proposed by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ). This protocol was the first one
to offer coercion-resistance: a voter cannot prove how he voted, and he cannot be
forced to abstain from voting, to cast a random vote, or to vote in a particular way
(see Sections 2.1.6 and 3.1). As we suppose that coercion-resistance is a mandatory
requirement for an online voting scheme to be used in parliamentary elections (com-
pare the legal requirement of free elections, see Section 8.1), we have selected the
JCJ scheme to demonstrate the applicability of our retention concepts established
for Federal Elections for the German Bundestag.
After the JCJ scheme was published in 2005, several proposals for improvements
followed [Smi05, WAB07, AFT07], of which only the last one preserved coercion-
resistance. However, as the improvements in [AFT07] only pertain to efficiency, they
are not relevant to our approach, and we stick to the original scheme [JCJ05]. We
investigate which records must be kept in order to meet the retention requirements
specified in Section 8.4, and which measures should be applied according to the
recommendations made in Section 9.4. An earlier version of this chapter has been
published in [15].
Chapter overview
First we describe the JCJ protocol in Section 10.1. In Section 10.2 we investigate
the records to be kept and the protective measures to be applied. The results are
discussed in Section 10.3.
10.1. Description of the JCJ scheme
The intuition behind the JCJ scheme [JCJ05] is the following: a potential adversary
does not learn whether the coerced voter complied with his demand. In effect, the
adversary thus has no possibility to coerce the voter. The voter’s identity remains
hidden during vote-casting, and validity of the ballots is verified by blind comparison
against the voters’ register. To this end, secret anonymous credentials are distributed
among the voters in registration phase. These credentials serve two purposes: they
are used to authenticate the voters, and mark a freely cast vote. If a voter wants the
vote he is about to cast to be accounted, he includes his valid credential; if not (due
to coercion), he attaches an invalid credential. The coercer is not able to distinguish
invalid credentials from valid ones and hence cannot know if the voter has complied
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with his demand. Since multiple voting is allowed, the voter can hereafter cast a
valid vote. In the end only the latest vote with a valid credential is accounted in the
tallying process.
In the following we explain the three phases of the protocol (i.e. registration, vot-
ing, and tallying phase) more thoroughly. The participants are voters, a registration
authority, and a distributed tallying authority. The registration authority is assumed
to be trustworthy; in particular, it must not leak credentials to an adversary [JCJ05].
For encryption, a modified version of ElGamal (see Section 2.2.1) is used throughout;
for details refer to [JCJ05]. Prior to the election, the key pair (SKT , PKT ) of the
tallying authority T is generated. Let EPKT (m) denote an encryption of message m
using the public key PKT .
Registration. Each eligible voter vi receives a unique valid credential σi from the
registration authority over an untappable channel. An encrypted version Si =
EPKT (σi) of each credential is published on the bulletin board. At the end of the
registration phase, the voters’ register L contains all valid encrypted credentials
alongside the plaintext names of registered voters, and is signed by the registration
authority.
Voting. The registration authority publishes an integrity-protected candidate list
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cnC} where each entry ci identifies a possible choice (that is, a
candidate or party). Using an anonymous channel, voter vi posts his ballot to the
bulletin board. Each ballot consists of the following components:
1. EPKT (cj), an encryption of the chosen candidate, hereafter referred to as the
encrypted vote
2. EPKT (σi), an encryption of the voter’s credential
3. a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (see Section 2.2.3) on cj ∈ C, proving
that the vote is cast for a valid candidate
4. a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of σi and cj
Voter vi encrypts his valid credential σi if he wants his vote to be accounted, oth-
erwise he encrypts a fake credential σ˜i. The proof that cj indeed marks a valid
candidate is necessary since casting write-in votes allows for coercion: the adversary
could force the voter to cast a vote containing a predetermined character string,
and subsequently verify whether the voter complied with his demand by checking
the bulletin board for this specific string. Knowledge of σi and cj must be proven
to prevent replay attacks performed by simply reencrypting votes that have already
been cast.
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Tallying.
1. Proof checking. Let B0 denote the list of all encrypted credentials that have
been used for ballot casting. The tallying authority first checks that all proofs
included in each ballot are correct. Ballots containing invalid proofs are dis-
carded. For the remaining ballots, let A1 denote the list of encrypted votes
and B1 the list of encrypted credentials.
2. Duplicate removal. The tallying authority removes ballots with credential dupli-
cates via pairwise plaintext equality tests (see Section 2.2.3). Only the latest
credentials in B1 are kept, resulting in a weeded list B2. The ciphertexts in
A1 which correspond to duplicate credentials (i.e. those with the same indices)
are also removed, resulting in a weeded list A2. Now there is no more than one
vote per given credential.
3. Mixing. The list of encrypted votes as well as the list of encrypted credentials is
processed by a reencryption mixnet (see Section 2.2.6) using the same, secret
permutation. The list of encrypted credentials contained in L is processed
through a reencryption mixnet as well, but using a different permutation. Let
A′2, B
′
2 and L
′ denote the mixed lists.
4. Validity checking. The credentials in B′2 are compared with the ones in L
′ via
pairwise plaintext equality test, eliminating those which do not correspond to
valid credentials in L′. The corresponding invalid votes in A′2 are eliminated as
well. Let A3 and B3 denote the final lists. These now correspond to authentic
ballots cast freely by eligible voters with at most one vote per voter.
5. Vote counting. The encrypted votes in A3 are jointly decrypted and tallied. The
tallying authority publishes a proof of correct decryption.
10.2. Records to be kept
We now investigate which records should be kept according to the implementation
proposals specified in Section 8.4, and which constraints and protective measures
should apply to these records according to the recommendations given in Section 9.4.
We follow the structure of Section 8.4.
10.2.1. Preparation phase
Prep1: Trustworthy entities
Prep1.1 The agreements and contracts documenting trustworthiness of staff
members, in particular registration and tallying authority, should be re-
tained in PDF/A format (see Section 9.4, R1.3). These records are con-
fidential as they contain personal information of the respective persons,
and should therefore only be accessible to designated election authorities
(see Section 9.4, R6.2).
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Prep1.2 The evaluation report should be signed by the certification authority
(see Section 9.4, R3.3) and retained.
Prep2: Proper installation and surroundings
Prep2.1 The JCJ scheme does not explicitly provide for a ballot box; the
ballots are cast by posting them to the bulletin board (see Section 10.1).
Therefore, documenting that the ballot box was empty before the voting
phase started amounts to documenting that the bulletin board did not
contain any ballots at that time. A copy of the contents of the bulletin
board provided with a qualified timestamp issued at the beginning of the
voting phase (see Section 9.4, R2.2) should therefore be retained.
Prep2.2 Not applicable (see Section 8.4.1).
Prep3: Closure of the voters’ register
The voters’ register L lists the names of the eligible voters and contains their
valid, encrypted credentials. It should be provided with a qualified timestamp
before the election starts (see Section 9.4, R2.1). The number of eligible voters
is determined by |L|, the length of list L. Since this list is a structured data
set, it should be generated and retained in XML format (see Section 9.4, R1.1),
and signed by the registration authority using XML signatures (see Section 9.4,
R1.2, R3.4a). This record is confidential as it contains personal information of
voters, and should therefore only be accessible to designated election authorities
(see Section 9.4, R6.2).
Prep4: Justified nomination of candidates
The candidate list C contains unique identifiers for the candidates and should
be retained since the identifiers are required to determine the election result
from the encrypted votes in list A3. If C does not list the names of the can-
didates, a document assigning the candidate identifiers to their names has to
be retained as well as the collection of supporting signatures for candidate
nominations. Each of these documents should be signed by the registration
authority (see Section 9.4, R3.4b). The collection of supporting signatures for
candidate nominations is confidential as it contains personal information of the
nominated candidates and the supporting voters, and should therefore only be
accessible to designated election authorities (see Section 9.4, R6.2).
10.2.2. Voting phase
Vote1: Special incidents
The log files of the system should be signed by an election authority (see
Section 9.4, R3.4d) and subsequently retained.
118
10.2. Records to be kept
Vote2: Different voting channels
i. List B3 in conjunction with the voters’ register L provides a record of
all voters who have cast a vote under a valid credential: B3 contains all
valid encrypted credentials that have been used for ballot casting, and
L contains the names of eligible voters alongside their valid, encrypted
credentials. Using plaintext equality tests, the names of voters who have
participated in the election using valid credentials can be figured out, as
well as their number. The resulting record should be signed by the tallying
authority and retained (see Section 9.4, R3.4c); it must be ensured that
it remains confidential as coercion-resistance would otherwise be compro-
mised (see also Section 9.4, R6.2). The number of voters who have only
cast ballots using invalid credentials cannot be determined: |B2| − |B3|
yields the number of ballots cast under invalid credentials; however, this
number may be greater than the number of voters who cast these ballots
due to the possibility of one voter using different invalid credentials. If
the total number of voters must be ascertainable, then the JCJ protocol
has to be adapted, for example by using predefined invalid credentials as
proposed in [MHEA08].
ii. Using plaintext equality tests as mentioned above, the names of voters
who have participated in the remote electronic election and used valid
credentials can be figured out, thus documenting the voters who cast
an online vote. The resulting record should be signed by the tallying
authority and retained (see Section 9.4, R3.4c) in a way such that its
confidentiality is ensured (see Section 9.4, R6.2).
Vote3: Secrecy of the vote
Vote3.1 Documenting that the content of the ballot was protected against
unauthorized inspection from the time the ballot was completed until the
end of the voting phase can be achieved by demonstrating that the key
pair (SKT , PKT ) has been generated securely (i.e. by a trusted third
party or using a secure key-generation protocol, see [JCJ05]). Accord-
ing documents should be retained. The certified trustworthiness of the
tallying authority (see Section 10.2.1, Prep1.1) completes this record.
Vote3.2 The JCJ protocol is not designed for providing voter declarations of
having voted personally. Such declarations could be introduced as another
part of the ballot (besides encrypted vote and zero-knowledge proofs), but
have to be anonymous in order to preserve coercion-resistance. Ballots of
voters who have not provided this declaration could then be sorted out in
tallying phase.
Vote4: Proper termination of the poll
i. Timely termination of the poll is documented by retaining the log files
(see Vote1, Vote5). Additionally, a copy of the contents of the bulletin
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board which has been provided with a qualified timestamp issued at the
end of the voting phase should be retained (see Section 9.4, R2.3).
ii. Having notified voters about the upcoming end of the voting phase is
documented by retaining the log files (see Vote1, Vote5).
Vote5: Public conduct of the poll
The log files of the system should be signed by an election authority (see
Section 9.4, R3.4d) and subsequently retained.
10.2.3. Evaluation phase
Eval1: Repeated, independent tallying
Since having the ballots recounted by an independent third party is not possible
due to the secret keys required, the ballots should be recounted using a different
tallying routine. Note that recounting the votes requires running through all
five phases according to Section 10.1. The results should be signed by the
tallying authority and retained (see Section 9.4, R3.4h).
Eval2: Public conduct of the tally
i. A validating authority confirming authenticity of the votes by signing
them is not provided by the JCJ protocol. Therefore, recommendation
R3.1 (see Section 9.4) cannot be applied. According to R3.2, the ballots
should thus be signed. As this cannot be provided by the voters themselves
(recall that coercion-resistance requires their identity to remain hidden
during the election process), the collection of received ballots should be
signed by the tallying authority and retained (see Section 9.4, R3.4e).
The total N of received ballots1 is determined by this record. The ballots
are a structured data set and, thus, should be generated and retained in
XML format (see Section 9.4, R1.1). XML signatures should be used to
sign the received ballots (see Section 9.4, R1.2).
ii. The proofs of correct decryption should be signed by the tallying authority
and retained (see Section 9.4, R3.4f).
iii. The election result and the number of valid and invalid ballots should be
documented, signed by the tallying authority, and subsequently retained
(see Section 9.4, R3.4g). Note that a ballot2 can be invalid due to one or
more of the following reasons:
1Note that this value includes multiple ballots cast by voters under both valid and invalid creden-
tials.
2As mentioned in Section 10.1, for the JCJ scheme to remain coercion-resistant, it is excluded that
voters cast write-in votes, which means that they vote for candidates that are not listed in C.
This implies that voters cannot cast invalid votes, that is, ballots which have been invalidated
by an illegal vote and not by using an invalid credential or providing invalid proofs.
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– it contains an invalid proof (this holds for N − |B1| ballots, see stage
1 of the tallying phase)
– it has been cast under a valid credential which was later on reused
to vote, thus invalidating the previously cast ballot (this holds for
|B1| − |B2| ballots, see stage 2 of the tallying phase)
– it was cast under an invalid credential (this holds for |B2| − |B3|
ballots, see stage 4 of the tallying phase)
Thus, there are N − |B3| invalid ballots. Note that documenting the
retrieval of the election result includes retaining ballots that have been
declared invalid. Thus, ballots that have been sorted out due to invalid
proofs, duplicate credentials or invalid credentials (see stage 1-3 of the
tallying phase) must not be discarded, but rather retained and just elim-
inated from the tally. The proofs of knowledge of the tallied votes should
be kept as well. List B3 contains the valid, unique credentials under which
votes have been cast; it should be retained as it must be verifiable that
only eligible voters (i.e. those listed in the voters’ register L) have cast a
ballot.
Other measures to be taken with regard to privacy
In accordance with our recommendation R5.4 (see Section 9.4), the JCJ scheme does
not timestamp the ballots, but rather refers to the order in which the ballots were
posted to the bulletin board for determining the order of the received ballots. The se-
cret key of the tallying authority should be securely retained for two months (i.e. the
period in which the election may be challenged by the public, cf. § 2 (2, 4) WPru¨fG)
and permanently deleted hereafter in order to protect voter privacy (see Section 9.4,
R5.2). Since the tallying authority is distributed (see Section 10.1), according dele-
tion policies must be enforced for each trustee. Any residual information linking the
voter to his vote must be deleted (see Section 9.4, R5.3): the voter must permanently
delete any local copies of the credential which he obtained from the registration au-
thority, and the mixnet must permanently delete the secret permutations used for
the mixing procedures in tallying phase, as well as the randomization values used to
reencrypt the messages. In the unlikely event that the election result allows inference
on the voting decision of individual voters, according measures must be applied to
protect voter privacy (see Section 9.4, R5.5).
After the election has terminated, authentication data referring to the identity of
the voter must no longer be linkable to ballot data containing the vote (see Sec-
tion 9.4, R5.1). This is not fulfilled by the JCJ scheme: the protocol provides for
publishing the list L of encrypted credentials alongside the voter names on the bul-
letin board. The list of all received ballots, consisting of encrypted vote, encrypted
credential and zero-knowledge proofs, is published as well (see Section 10.1). Hence,
via L, the voter is linked to the encrypted credential, and, via the ballot, the en-
crypted credential used for vote-casting is linked to the encrypted vote. It follows
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that, should the encryption scheme be broken in the long term, voter and vote can
be linked. In Section 10.3 we propose how to improve the protocol in this regard.
Other measures to be taken with regard to integrity, authenticity, and
confidentiality
Any of the records retained should be kept on non-rewritable, portable storage media
and stored in a secure location; a duplicate of each record shall be kept in a different
place (see Section 9.4, R2.4). The records which are public should be posted to
the bulletin board for at least two months after the poll (see Section 9.4, R6.1).
The confidential records should only be accessible to election authorities and official
election observers. Therefore, these records should be protected by either encrypting
them or by implementing access control within the archiving system (see Section 9.4,
R6.2). Moreover, anyone who has access to election records containing personal data
must be informed on his duty not to use this data for any purpose other than specified
by electoral law (cf. § 89 (2, 3) BWO), i.e. election statistics, scrutiny procedures or in
case an election fraud according to § 107 and § 108 StGB is suspected (see Section 9.4,
R6.3). Timely signature renewal must be taken care of for any signatures issued
(see Section 9.4, R3.5).
10.3. Discussion
In this chapter we investigated which of the data occurring in an online election
based on the protocol [JCJ05] must be retained according to the implementation
proposals given in Chapter 8, and how the protective measures derived in Chapter 9
can be applied to the protocol. We have seen that
– retaining no more than the data generated by the protocol is not sufficient to
meet legal retention requirements. For example, secure generation of the key
pair (SKT , PKT ) must be documented;
– retaining records generated by the protocol in their original condition lacks
sufficient probative value. For example, according to the protocol, no record
besides the voters’ register L is to be signed by an election authority. Thus,
additional protective measures as proposed in Section 9.4 have to be taken;
and
– retaining any data occurring during the online election is even dangerous since
this may compromise voter privacy. For example, the randomization values
and the permutation used by the reencryption mixnet could be exploited to
reconstruct the mixing of the ballots in tallying phase.
In order to maintain voter privacy in the long term, we propose that the valid
encrypted credentials should not be published alongside the voters’ plaintext names
(cf. Section 8.4.2, Vote3). We recommend to detach the two parts of list L and
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scramble them already in the registration phase in order to hide the relation between
the voter and the encrypted credential. Alternatively, the plaintext names of voters
should not be published at all (cf. Section 8.4.1, Prep3, and Section 9.4, R6.2): the
voter can see the anonymized list of encrypted credentials published on the bulletin
board; additionally, he can be assured by obtaining a proof from the registrars that
the encryption of his credential is valid and contained in this list. However, this
approach cannot save receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance in the long term as
the adversary learns the valid credentials if the encryption is broken and, thus, can
tell whether he has obtained a valid or a fake credential from the coerced voter.
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Chapter overview
This chapter concludes the thesis at hand by providing a summary for each Part I
and II, recapitulating the contributions made, and considering future work.
Part I: A Taxonomy for Privacy and Verifiability in Electronic Voting
The first part of this thesis aimed at answering the following research question:
Which levels of privacy and verifiability are conceivable in electronic vot-
ing, and how are both properties related?
We addressed this question by first reviewing existing definitions of privacy and ver-
ifiability and considering related work in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we provided an
intuitive model which captures both privacy and verifiability and allows to express
both properties in terms of (un)linkability, thus clarifying the relation between the
two. Also in Chapter 4, we introduced different levels of privacy and verifiability.
Our research question was thus answered in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 we considered
different adversary capabilities and how they can be exploited to mount attacks on
privacy and verifiability. The adversary capabilities constitute building blocks which
can be combined in order to obtain the desired adversary model. Together, these
three components (i.e. the (un)linkability model, the privacy and verifiability levels,
and the adversary capabilities) establish our taxonomy for privacy and verifiability
in electronic voting. The taxonomy can be used for analyzing the security of existing
voting schemes, which we have done in Chapter 6, thus demonstrating the appli-
cability of the taxonomy. Our analysis showed that, depending on the adversary
capabilities assumed, different levels of privacy and verifiability and, thus, different
forms of (un)linkability are provided.
The value of the (un)linkability model lies in the unification of seemingly different
properties under a common terminology, enabling a clear visual representation of
privacy and verifiability. Moreover, the model allows to define precisely the notions
cast-as-intended, counted-as-cast, recorded-as-cast and counted-as-recorded, which
are not accurate by themselves. The levels of privacy and verifiability demonstrate
the different facets of both properties. Together with the (un)linkability model, they
contribute to a deeper understanding of privacy and verifiability and their correlation
in electronic voting. Moreover, the compilation of the different levels of privacy and
verifiability allows to select appropriate levels for different types of elections, and the
adversary capabilities enable designing voting systems for particular environments,
where the stakes of the election determine what kind of adversary model should be
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assumed. Consequently, the question arises which privacy and verifiability levels and
what adversary models are suitable for which election type. However, answering this
question is beyond the scope of this thesis as it involves a long process of decision-
making.
When investigating the levels of privacy in Section 4.3, we did not consider prob-
abilistic privacy [DPP07]: even if an adversary cannot link voter and vote with
absolute certainty, it is still not desirable that there is a high probability that a voter
cast a specific vote. The suitability of this approach for voting is limited as the
outcome of an election is directly related to the probabilities of voters having voted
in a certain way [Pie08]. However, it may still be considered future work to extend
the taxonomy by the concept of probabilistic privacy. Similarly, one could define
sublevels of universal verifiability depending on whether verification is probabilistic
or not:
Absolute accuracy verifiability. There is a proof of the correct processing of
the ballots in tallying phase, i.e. absolute assurance is provided.
Probabilistic accuracy verifiability. There is evidence of the correct process-
ing of the ballots in tallying phase, i.e. probabilistic assurance with a certain
probability p < 1 is provided.
Such a differentiation would allow for a classification of the techniques employed to
achieve verifiability. We consider this to be future work.
Part II: Long-Term Verifiability: Legal Issues and Technical Implications
The second part of this thesis aimed at answering the following research question:
Which records of a remote electronic election should be retained, and
which protective measures should be applied?
We addressed this question by first providing background information on long-term
retention of election data, presenting related work, and explaining the methodology
in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8, we answered the first part of our research question by
identifying the records to be retained after an online election has been carried out. To
this end, we abstracted from legal retention obligations on paper-based elections and
derived retention requirements for online elections using an approved method named
KORA. In Chapter 9, we identified any constraints which apply to the record keeping,
and used KORA to derive according technical measures for secure and conclusive
retention of electronic election data, thus answering the second part of our research
question. In Chapter 10 we applied our results to [JCJ05], a state-of-the-art voting
scheme. We investigated which of the data generated by (or in addition to) the
protocol must be retained in order to meet the requirements identified in Chapter 8,
and which measures should be applied according to the recommendations made in
Chapter 9. We also proposed how to improve the protocol with respect to long-term
voter privacy.
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Establishing Internet voting in parliamentary elections presupposes that its tech-
nical implementation meets certain legal requirements, and conclusive retention of
election data is one of them. Thus, our work contributes to laying the basis for
legally binding online voting on a parliamentary level in Germany. As electoral law
in Europe is rather consistent, other countries may benefit from this as well. Fur-
thermore, our work is valuable for developing legally compliant electronic voting
systems as the need for record keeping should be considered already when designing
and implementing a remote electronic voting protocol.
In Chapter 8 we have seen that, in an online election, it is not possible to fully
comply with the legal principles of secrecy and freedom of vote. This is due to
the fact that the scenario of remote electronic voting does not allow unobserved
polling to be enforced by any supervisory authority. Moreover, as the poll cannot
be physically observed, it is particularly challenging to establish and to document
the public conduct of an online election. Both disadvantages apply also to absentee
voting, a voting channel which is well-established in Germany. It was introduced in
the 1957 Federal Election and has ever since become widely used. Between 1990 and
2009, the absentee voter turnout (i.e. the number of absentee voters divided by the
total number of participating voters) increased from 9.4% to 21.4% [Bun] (see also
Table 11.1).
Table 11.1.: Absentee voter turnout in Federal Elections since 1990 [Bun]
1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009
9.4% 13.4% 16.0% 18.0% 18.7% 21.4%
The option of absentee voting was introduced in order to strengthen the universal-
ity of elections at the expense of secrecy and public conduct [BR09]. Online voting
happens in uncontrolled environments as well and is therefore comparable to absen-
tee voting. In both scenarios, secrecy in terms of unobserved polling must be taken
care of by the voter himself. With regard to the principle of public elections, however,
remote electronic voting has an advantage over absentee voting by offering a different
kind of transparency which cannot be established even in a conventional paper-based
election: anyone can verify that the ballots have been correctly processed and tallied,
usually on the basis of mathematical proofs. These are less intuitive, but provide
much stronger evidence of the proper conduct of the election than simply observing
the Electoral Board counting the votes manually. Although such verification meth-
ods are not understandable to the general public, they can substantially help experts
to verify that the election has been duly performed.
Contrary to that, the Federal Constitutional Court has judged that each citizen
must be able to comprehend the essential steps of the election without having ex-
pert knowledge (see [Fed09a], margin number 109). However, this judgment refers
to voting in the controlled environment of polling stations using voting machines.
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Therefore, it does not fully apply to remote electronic voting in uncontrolled envi-
ronments as the public conduct is traded off for universality in this case. In fact,
the Court’s press release states that “all essential steps of an election are subject
to the possibility of public scrutiny unless other constitutional interests justify an
exception” [Fed09b]. Introducing remote electronic voting as an additional voting
channel in parliamentary elections accommodates voters’ needs in a mobile society
and provides an opportunity to increase voter turnout, which is a constitutional in-
terest. It is, however, highly desirable to provide easily comprehensible verification
methods in order to reach as many people as possible. The question how to reconcile
verifiability and usability is, in fact, a major open problem in electronic voting.
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Acronyms
BDSG Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Federal Data Protection Law)
BSI Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Federal Office
for Information Security)
BWG Bundeswahlgesetz (Federal Electoral Law)
BWO Bundeswahlordnung (Federal Electoral Regulations)
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
DFG Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation)
DOMEA Dokumenten-Management und elektronische Archivierung
(Document Management and Electronic Archiving)
ERS Evidence Record Syntax
GG Grundgesetz (German Constitutional Law)
GI Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik (German Informatics Society)
InterPARES International Research on Permanent Authentic Records in
Electronic Systems
KORA Konkretisierung rechtlicher Anforderungen (Implementation of Legal
Requirements)
NESTOR Network of Expertise in Long-Term Storage of Digital Resources
SGB Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Security Code)
SigG Signaturgesetz (Signature Law)
SigV Signaturverordnung (Signature Ordinance)
StGB Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code)
UrhG Urheberrechtsgesetz (German Copyright Act)
WPruefG Wahlpru¨fungsgesetz (Law on the Scrutiny of Elections)
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